University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2015

Essays on Multiple Selves and Temporal Framing
Rudolph Henkel
University of Pennsylvania, rudyhenkel@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Economic Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Henkel, Rudolph, "Essays on Multiple Selves and Temporal Framing" (2015). Publicly Accessible Penn
Dissertations. 1758.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1758

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1758
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Essays on Multiple Selves and Temporal Framing
Abstract
There exist numerous documented behavioral deviations from standard discounted utility maximizing
behavior. These include time inconsistency, violations of the axiom of independence of irrelevant
alternatives, preferences for commitment, and preferences over the timing of information. I develop two
novel models which provide new insights into, and plausible explanations for, several of these deviations.
In the first model, Multiself Bargaining, I propose a dual-self model in which two selves have conflicting
preferences over the action to be taken by an agent. The selves have identical payoff utility, and only differ
in their time preference factor. The default action of the agent is modeled as the outcome of a Tullock
contest among the selves, where the self who wins chooses their preferred action. Viewing the outcome
of this contest as the point of disagreement, the selves are allowed to negotiate to a mutually preferred
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model, Temporal Reference Points, I develop an alternate form of prospect evaluation in which agents
form a set of subjectively important points in time in the life of a prospect, termed “temporal reference
points.” When determining the present value of a prospect, agents discount based on the time between
each of these temporal reference points, as opposed to based on the entire time between the present and
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MULTIPLE SELVES AND TEMPORAL FRAMING
Rudy Henkel

David Dillenberger

Mallesh Pai

There exist numerous documented behavioral deviations from standard discounted utility maximizing behavior. These include time inconsistency, violations of the axiom of independence of irrelevant
alternatives, preferences for commitment, and preferences over the timing of information. I develop
two novel models which provide new insights into, and plausible explanations for, several of these
deviations. In the rst model, Multiself Bargaining, I propose a dual-self model in which two selves
have conicting preferences over the action to be taken by an agent. The selves have identical payo
utility, and only dier in their time preference factor. The default action of the agent is modeled as
the outcome of a Tullock contest among the selves, where the self who wins chooses their preferred
action. Viewing the outcome of this contest as the point of disagreement, the selves are allowed to
negotiate to a mutually preferred outcome, and this negotiation is modeled as a Nash bargaining
problem. I show that many of the deviations of interest are generated by this model, including time
inconsistent behavior, such as diminishing impatience, as well as violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives in choice problems. Notably the preference reversals from time inconsistency are
smooth, as opposed to the singular reversal in quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the standard model
used in the literature. In the second model, Temporal Reference Points, I develop an alternate form
of prospect evaluation in which agents form a set of subjectively important points in time in the
life of a prospect, termed temporal reference points.

When determining the present value of a

prospect, agents discount based on the time between each of these temporal reference points, as
opposed to based on the entire time between the present and the payout of the prospect. Under
restrictions on the formation of temporal reference points, diminishing impatience in an agent is
shown to be equivalent to a preference for informational updates occurring at the same time. Finally, the model is shown to allow the novel resolution of an apparent conict in the experimental
evidence on diminishing impatience.
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Part I

Multiself Bargaining
The idea of self-control is paradoxical unless it is assumed that the psyche contains more
than one energy system, and that these energy systems have some degree of independence
from each other. (Donald McIntosh, The Foundations of Human Society, 1969)

1 Introduction
The observable behavior of decision making agents includes a number of ubiquitous eects not
consistent with the predictions of standard utility maximization with geometric time discounting.
Among these, agents exhibit time inconsistency; specically, they have reversals of preference when
outcomes are mutually delayed. Agents exhibit violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives
in choice problems; in general, their decision may depend on the entire choice set, and they may be
tempted toward an option that they yet do not choose. Related to both of these, agents seek out
commitment devices, whether to prevent preference reversals, or to remove temptations, even when
such devices are costly.
That an individual might contain conicting internal preferences is certainly one potential cause
of these phenomena. One strand of work in neurology views the brain as operating with a team
of rivals architecture, wherein dierent sections of the brain compete with each other directly for
control over the actions of the individual, e.g. Eagleman (2011). Some MRI evidence is consistent
with the notion that decisions made with dierent time horizons engage very dierent areas of the
brain, e.g. McClure et al. (2004). Threads of research in psychology also address the idea of conict
between multiple selves, e.g. Ainslie (1986).
Without laying claim to being a model of the brain, which it is not, this work has the goal of
formalizing this neurological inspiration in order to account for the described empirical regularities
in behavior.

I do this through the use of a novel dual-self  model.

The model gives rise to a

smooth form of time inconsistency, which has the same qualitative implications as hyperbolic time
discounting. It further generates a two-sided temptation eect, in which unchosen alternatives alter
the decisions of the agent. The model additionally predicts the use of costly commitment devices by
the agent, provides strong intuition about the nature of these phenomena, and provides some novel
insight into welfare evaluation.
I model an individual decision maker, or agent, as consisting of two selves:
one impatient.

one patient and

The selves are taken to share the same payo utility, and each discounts time

1

geometrically, but they dier in their time discount factor. Thus, while they agree on the immediate
utility granted by a decision, such as which avor of ice cream is the most delicious, they will in
general disagree with regard to decisions which have consequences over time, such as whether it is a
good idea to eat the ice cream. If the selves cannot agree on what action to take, it is assumed that
they engage in a costly conict over control of the action, modeled as a variant on a Tullock (1980)
rent-seeking game.

1

The self that wins the conict then chooses their most preferred action.

I allow the selves to negotiate in order to select an action mutually preferred to this costly
conict; this negotiation is modeled as a Nash bargaining problem. The bargaining set is the set
of possible utility vectors created by available actions, or lotteries over actions, and the outcome
of the costly conict is treated as the disagreement point for the bargaining. Thus, in equilibrium,
the costly conict will not occur, as the selves will negotiate to a better outcome. This bargaining
can result in either a deterministic choice in some applications, such as consumption-savings, or
an agreed upon mixing between discrete choices in some discrete menu choice applications; both of
these are addressed. Section 2 details the model in full.
The rst empirical regularity, addressed in Section 3, is diminishing impatience. This is a particular form of time inconsistent preference reversal, where as the consequences of a decision are
pushed into the future, an individual's choices exhibit less impatience regarding the outcome. As a
simple example, an individual given the choice between $100 today and $120 tomorrow may choose
the $100 today, but when presented with the choice between $100 in seven days and $120 in eight
days may switch, and now desire to wait the extra day for the greater reward. As another example,
an individual may desire to save a large portion of his next paycheck for retirement; however, when
payday arrives, he may change his mind when faced with the immediate reality of reducing his consumption. Proposition 1 establishes that the multiself bargaining model reects a smooth form of
diminishing impatience. In discrete decisions, as payos at dierent times are both pushed into the
future, the observed patience of the agent increases continuously, in that they choose latter rewards
with continuously increasing probability.

For continuous decisions, such as consumption-savings,

the model predicts that their decision reects greater patience as the decision is made farther in
advance, such as through a higher savings rate.
The empirical evidence for diminishing impatience is broad, and spans disciplines, seeing particular interest in psychology and economics; e.g.

Thaler (1981), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992),

Kirby and Herrenstein (1995), Frederick et al. (2002), Fang and Silverman (2009). Many models
attempt to incorporate the phenomenon by utilizing forms of time discounting other than geometric. Evidence, e.g. Ainslie (1992) and Myerson and Green (1995), suggests that the form of time
discounting reected in the decisions of agents is well t by hyperbolic discounting, in which the

1 Also

used by Benabou and Pycia (2002).

2

discount factor falls steeply at rst, but then less rapidly.

2

Consumption data is shown by some

work, e.g. Angeletos et al. (2001), to be much better t by hyperbolic models than exponential.
The most commonly used model of diminishing impatience, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, also referred to as beta-delta, was introduced by Laibson (1997). Quasi-hyperbolic discounting amounts
to having one time discount factor between the current period and the next period, and a second,
higher, time discount factor for evaluating between all periods thereafter. The diculty with such
an approach is that it allows only a discontinuous form of diminishing impatience: a stark division
between now and later extremely sensitive to the precise denition of the length of a period. One
advantage of the multiself bargaining model is that the form of diminishing impatience it creates
more closely reects hyperbolic than quasi-hyperbolic discounting, avoiding this discontinuity and
period sensitivity.
The tendency of agents to utilize costly commitment actions is addressed in Section 4.

Evi-

dence for the use of commitment options includes voluntary intermediate deadlines, e.g. Ariely and
Wertenbroch (2002), Kaur et al.

(2009), and savings pre-commitment, e.g.

Thaler and Benartzi

(2004). In many cases these options are a priori inecient, as the same choices can be made without the costly commitment device. Individuals now make use of smart phone apps which impose
nancial penalties for not going to the gym, for example. As we are dealing with preference aggregation, and not a single set of preferences, the model cannot easily address a true preference for
commitment, and commitment options cannot benet both selves in this model. However, we can
speak of what the model implies about the behavior of the agent. Proposition 2 establishes that
for suciently low, but positive, commitment cost, agents will make use of commitment devices to
commit to specic actions in advance with strictly positive probability. Further, under a broad set
of conditions, this probability will be 1. Intuitively, this arises from the fact that the patient self
has greater foresight when making decisions further in advance, and this foresight places that self in
a better position for bargaining; the commitment device then allows the patient self the ability to
lock in that superior position. Proposition 3 establishes conditions under which the same result will
hold when commitment devices for minimal (or maximal) actions are available, such as a minimum
amount of savings.
The eects of tempting options on choices is addressed in Section 5. Temptation here is used
to refer to cases where the addition of an option to a choice set alters the decision made by the
individual, even when the new option is not chosen; in other words, a violation of independence of
irrelevant alternatives. This is documented in choices from discrete sets, as well as in consumptionsavings decisions, e.g.

Hanks et al.

(2012), Ashraf et al.

(2006), Huang et al.

(2013).

Existing

literature on temptation primarily relies on choices being assigned some explicit temptation, or self-

2 Specically,

under generalized hyperbolic discounting, a reward in

3

t

time is discounted by

(1 + αt)−(γ/α) .

control value, e.g.

Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).

The agent is taken to have a limited, or costly,

capacity to resist such temptations. In contrast with this literature, in this model temptation eects
will arise endogenously from the diering utility evaluations of the selves, which in turn result from
their diering time preference. Proposition 4 establishes that when the utility granted to a self by
their most preferred action increases, the agent will choose an action, or lottery, that grants that
self a higher expected utility, even if this most preferred action is an irrelevant alternative.
However, the overall temptation eect of an action will be shown to depend on how much the
option is valued by both selves. If the preferred action of the short-term self is regarded as particularly
awful by the long-term self, such as a very unhealthy dessert choice, then the anticipated eort the
long-term self exerts in conict increases.

Proposition 5 examines how the utility granted to the

long-term self by the short-term self 's preferred action inuences the outcome, establishing a cuto
which determines the way in which changes to this utility move the action chosen by the agent. The
implications of Propositions 4 and 5 are then combined to characterize the net eect of the addition
of a new option to an existing choice set.
Section 6 investigates the implications of the model for welfare evaluation, with the primary
insight being that while the model is more limiting than the classic model for welfare evaluation,
we can recapture much that is lost by models that use non-geometric time discounting.

This is

accomplished by viewing the selves as individuals for the purposes of examining welfare, so that
we can evaluate policies from the standpoint of how they aect the welfare of both selves. Utility
aggregation methods are considered, and several results are established for a weighted utility welfare
function. Notably, commitment devices are argued to be welfare improving for suciently long time
horizons.
Section 7 discusses extensions and alterations to the model, and concludes. Extensions discussed
include variations on the conict game, the robustness of the model to other methods of bargaining
between selves, and varying the preferences of the selves along dimensions other than time preference.

4

2 The Model
2.1 Decision Problem and Notation
Time is continuous, but there are a nite number of discrete times
decisions are made and payos received, with
referred to as decision

n.

ρl ,

time discount rates satisfy
self is larger.

3

where

The decision made at time

tn

is

An agent is assumed to consist of two selves. Both selves share an identical

utility function over payos,
to as long-term with

∆n = tn+1 − tn ≥ 0.

t1 = 0, t2 , t3 ... tN ,

u(·);

ρ.

they dier only in their time discount rate,

and one is referred to as short-term with

ρs > ρl > 0;

ρs .

One self is referred

It is assumed that these

note that this means the discount factor of the long-term

The choice of continuous time here allows for ease in comparative statics exercises to follow, but
as utility is not evaluated continuously, the model should conceptually be thought of as consisting
of discrete periods with varying period lengths. In particular, for xed intervals,

∆N −1 = ∆,

∆1 = ∆2 = ... =

the model becomes analogous to a standard discrete model, with time discount factors

given by

βl = e−∆ρl > βs = e−∆ρs .
The actions available to the agent at decision

n

are given by action set

An ; An

is assumed to

either be a discrete choice set, or a compact Euclidean space. The set of lotteries over actions is
given by

An .

At each decision point the agent must select one lottery over actions

history of realized actions up to decision
therefore

n

An , may depend on this history.

be given by

hn = {a1 , a2 , ... an−1 }.

αn ∈ An .

In general,

Let the

An ,

and

In addition to its eect on future action sets, each realized

action grants some payo vector, and the corresponding payo utility is denoted

u(at ).4

Each self

evaluates their own welfare using standard expected utility with geometric time discounting, so that
the time

0

discounted utility of a realized action stream

n
X

a1 , a2 , ... an

to self

i

is given by

e−ρi tj u(aj ).

j=1
Every lottery

αn

at decision

n creates an expectation over realized actions, and thus an expected

payo utility, given by

Eαn [u(an )].
3 For ρ = ρ the model coincides with standard expected
s
l
4 A payo occurring at a time where there is no decision

utility with geometric discounting.
to be made can be modeled as resulting from a trivial

decision from a singleton action set. In this way, the model can accommodate streams of payos resulting from single
actions, either by modeling the future payos as resulting from degenerate decisions, or by altering future action sets
to accomodate the changed payos. Implicitly, the history of actions acts as a state variable.

5

The decision procedure employed by the agent will be described recursively. Consider the decision
made at time

tN .

As there are no future decisions, the concern of the selves is focused entirely on

the payo utility derived from the possible actions. As the selves agree on payo utility, they agree
on rankings of lotteries for this nal decision. Thus, the lottery chosen is simply

D(AN (hN )) = arg
where
self

i

D(AN (hN ))

Now consider decision

the future history,

N -1,

αN −1

hN .

EαN [u(aN )],

indicates the decision made from lottery set

derives from this decision at time

Each possible lottery

max

αN ∈AN (hN )

at time

tN

will be denoted

tN −1 ,

AN (hN ).5

The expected utility

Ui,N (D(AN (hN )), hN ).

where the lottery is being selected from

AN −1 (hN −1 ).

creates not only an expected payo utility but also an expectation over

This future history in turn inuences the future action set, which inuences

the future decision made, and therefore the future utility. Specically, the discounted utility to self

i

at time

N -1

from lottery

αN −1

is given by

Ui,N −1 (αN −1 , hN −1 ) =


EαN −1 u(aN −1 ) + e−ρi ∆N −1 (Ui,N (D(AN ({hN −1 , aN −1 })), {hN −1 , aN −1 })) .
This utility will also be denoted as
of payo utility,

u(aN −1 ),

Ui (αN −1 )

to conserve notation; it consists of the expectation

as well as the expected discounted future utility. Note that

is the future history, and the expectation is over what value

aN −1

{hN −1 , aN −1 }

will take. Essentially, the selves

are (correctly) projecting the action that will be taken at the nal decision point based on the action
taken today, and discounting the utility they will receive from that action based on the time dierence
between the current decision and the latter one,

∆N −1 .

Note that this implies the assumption of

sophistication of the selves. Now, in contrast to the nal decision, due to the diering discount rates,
the selves do not agree on the ranking for this decision, and generally may prefer dierent lotteries.
Each lottery

αN −1

valuation. Denote by
will be abbreviated

creates a utility vector

UN −1 (AN −1 , hN −1 )

UN −1 .

(Us (αN −1 ), Ul (αN −1 )),

as determined by the above

the set of all such utility vectors for decision

Since the choices are lotteries over actions,

UN −1

N -1,

which

will be a convex set.

A conict/bargaining procedure, described in the next two subsections, is used to select a single
utility vector from

UN −1 ,

and the lottery chosen by the agent is the one corresponding to that

utility vector. These steps can then be applied recursively backward, as the selves can now project
the lottery chosen at decision

N -1,

and so on. The utility of lottery

αn

to self

i

at time

tn

is


Ui,n (αn , hn ) = Eαn u(an ) + e−ρi ∆n [Ui,n+1 (D(An+1 (hn+1 )), hn+1 )] .
5 In

the non-generic case where

arg

is multi-valued here, the agent is indierent between its elements, and the

model is agnostic about the lottery chosen from among them.

However, as will be seen this indierence does not

impact the recursive decision procedure for earlier decisions, which is only dependent on the utility to each self.

6

This is not a Bellman equation.
selves, not just self

i,

D

is a decision process depending on the utility values of both

thus it cannot be expressed as an optimization decision made by self

i.

2.2 Conict
Now we turn to describing the procedure by which the agent selects an action when the selves do not

6

agree.

Consider decision

by the lotteries in

An .

n

tn ,

made at time

and corresponding set of utility vectors,

First, note that each self will have a bliss action in

7

grants them the highest discounted utility.

An :

Un ,

created

the action which

This bliss action is given by

bin = arg max Ui (an ).
an ∈An

These bliss actions induce a pair of bliss points in

Un ,

given by:

(Us (bsn ), Ul (bsn )) ≡ (Xns , Yns ), (Us (bln ), Ul (bln )) ≡ (Xnl , Ynl ).
Thus,

Xnl

represents the discounted expected utility granted to the short-term self by the bliss

action of the long-term self. Finally, we dene

Sn ≡ Xns − Xnl ; Ln ≡ Ynl − Yns .
Sn ,

for example, is the non-negative dierence in utilities that the short-term self will receive from

the two bliss points. Figure 1 illustrates these terms.

Ul

U(bl)

L

S

U(bs)

Us

Figure 1: Utility vector set U with bliss points, bl and bs .
6 If

they do agree, the result of the procedure coincides with the mutually preferred lottery, and so need not be

viewed as a special case.

7 Usually,

there will only be one such action. It is possible, however, that a self may have multiple best actions,

granting the same maximum discounted expected utility; in most applications this will be a non-generic occurrence.
In this case, the model requires a single bliss action to be selected from among these actions, but is agnostic about
which; while the specic outcome that will result in this special case will depend on which bliss point is selected, the
general results of the model do not depend on the selection method.

7

If the selves cannot agree on what action or lottery to take, it is assumed that the selves will
engage in a conict modeled as a slight variant of the Tullock (1980) rent-seeking game.
selves simultaneously commit to an eort choice

ei .

8

First, the

Second, the winner is determined based on the

eort choices. The probability that the short-term self is the winner is given by

p≡



1,



with

0 ≤ γ.

if es = el = 0

2

eγ
s
γ
eγ
s +el

,

otherwise,

Third, the winner selects the action taken by the agent. Naturally, the self that wins

will select their own bliss action. Considering potential equilibria of this conict game, note that

es = el = 0

is not one, as both selves would have incentive to exert marginal eort.

es

short-term self selects

to maximize:

eγs

Lemma 1.

Given

Thus, the

eγl
eγs
s
X l − es .
γ Xn + γ
+ el
es + eγl n

Sn > 0, Ln > 0, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1,

the conict game at decision

n

has a unique Nash

equilibrium given by:

e∗s,n =

γ
γLγ+1
Snγ
γLγn Snγ+1
n Sn
∗
∗
.
γ 2 , el,n =
γ 2 , pn =
γ
γ
γ
(Sn + Ln )
(Sn + Ln )
Sn + Lγn

This creates an expected utility vector for the selves given by



Proof:

Xnl

Lγ+1 (Lγn + (1 − γ)Snγ )
S γ+1 (Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn )
, Yns + n
+ n
γ 2
γ
(Sn + Ln )
(Snγ + Lγn )2


.

Proofs of all results not given in text are in Appendix A.

To ensure uniqueness, we will restrict attention to

0≤γ≤1

in the conict game.

9

2.3 Bargaining
The model allows the selves to negotiate to an option mutually preferred by the selves to the outcome
of the conict. This is modeled as a Nash bargaining problem, using the set of utility vectors,

Un ,

as the bargaining set, and the equilibrium of the conict game as the disagreement point.

8 The

variance is that in the classic Tullock game the players are competing for an equal prize; in this application

the prize - control over the action of the agent - has dierent values for the two players.

9 This

is dierent from the standard Tullock requirement of

value

8

0≤γ≤2

precisely because of the homogeneous prize

For the remainder of the paper, I will add the cost of eort from the conict game back into the
disagreement point, leaving the disagreement point as a simple mixing between the utility vectors
induced by the two bliss actions. This step will allow for cleaner intuition and understanding: the
actual payment of the cost of eort in the conict game is not the source of any interesting behavior
in the model. The qualitative nature of the results are not changed by this step, and where relevant

10

both disagreement points are shown to yield the same result in the proofs.

This gives a simpler

form to the disagreement point derived from the conict game, now given by

dn = (ds,n , dl,n ) =

p∗n Xns

+ (1 −

p∗n )Xnl ,

p∗n Yns

+ (1 −

p∗n )Ynl




= Xnl +

Lγ+1
Snγ+1
n
s
γ
γ , Yn + γ
Sn + Ln
Sn + Lγn



The standard Nash bargaining solution maximizes the product of the gains of the two selves
relative to a disagreement point; this product is denoted the Nash product. Thus, the action taken
by the agent is given by


D(An (hn )) = arg max

αn ∈An

Us (αn ) −

The chosen utility vector is illustrated as

Xnl
α

S γ+1
− γn γ
Sn + Ln

in gure 2.


Ul (αn ) − Yns −

11

Lγ+1
n
γ
Sn + Lγn


.

Note that this procedure implies that

conict does not occur in equilibrium. Rather, anticipation of conict drives the bargaining between
selves. Both selves are able to project the outcome of conict, and it is this commonly anticipated
outcome that drives the bargaining.

Ul

b

l

α

d

b

s

Us

Figure 2: Utility vector set U with disagreement point d and outcome vector α.
10 Proposition

5 has a variant equational form depending on which disagreement point is used, both with the same

qualitative implications. The variant form is included in Appendix A.

11 The

Nash bargaining solution will give a unique utility vector, but it may be that multiple lotteries create the

same utility vector, thus leading the

arg

function to be multi-valued. In this case, both selves are indierent between

the possible arguments, and I interpret this as the agent being indierent between the options. In most applications
this is a non-generic occurrence, and for the remainder of the paper I will assume that

9

D(·)

is single valued.

.

Lemma 2.

The decision process employed at a given decision

n

is Pareto ecient with respect to

the utilities of the selves. It is invariant to ane transformations of the shared payo utility function

u(·).

If

Un

is such that

(x, y) ∈ Un

(y, x) ∈ Un , then Us (D(An (hn ))) = Ul (D(An (hn ))).

if and only if

An ane transformation could also be applied to both eort costs in the conict game without
changing the outcome, but the costs have been normalized so that the marginal cost of eort is
1. The last part of Lemma 2 is essentially the Symmetry axiom of Nash bargaining: the decision
process does not favor one self over the other; the classic axiom is based on an exogenous, symmetric
disagreement point, however.
Observe that if the Pareto frontier consists only of mixtures between the two bliss points, then the
disagreement point (itself being a mixture between the bliss points) will lie on the Pareto frontier, and
thus coincide with the outcome vector. So, for example, if there are only two actions, the outcome
can be interpreted as the selves agreeing on the same mixing that would result from conict, and by

12

doing so bypassing the actual costs of conict.

2.4 Illustrative Example
To illuminate the workings of the model, we look at a simple example of savings-consumption.
Consider an agent endowed with $1 at time
must decide how much to consume at time

t1 ,

t1

and nothing at time

A1 = [0, 1],
t2 .

t1

as

a.

with

∆1 = t2 − t1 = 1.

He

and how much to save; assume there is no interest on

savings. We take his consumption utility function to be
Denote the amount saved at time

t2 ,

u(c) =

√

c,

and

ρl = 0, γ = 1, ρs = ln(2).

Modeling the action as being the choice of

a,

we have

with each action granting a payo utility as well as constraining the action set at time

At t2 , both selves will agree to consume the full amount remaining, so decision

each self in the rst decision has a discounted utility given by

√

1−a+e

√
−ρi

a.

2 is trivial.

Thus,

To determine their

bliss actions, we have:

bi1 = arg max

√

√
1 − a + e−ρi a,

a∈[0,1]

which gives

bi1 = e−2ρi /(1 + e−2ρi ); bs1 = 0.2; bl1 = 0.5.

This creates bliss points

12 If

we use the disagreement point without the eort costs added back in, then this is still the case, but it is not

obvious; see Lemma A.3 in Appendix A for a proof.
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√
= (Us (0.2), Ul (0.2)) =

√ !
5 3 5
,
;
2
5

X1l , Y1 = (Us (0.5), Ul (0.5)) =

!
√
3 2 √
, 2 .
4

(X1s ,

Y1s )


l

Thus,

√
√
√
√
2 5−3 2
5 2−3 5
S1 =
; L1 =
;
4
5

d1 =


X1l +

S12
L21
, Y1s +
S1 + L1
S1 + L1


≈ (1.086, 1.382).

Finally, the amount of savings undertaken by the agent is found by solving

max
a

which gives

a ≈ 0.354.

√

 √

√
√
1 − a + 0.5 a − ds,1
1 − a + a − dl,1 ,

This outcome is illustrated in gure 3.

a=0.5

Ul
a=0.354

1.40

1.38

d

1.36

1.34

a=0.2

1.32

1.02

1.04

1.06

1.08

1.10

1.12

Figure 3: Savings decision of a = 0.354.
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Us

3 Diminishing Impatience
The source of diminishing impatience in the model is best introduced through a simple example.
Consider an individual with payo utility function given by
choice between receiving $100 at time

t2 ,

u(w) = w

or receiving $120 at time

t3 .

who, at time

t1

is given the

The utility vectors created

by the two options are, respectively,


 
100e−ρs ∆1 , 100e−ρl ∆1 ; 120e−ρs (∆1 +∆2 ) , 120e−ρl (∆1 +∆2 ) .
As this is a binary decision, the resulting
options, and

Ut

is as a result a line segment.

100 > 120e−ρs ∆2 ,

At

consists of all mixing lotteries between the two

Consider the interesting case where

120e−ρl ∆2 >

so that the long-term self strictly prefers to wait for the second option, and the

short-term self strictly prefers the sooner option. The time

t1

bliss points given by these options,

then, are given by:


(X1s , Y1s ) = 100e−ρs ∆1 , 100e−ρl ∆1 ;


X1l , Y1l = 120e−ρs (∆1 +∆2 ) , 120e−ρl (∆1 +∆2 ) ,
so that,


S1 = 100e−ρs ∆1 − 120e−ρs (∆1 +∆2 ) = e−ρs ∆1 100 − 120e−ρs ∆2 ;

L1 = 120e−ρl (∆1 +∆2 ) − 100e−ρl ∆1 = e−ρl ∆1 (120e−ρl ∆2 − 100).
We will use

γ = 1,

p=
As

ρs − ρl > 0,

so we have

S
100 − 120e−ρs ∆2
=
.
S+L
(100 − 120e−ρs ∆2 ) + e(ρs −ρl )∆1 (120e−ρl ∆2 − 100)

it is straightforward to see that

∂p
∂41

< 0.

That is, as the payos are pushed into

the future, the probability of the short-term self gaining control in the case of conict shrinks: the
disagreement point moves toward the bliss point of the long-term self. Thus, the model predicts that
as rewards are delayed, the individual has a higher probability of waiting for the greater reward. The
resulting

Un

and outcomes are shown for multiple values of

20
ρl = ln( 19
), γ = 1, ∆2 = 1.

For each

Un

∆1

in gure 4, which uses

ρs = ln(2),

line segment, the higher point is the utility vector that

results from waiting for the latter, larger reward, and the point in between the two endpoints is the
outcome vector. One can see that as the delay (∆1 ) grows, the outcome moves to place more weight
on waiting for the latter, greater reward.
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Ul
120

(60,114)
(30,108.3)

100

Δ1=0

Δ1=1

(7.5,97.7)

(100,100)

Δ1=3

(50,95)

(12.5,85.7)

80
20

40

60

80

100

Us

Figure 4: Utility vector set U1 for diering delays until payos.
The result on binary choices is generalized in the following.

Lemma 3.
MHigh
ML .

Given a choice at time t1 between a payout vector

at time t3 , with

u(MHigh ) > u(MLow ),

denote by

pL

MLow

at time t2 and a payout vector

the probability an individual will choose

Then,
∂
∂∆1 pL

with the derivative strict wherever

≤ 0,

0 < pL < 1.

Intuitively, as rewards are pushed into the future, both selves care less about the dierence
between the two rewards; that is, the discounted value of the utility dierence shrinks. However,
the dierence shrinks at a faster rate for the short-term self. Essentially, the long-term self sees a
much bigger dierence between far future rewards than the short-term self does, relatively.

As a

result, the short-term self has little incentive to exert eort in the conict game, and is projected
to win such a conict with low probability, shifting the disagreement point in bargaining to favor
the long-term self. Observationally, as

∆1

increases, the behavior of the individual becomes closer

to that predicted by standard geometric discounting, as though the long-term self was the entire
individual. I will now present the general result for diminishing impatience.
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Proposition 1 (Diminishing Impatience).
suppose that all actions

a1 ∈ A1

Consider an agent selecting an action from

A1 ,

and

grant the same payo utility at time t1 . Then,

Y1l − Ul (D(A1 ))
∂ Y1l − Ul (D(A1 ))
≤
0
and
lim
= 0,
−ρ
4
∆1 →∞
∂∆1
e l 1
e−ρl 41

with the inequality strict if the Pareto frontier of

The term

Y1l − Ul (D(A1 ))

Y1l ,

bliss point,

is smooth.

is the dierence in time t1 utilities the long-term self receives from his

and from the decision made by the agent. Proposition 1 states that this dierence in

utilities is shrinking to 0 as

∆1

U1

∆1

grows. Note that, since all actions in

is the amount of time between the decision at time

t1

A1

grant the same payo utility,

and any possible payo utility variation

resulting from that decision; this is capturing the eect of shifting all payos into the future. Taking
the future value of the utility dierence, by dividing by

e−ρl ∆1 ,

shows that Proposition 1 is not

merely the result of both utilities shrinking to zero. Rather, the future payo utility received draws
close to the optimal future payo utility of the long-term self.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is that as the consequences of a decision are pushed into the
future, the outcome asymptotically approaches the bliss action of the long-term self. In the case of a
discrete decision, this takes the form that the probability with which the agent will choose the bliss
action of the long-term self approaches 1. For a continuous decision, the action chosen by the agent
approaches the bliss action of the long-term self asymptotically. Putting Proposition 1 in terms of
utilities allows the capture of both of these cases.
I'll now illustrate Proposition 1 for a continuous decision. Consider again a consumption-savings
example, with no interest and

u(c) =

that they will receive endowment

t2

w

and how much to save for time

made at time

√

c, γ = 1, ρl = 0, ρs = ln(2).

at time

t3 ,

with

t2 ,

a = 0.5w.

t1 ,

a consumer knows

and must now decide how much to consume at time

∆2 = t3 − t2 = 1.

Denoting by

a

the savings decision

t1 .

The short-term self would like to choose
which gives

At time

a = 0.2w

a

to maximize

√
√
e−ln(2)∆1 w − a + e−ln(2)(∆1 +1) a,

as their their bliss action. Similarly, the bliss action of the long-term self is

Note that the bliss actions of the selves are not individually aected by the delay between

the decision and the rst consumption,
The bliss utility vectors at time

t1

∆1 ,

as both selves are individually geometric discounters.

are respectively given by:

√
√
√
√

e−ln(2)∆1 ( 0.8w + 0.5 0.2w), 0.8w + 0.2w =
√
√

√ √
√ √
2−∆1 w( 0.8 + 0.5 0.2), w( 0.8 + 0.2) ;
√
√
√
√
√
√


e−ln(2)∆1 ( 0.5w + 0.5 0.5w), 0.5w + 0.5w = 2−∆1 1.5 0.5w, 2 0.5w .
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Determining

S

and

L,

we nd that

√
√ 
√
√ √
0.8 + 0.5 0.2 − 1.5 0.5 = 2−∆1 w
S1 = 2−∆1 w

√
√ !
√
5 2−3 5
≡ wKl .
5

√
√  √
√  √
L1 = w 2 0.5 − 0.8 − 0.2 = w
The intuition becomes clear here again:

S1

√
√ !
√
2 5−3 2
≡ 2−∆1 wKs ;
4

is being discounted, which represents the short term

seeing a smaller dierence between the bliss points as

∆1

increases.

L1

is discounted to a lesser

degree (in the chosen example, it is not discounted at all), representing that the long-term self
continues to see a dierence between options for long delays. We can now calculate the probability
of the short-term self winning the conict game:

√
2−41 wKs
Ks
∂
√
p1 = −4 √
=
⇒
p1 < 0.
K s + 2 ∆1 K l
∂∆1
2 1 wKs + wKl
So, we see for the continuous case that the short-term self again has a lower probability of winning
the conict game as the payos are pushed into the future. Since this lower probability is anticipated
by both selves, this will translate into a bargaining outcome more favorable to the long-term self:
in this case, a higher savings rate. Figure 5 shows the result for

∆1 = 1 ;

that is, the result when

the agent is deciding on the amount of saving 1 unit of time in advance. The utility values for the
short-term self contract and, as a result, the disagreement point moves closer to the bliss point of
the long-term self; the savings rate increases from the previous 0.354 to 0.388.
a=0.5

Ul

a=0.388

1.40
d

1.38

1.36

a=0.2

1.34

1.32

0.5

0.52

0.54

0.56

0.58

Us

Figure 5: Savings decision of a = 0.388 made in advance.
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The model thus predicts that when an individual is making a savings decision, the amount that
they will choose to save increases the farther their decision is from the date of consumption. It is
again this ability to account for smooth preference reversals that prevents the model from being
reliant on period length specication, and aligns it more closely with hyperbolic discounting models,
as opposed to the more popular

β -δ

specication.

4 Preferences for Commitment
To state the predictions of the model with regard to an agent's use of commitment devices, I will rst
introduce commitment sets, which are action sets that model committing to decisions in advance. It
is then shown, in Lemma 4, that if the agent commits to a single action suciently far in advance,
the action (or lottery) chosen will be dierent than the action chosen if he does not commit in
advance. Building on this, Proposition 2 shows that, under the same time condition as Lemma 4,
the agent will utilize costly, voluntary commitment devices to commit to single actions in advance,
for suciently low commitment cost. Lemma 5 establishes that, intuitively, commitment devices are
used to commit to actions favorable to the long-term self, as opposed to those favorable to the shortterm self; one observes commitments to go to the gym, but not commitments to not go to the gym.
Finally, Proposition 3 establishes conditions under which commitment devices for minimal actions,
such as minimum amounts of savings, are equivalent to commitment devices for specic actions,
such as exact amounts of savings.

This result, in turn, implies that minimal action commitment

devices have the same implications for behavior as single action commitment devices.
For this section, I exclusively consider two decision points,

1

and

n,

with

the possibility that there are decisions made in between the two. Dene
is potentially distinct from

∆1 = t2 − t1 .

Denote

Anc
n

∆t = t n − t 1 ;

Unnc .

nc
the assumption that the Pareto frontier of Un is not single valued.

1.

is a required commitment set for

∀ an ∈ Anc
n ∃

a unique

ar1 ∈ Ar1

such that

commitment action, and to induce action
2.

u(ai ) = u(aj ) ∀ ai , aj ∈ Ar1 .

3.

An0 (hn0 )

13 If

is invariant to which action

note that this

I will assume throughout that

has at least two elements, and that the selves prefer dierent lotteries in

Ar1

I do not exclude

some xed potential set of actions at decision

n, with corresponding lottery set Anc
n , and utility vector set

Denition 1.

1 < n;

Anc
n

13

Anc
n ;

Anc
n

this is equivalent to

if the following conditions hold.

ar1 ∈ hn ⇒ An (hn ) = {an }. ar1

is said to be a

an .

a1 ∈ A1

belongs to

hn0

if

n0 6= n.

this assumption does not hold, then the selves agree on what action to take, the resulting behavior is trivial,

and nothing interesting results.
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4.

Ar1

and

Anc
n

have a one-to-one correspondence.

A required commitment set

Ar1 captures the concept of an agent having to decide now what action

to take at a future date. The rst condition species that any action in
by choosing a corresponding action in

Ar1 .

Anc
n

may be committed to

The second condition species that the immediate payo

utilities between the dierent commitment actions are the same, and the third condition species
that the commitment actions do not aect action sets at any other decision points; these two together
imply that the only dierence between the commitment actions is through their eect on decision

n

r
actions. Finally, the fourth condition limits A1 to the commitment actions dened by condition 1;
every action in

Anc
n

Ar1 ,

has a unique corresponding commitment action in

and every action in

Ar1

is

nc
a commitment action for some unique action in An .

Ar1

has an associated set of lotteries,

r
agent chooses from A1 as

α1r

=

Ar1 ,

n.

is the realized lottery over actions at time

Ar1

at time

tn

αnr ; thus, αnr

that results from the agent choosing from the required

t1 .

the agent is essentially deciding from the actions of

r
vectors in U1 are the same as those in

n.14

Denote the lottery that the

I refer to this resulting lottery over actions as

For expositional purposes, it is useful to note here that

and

U1r .

D(Ar1 ); this is a lottery over commitment actions, which induces a

realized lottery over actions at decision

commitment set

and utility vector set

Anc
n ,

U1r

is a time discounted version of

Unnc ;

he is just doing so earlier. Thus, the utility

Unnc , discounted by the additional time between decisions

As the short-term self discounts more heavily than the long-term self,

U1r

1

is contracted

more severely along the horizontal axis than the vertical. A contraction of this kind was illustrated
previously in Figure 5.
Now, dene

αnnc

to be the realized lottery over actions at time

not previously commit to any action from

Anc
n .

That is,

tn

that results if the agent does

αnnc = D(Anc
n ).

So,

αnr

is the realized lottery

nc
over actions at time tn that results from commitment in advance, and αn is the realized lottery that
results from no commitment in advance. The following lemma denes the condition under which
these realized lotteries are dierent.

Lemma 4.

Let

tn − t1 = ∆ t >

Ar1

∆, αnnc

(Us (αnnc ), Ul (αnnc )),

Proof:

be a required commitment set for

6=

then

αnr , and

Ul,n (αnnc )

<

Anc
n ,

with

n > 1.

Then,

Ul,n (αnr ). If the Pareto frontier of

∃∆

such that if

Unnc is smooth at

∆ = 0.

Application of Proposition 1. Details in Appendix A.

Lemma 4, intuitively, says that decisions change when they are made earlier. Further, it says
that if the earlier decision diers, it will dier in favor of the long-term self; these eects follow

14 The

payo utility

u(·)

is not relevant at decision

m;

as it is the same for all actions, it can be normalized to zero.
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from the diminishing impatience discussed in the previous section.

Concerning the latter part of

Lemma 4, the conditions under which the Pareto frontier is smooth at the point of decision are quite
broad. If the action set is continuous and the utilities are continuously dierentiable functions of
the action set (such as in consumption-savings applications) it will generally be so. In specic, for
consumption-savings decisions with strictly concave payo utility, the Pareto frontier of

U

will be

a strictly convex, and thus the second condition of Lemma 4 will always hold. It will also always
hold for a binary action decision, as the outcome will be a strict mixing on the line between the two
bliss points. If the Pareto frontier is not smooth at the outcome, which can occur generically for a
discrete action set with more than two actions, then Lemma 4 says that a decision made suciently
far in advance will still dier from one made at the time of the action.
This result only applies in situations where advanced commitment is required. In many applications it is more reasonable to think of commitments as something optional; the agent may commit,
but they may choose not to as well.

Denition 2.

Ao1

is an optional commitment set for

commitment set for

Anc
n ,

and

anc
1

is such that

Anc
n

if

Ao1 = Ar1 ∪ {anc
1 }

where

nc
nc
anc
1 ∈ hn ⇒ An (hn ) = An . a1

Ar1

is a required

is termed the no

commitment action.

An optional commitment set takes a required commitment set, and gives the agent the additional
option to choose not to commit to any decision
that

u(anc
1 )

n

action. Note that this denition does not require

be equal to the payo utility of the commitment actions; this will allow us to examine

situations in which commitment carries with it some cost. If the realized action at decision
then this means that the agent will choose his period

Anc
n , and the resulting lottery over actions will be
Ao1

has an associated set of lotteries,

o
agent chooses from A1 as
either

αnnc

α1o

=

Ao1 ,

n

1

is

anc
1 ,

lottery of actions from the full lottery set

αnnc , as previously dened.

and utility vector set

D(Ao1 ). All actions in

U1o .

Denote the lottery that the

Ao1 induce a lottery over decision

n

actions,

for the no commitment action, or a degenerate lottery for the commitment actions. Thus,

α1o induces a realized lottery over actions at time tn , and I refer to this resulting lottery over actions as
αno .

Denote as

pnc
1

the probability that

r
purposes, note that U1

⊆

U1o :

α1o

places on the no commitment action,

U1o can be thought of as starting with

anc
1 .

For expositional

U1r , then adding the utility

vector induced by the no commitment action, along with any mixings involving it that are Pareto
improvements over existing vectors in

U1r .

Proposition 2 builds on Lemma 4 to examine the more interesting case of a decision made from
the optional commitment lottery set

Ao1 .
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Proposition 2 (Preference for Commitment).
Anc
n ,

an optional commitment set for

∀ a1 ∈ Ao1 /{anc
1 },
that if

αnnc

and that

c < c̄, pnc
1 < 1.

and

αnr ,

then

∆t > ∆,

Further, if

∃b
c>0

Ar1

respectively, with

∆

where

Unnc

such that if

Let

and

Ao1

n > 1.

be a required commitment set and

u(anc
1 ) − u(a1 ) = c ≥ 0

Suppose that

satises the condition of Lemma 4. Then,

such

contains Pareto improvements on all strict mixings between

c < ĉ, pnc
1 = 0,

and

α1o = α1r .

Suppose that the agent can choose not to commit, and bears some utility cost
commitment actions.

∃ c̄ > 0

c

related to

Proposition 2 says that as long as the agent would have chosen a dierent

lottery if required to make the decision in advance (the broad condition for which was dened by
Lemma 4), and the costs are suciently low, they will voluntarily use commitment options with a
strictly positive probability.
To interpret the second part of the result, note that requiring
on all strict mixings between

αnnc

and

αnr

Unnc to contain Pareto improvements

is equivalent to the requirement that the line segment con-

Unnc , excepting the endpoints.

αnnc

and

αnr

Strict convexity of the Pareto frontier of

Unnc

is a sucient condition for this, so the condition will

necting the utility vectors created by

lay on the interior of

always hold in savings-consumptions problems with concave utility, such as our illustrative example.
It also holds generically in the case of discrete action sets when

αnnc

and

αnr

have dierent supports,

since their induced utility vectors would then lie on dierent line segments of the Pareto frontier.
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In the event that this condition holds, Proposition 2 says that for suciently low costs, the lottery
over commitment actions chosen will be the same as the lottery they would have chosen if they were
required to commit; the option not to commit will not be used. Two examples will greatly aid in
the understanding of this result.

Ul
3

Ul

Time tn
H

3

1

0.3 cost

2

G

Time t1
0.5 cost

3

cH

cH



d,

2

Ul

Time t1

nc

d



2

nc

d

1

1
cG

1

2

3

Us

1

cG

Us

1

Us

Figure 6: Utility vector sets at tn and t1 for optional commitment decision at t1 .
15 Non-generically,

one element of the discrete action set may induce the same utility vector as a mixing between

two other elements of the action set, meaning that they would all lie on a line segment in
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U.

Consider

Anc
n ={(H)ouse

example, time

tn

Salad, (G)rilled Steak},

∆ = 1, γ = 1, ρl = 0, ρs = ln(2).

is the point at which the food is consumed. The time

tn

In this

discounted utilities of the

two options are shown in the leftmost graph of Figure 6; the dierence in payos shown can arise
if the grilled steak gives higher payo utility at decision

n,

but changes future action sets (perhaps

through lower health) in a way that results in lower payo utility at future decisions.
which is labeled

d, α

indicates the utility vector induced by

αnnc ,

The point

the lottery that the agent would

choose if making the decision at the time the food is consumed. In this case, it is a 50/50 mixture
between the two options. The Pareto frontier is smooth at that point, so Lemma 4 implies that the
mixing that the agent would choose in advance is dierent than 50/50.
The second graph illustrates the decision made from an optional commitment set at decision 1,
where the payo utility cost of commitment is 0.3. The three actions show are to commit to a house
salad (cH), commit to a grilled steak (cG), and not to commit (nc).

Ar1 ={cH,
by

H

cG}. The utility granted by

cH ,

Ao1 ={cH,

cG, nc} whereas

for example, is time discounted from the utility granted

in the rst graph, and further reduced by the cost of commitment.

If the agent were selecting from

Ar1 ,

meaning if he had to select his food in advance, then the

Pareto frontier would be the mixing between
actions is illustrated by point

d;

cH

and

cG on the graph, and the resulting mixing over

this is the utility vector induced by

α1r .

In this case, the probability

that the agent will end up eating the house salad is higher than the 50/50 chance he had when
selecting at the time of eating. The mixture over ultimate actions is

αnr ,

so

αnr 6= αnnc ,

in accordance

with Lemma 4.
In the event that the agent is selecting from

Ao1 ,

meaning he can commit to his food in advance,

but does not have to, the Pareto frontier is given by the line segments connecting
to

cG.

The ultimate lottery selected is a mixing between

o
This is the utility vector induced by α1 .

αnr and

cH

and

nc,

cH

illustrated by

α

to

nc,

and

nc

on the graph.

αnnc have the same support (and lie on the same

segment of the Pareto frontier), so that the second part of Proposition 2 does not apply here. Thus,
there is a positive probability of commitment, but not certain commitment. Finally, the third graph
simply shows the resulting outcome for a higher cost of commitment; the probability of choosing
not to commit becomes higher (the agent chooses a lottery with higher weight on the

nc

action).

An important intuition to take away from this graph is that the agent does not mix with committing to the option favored by the short-term self, the grilled steak. The agent either commits to
the action preferred by the long-term self, or they do not commit at all. This is a desirable property
of the model, because we do not observe individuals committing to unhealthy actions. They either
commit to going to the gym, or they do not commit either way; they never commit to not go to the
gym. The following lemma captures this intuition.
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Lemma 5.

Let

respectively, with
if

∆t > ∆,

Ar1

Ao1

and

n > 1.

the lottery

be a required commitment set and optional commitment set for

Suppose that

α1o

o
nc
u(anc
1 ) − u(a1 ) = c ≥ 0 ∀ a1 ∈ A1 /{a1 }.

Then,

∃∆

Anc
n ,

such that

places zero weight on commitment actions that are strictly worse for the

long-term self than the no commitment action.

Let's consider commitment as applied to the illustrative consumption-savings example.
Section 3, if the agent has to select the savings amount 1 time in advance, he selects
is shown in the left side of Figure 7; this graph corresponds to
is degenerate on

a = 0.388.

From

a = 0.388;

this

U1r , and the induced action lottery αnr

Consider now giving the agent the option not to commit to a savings rate

in advance, and suppose that the commitment options carry with them some cost of commitment.
Recall that the agent chooses

αnnc

a = 0.354

if the decision is made without prior commitment. That is,

is a degenerate lottery with a probability of 1 on

a = 0.354.

This is illustrated in the right side

of Figure 7; the no commitment point extends the Pareto frontier outward, since it carries no payo
utility cost in contrast to the commitment options; this graph corresponds to

o
the graph is the utility vector induced by α1 , the decision made from

Ul

Ul

a=0.388

U1o .

The

α

shown on

Ao1 .

α
nc, a=0.354

d

d

Us

Us

Figure 7: Required commitment versus optional commitment.
Note that since the Pareto frontier of

Unnc

is strictly convex, the second part of Proposition 2

applies, so that for suciently small costs of commitment, commitment should be guaranteed. This
is illustrated in Figure 8, which shows what happens as the costs of commitment are reduced. The
no commitment option draws closer to the curve created by the commitment options; as it does
so, the portion of the Pareto frontier of

U1o

that includes mixings with the no commitment option
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shrinks and, if the cost is small enough, the option chosen when commitment was required, in this
case

a = 0.388,

becomes part of the Pareto frontier, and the agent will choose that option.

Ul

Ul



a=0.388
nc,
a=0.354

d

d

Us

Us

Figure 8: Optional commitment for diering commitment costs.
A reasonable objection to the applicability of this set of results is that savings commitments are
more naturally thought of, and observed as, minimal savings commitments, as opposed to binding
savings levels, so I now consider commitments to minimal actions.

Lemma 6. D(A) = D(D(A)).
Proof: D(A) is the decision made from a given set of lotteries, A.

D(D(A))

is the decision made

when we limit the set of lotteries to the one lottery we would have picked from the full set. As there
is only one lottery to pick from, the choice is the same.
Lemma 6, while simple, is important to understand the application of Proposition 2 to savings
problems, or other commitment decisions where we restrict options without committing to a single
action. If an agent makes a commitment to a minimal amount of savings, then Lemma 6 implies
that this is equivalent to committing to the exact amount of savings that the minimal amount of
savings will induce. For example, if without any commitment an agent chooses savings

a = 0.35, and

committing to a minimal savings of 0.2 in advance induces him to ultimately choose savings of 0.4,
then the commitment to a minimum of 0.2 is equivalent to committing to saving exactly 0.4 in the
rst place, both in terms of realized action of the amount saved, and in terms of utilities received by
the selves.

16

Thus, a commitment decision to limit an action set can be reframed as a commitment

decision to a specic action or lottery.

16 Assuming

that the costs of the commitment options are the same.
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However, this does not mean that any set of commitment actions is equivalent to a required
commitment set, or optional commitment set, that includes all possible actions. To see why this is,
consider again our savings-consumption example. Suppose an agent has the ability to commit to
a minimum savings rate in advance, but not a maximum one. Then, there is no minimum savings
commitment which would be the equivalent of committing to saving 0, since no minimal commitment
in advance would induce the agent to choose

0

as the ultimate savings decision. If a decision maker

commits to a minimum savings rate of 0, this is equivalent to making no commitment at all.

Denition 3.

Am
1

1.

Anc
n

2.

∀ an ∈ Anc
n ∃

is a minimal action commitment set for

is an interval in

Anc
n

if the following conditions hold.

R.

a unique

m
am
1 ∈ A1

m
am
1 ∈ hn ⇒ An (hn ) = {a : a ≥ an }. a1

such that

is said to

be a minimal commitment action.
3.

u(ai ) = u(aj ) ∀ ai , aj ∈ Am
1 .

4.

An0 (hn0 )

5.

Am
1

is invariant to which action

a1 ∈ Am
1

belongs to

if

n0 6= n.

contains no actions other than those dened by 1.

Proposition 3 (Minimal Commitment Equivalence).
interval in
interval

hn0

R, an ∈ [a, b],

I ⊆ An ,

and that

Ui (an )

the utility vector set,

Suppose that

is continuous over

Un (I)

An .

An

Suppose further that for any

has a Pareto frontier that consists of utility vectors

from only pure actions (degenerate lotteries). Then, there exists an interval
such that if
set for

Arn ,

Am
1

is a minimal action commitment set for

both with the same commitment cost

selves and decision

n

is represented as an

c,

An ,

and

Ar1

Arn = [a0 , b] ⊆ [a, b]

and a required commitment

then the same discounted utility vectors for the

realized actions will result from the agent choosing from

Ar1

or from

Am
1 .

Proposition 3 says that allowing the agent to commit to a minimum action from within an interval
has the same outcome as allowing them to commit to a single action from a (weakly) smaller interval;
note that both intervals have the same maximum; this is because committing to a minimum of
is the same as committing to

17
commitment actions.

b.

b

Crucially, this allows the application of Proposition 2 to minimal

Notably, consumption-savings decisions, with strictly concave consumption

utility, will satisfy the suppositions of Proposition 3.
It follows that, under the suppositions of Proposition 3, the use of a minimal action commitment
device has the same eect on agent decisions as exogenously forbidding low values in a single action
commitment device. The intuition here is fairly straightforward: minimal action commitment sets

17 As

well as maximal commitment actions, as any maximum commitment set can be reframed as a minimal

commitment set; e.g. amount consumed versus amount saved.
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eliminate low options, but still allow the agent to revise upward when the period to make the
decision arrives. Single action commitment sets prevent any revision upward. Thus, for example,
the model predicts that higher savings rates will result from having the option of choosing minimal
savings amount, followed by a later decision on additional saving, than from having the agent decide
their full amount of savings in advance. The long-term self essentially uses the early commitment
possibility to eliminate some particularly bad options (low savings rates), and then re-negotiates
from a stronger position when the time for the ultimate decision on savings comes around.

5 Temptation
I now turn to temptation eects: the observation that agents' decisions do not always satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives. To be clear, by independence of irrelevant alternatives, I am
referring to Sen's (1971) condition
where

C(A)

α, which states that if x ∈ B ⊂ A, and x ∈ C(A), then x ∈ C(B),

is the set of elements chosen from set

A.

If

C(·)

is a singleton, then this property says

that the removal of unchosen options should not alter the chosen option. I interpret violations of
this property in choice behavior as arising out of temptation. The presence of an option that one
self nds very desirable (tempting) increases the anticipated eort that self would exert in conict.
This manifests as the option exerting a pull on the outcome decided upon by the agent, even when
the option is not chosen.
In the multiself bargaining model, the action decided upon by the agent will depend on the
bliss actions of both selves, even if these actions are irrelevant options.

This is due to the fact

that it is the bliss points determine the resolution of the projected conict game, and therefore the
disagreement point that the selves anticipate in their bargaining. Irrelevant alternatives that are
not the bliss point of either self will not inuence the outcome; in this sense the model is in accord
with existing literature on temptation, which primarily takes the view that it is only the most
tempting point that is relevant. For expositional purposes, this section focuses exclusively on the
temptation created by the bliss point of the short-term self, but the results apply similarly for the
bliss point of the long-term self.
Consider an agent at a restaurant choosing between a (H )ouse salad, (G)rilled steak, and a
(B )acon cheeseburger. The individual believes that

B

is the most delicious and

H

the least, but

that the opposite is the case regarding the health eects of the choices. Suppose further that, as
a result of health eects being something in the future, the preferences of the selves are such that

H l G l B

and

H ≺s G ≺s B ,

where

i

indicates the preference ordering of the self

possible set of utility pairs granted by the three choices, then, is illustrated by Figure 9.

24

i.
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Ul
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'
G

G

d

B

Us

Us

Figure 9: Menu choice with and without tempting option B.
The left graph of Figure 9 illustrates the decision made when the individual is choosing between
only

B.

H

and

G.

The point

the lottery to

In the right graph we see how the outcome changes when we add in the third option,

α shows the lottery chosen by the agent in the rst case, while the addition of B
α',

shown to the right. With the addition of

B,

moves

though the individual still chooses

with zero probability (the outcome shown is a mixing between

H

and

G),

the weight placed on

B
G

grows. Intuitively, in the presence of an option more desirable to a self, that self is more willing to
exert eort in the projected conict game; this pulls the disagreement point, and thus the ultimate
decision of the agent, closer to the bliss point of that self. It is important to note, though, that the
long-term self is also more willing to exert eort with the addition of point
more opposed to

B

than they were to

G.

B , since that self is much

Temptation is always bi-directional in the model, and it is

the dierences in bliss utilities for both selves that determines the overall eect. It is therefore not
always the case that adding an action to

At

which has a greater utility for the short-term self than

their current bliss point moves the outcome in their favor.
To nail down the net temptation eect of a given option, I will break down the eect into
component parts. First, Proposition 4 considers the eect of making the bliss point of the shortterm self better or worse for the short-term self; in graphical terms this is moving
left in Figure 9.

25

B

to the right or

Proposition 4 (Pure Temptation).
sponding

Un ,

αn

from

An ,

corre-

and consider the eects of altering the utility granted to the short-term self by the

short-term bliss point:
taining

Consider a decision maker choosing

Xns .

As long as an open connected subset of the Pareto frontier of

Un = (Us (αn ), Ul (αn ))

Un ,

remains a subset of the Pareto frontier of

Un

con-

then,

∂Ul (D(An ))
∂Us (D(An ))
≥ 0,
≤ 0,
∂Xns
∂Xns

with the inequalities strict if the Pareto frontier is smooth at

(Us (αn ), Ul (αn )).

The interpretation of Proposition 4 is straightforward: if we increase the utility granted to the
short-term self by their bliss point, then the action chosen by the agent changes to one that grants
a higher utility to the short-term self. This is the temptation eect in its purest and most intuitive
form: as the desserts on the menu become more delicious, the agent is pulled more toward them.
If the Pareto frontier is smooth, then the strictness of this change implies a continuous temptation
eect, one which applies even if the bliss point is chosen with zero probability. However, if the slope
is not dened at the outcome, then the temptation eect ceases to be strictly increasing.
For example, in Figure 9, if we move point
the right as well; move

B

B

to the right, the decision will shift smoothly to

far enough, and the individual will eventually choose

remain there for an interval as

B

is moved farther to the right.

the individual would begin mixing between

G

and

B,

Once

B

G

for certain, and

is moved far enough,

and the temptation eect would again be

18
continuously increasing.
To see why the result is true, note that in moving
long-term self by

B

B

in this way, the utility granted to the

remains the same, and thus the dierence to the long-term self between the

bliss points remains the same (Ln constant). This means that the long-term self 's incentive to exert
eort in a potential conict is unchanged, but the short-term self 's incentive is increased.

Thus,

the projected probability of the short-term self winning a conict is conclusively increasing, moving
the disagreement point closer to

B

along the mixing line between

H

and

B;

this is compounded by

the fact that the mixing line itself is shifting in favor of the short-term self (since the

B

endpoint is

moving in favor of the short-term self ). Finally, the fact that the disagreement point has shifted in
favor of the short-term self means that the bargaining outcome will as well.
The relevance of requiring that a section of the Pareto frontier surrounding the decision be
unchanged is to ensure that the changing point is an irrelevant alternative. Doing away with that
condition, we obtain a more limited result:

18 Though,

once the agent was mixing with

G and B , the Pareto frontier around the decision would also be changing,

and it would no longer be a pure temptation eect; B would no longer be an irrelevant alternative.
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Lemma 7.

Consider a decision maker choosing

αn

from

An ,

with corresponding

Un ,

and consider

the eects of altering the utility granted to the short-term self by the short-term bliss point:

Xns .

Then,

∂Us (D(An ))
≥ 0.
∂Xns

Without the limitation on the Pareto frontier, an improvement in the bliss utility of the shortterm self still moves the outcome in a direction favorable to the short-term self. However, it may
also add Pareto improvements on the previous outcome, and so the net eect on the utility granted
to the long-term self is ambiguous. This would occur if, in Figure 10,
the right that the Pareto frontier became the line segment between

B

H

was shifted far enough to
and

B

(so that

G

was no

longer on the frontier).
I now turn to the second component of temptation, which is the eect of making the short-term
bliss point more or less desirable to the long-term self. In Figure 9, this would correspond to moving

B

up or down. If the bliss point of the short-term self becomes worse for the long-term self, then

essentially the long-term self 's (unchanged) bliss point becomes relatively better for the long-term
self than it was before; intuitively, if the long-term self knows that losing a conict would result in
a very bad option, he will exert more eort in such a conict. As it is the worsening of one bliss
point that makes the other bliss point more appealing, I refer to this as indirect temptation. So,
the projected probability that the short-term self wins a conict conclusively decreases as a result
of such a change.
However, if the short-term self wins, the outcome is worse for the long-term self than it was
previous to the change.

These two eects create an ambiguous net eect on the expected utility

outcome of the projected conict game, and thus on the disagreement point. Proposition 5 details
the condition under which the the rst eect dominates.

19

That is, the condition under which a

worsening of the short-term self 's bliss point for the long-term self leads to a better disagreement
point, and thus a better outcome, for the long-term self.

19 This

is the only proposition in which the equational form is dependent on whether one uses the disagreement

point with or without the eort costs added in, as discussed in section 2.3. Proposition 5 uses the disagreement point
with eort costs added back in. Proposition 5', included in Appendix A, uses the disagreement point without eort
costs added in; it has the same qualitative implications, and yields no additional intuition.
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Proposition 5 (Indirect Temptation).
sponding
point:

Un .

Yns .

Consider a decision maker choosing

αn

from

An ,

corre-

Consider altering the utility granted to the long-term self by the short-term self bliss

As long as an open connected subset of the Pareto frontier of

bargaining outcome

(Us (αn ), Ul (αn ))

Un

containing the Nash

remains a subset of the Pareto frontier of

Un ,

then

Ul (αn ) − dl
∂Ul (D(An ))
Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn
∂Us (D(An ))
<
≥ 0,
≤ 0,
⇒
s
U
(α
)
−
d
∂Y
∂Yns
γSn Lγ−1
s
n
s
n
n

with the reverse strict inequality implying the reverse weak inequalities.

To interpret this proposition, I start by noting that the rst term is a ratio of the changes in the
coordinates of the disagreement point that result from an increase in

Yns :

it is the slope along which

the disagreement point moves as a result of such a change. The second term is the slope of the line
connecting the disagreement point to the utility vector created by the current lottery choice,
Note that if the Pareto frontier of

Un

is smooth at

(Us (αn ), Ul (αn )),

αn .

then this slope is the negative

of the slope of the Pareto frontier at that point; this follows from the nature of the Nash bargaining
solution.
Thus, Proposition 5 says that if an increase in

Yns

moves the disagreement point below the line

connecting the original disagreement point to the original decision, then the lottery chosen by the
agent changes to a lottery granting higher utility to the short-term self, and lower utility to the
long-term self. Now, to get at some intuition for this, consider

γ = 1;

in which case

Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn
= 1.
γSn Lγ−1
n
If additionally the Pareto frontier is smooth, then Proposition 5 can be more simply stated as:
If the slope of the Pareto frontier at the current decision is greater in magnitude than 1, then an
increase in

Yns

changes the outcome in favor of the short-term self (and similarly a decrease in

Yns

changes the outcome in favor of the long-term self ). Tying this back into the menu-choice example,
this condition would imply that shifting the

B

option downward would make the outcome worse for

the short-term self; the additional incentive of the long-term self to exert eort in projected conict
would be the dominant eect of the shift. Intuitively, the relatively high slope of the Pareto frontier
indicates that the long-term self has more to lose from shifts along the frontier; thus, said self will
react more strongly to changes in options which have the potential to move the outcome along the
frontier.
Now, putting together the implications of Propositions 4 and 5, consider the addition of a new
option (such as menu choice

B

in the example) to an existing set of actions (such as

{H, G}).

Suppose that the new option is better for the short-term self than their existing bliss point, but
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worse for the long-term self. If the condition of Proposition 5 holds, then the net eect of such a
new option is ambiguous: it increases
Proposition 4, but decreases
5. If the decrease in

Yns

Yns ,

Xns ,

which improves the outcome for the short-term self by

which improves the outcome for the long-term self by Proposition

is suciently large relative to the increase in

Xns ,

the outcome may actually

improve in favor of the long-term self, in spite of the new point being a favorable option for the
short-term self. I refer to this as a backre eect, and such a situation is illustrated in Figure 10
below.

100

Ul

B

α

80

3
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C
2
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1
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Us

Figure 10: Regions dividing eect of adding a new bliss point; γ = 1
The Pareto frontier is Figure 10 is the line segment between B and C, with the outcome vector
marked in between them as

α.

Consider adding another vector to the set of utility vectors. Region

1 in the graph is the backre region; in this region the increase in bliss utility for the short-term
self is relatively small, compared to the large potential decrease in utility for the long-term self.
As a result, additions in this region cause the outcome to move to favor the long-term self; the
indirect temptation eect dominates.

Additions in region 2 cause the outcome to shift in favor

of the short-term self while hurting the long-term self; the pure temptation eect dominates. For
additions in region 3, the pure temptation eect still dominates, but the new option creates large
enough Pareto improvements over the original outcome, due to shifting the Pareto frontier outward,
that both selves benet.
If the condition of Proposition 5 does not hold, however, there is no backre eect, and region 1 is
empty; is this case any new action which increases the bliss utility for the short-term self necessarily
improves the outcome for the short-term self. Note now the distorted scale of Figure 10: the slope
of this frontier is

−4.

The magnitude must be greater than 1 for region 1 to be non-empty, and a
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relatively high slope magnitude is required for region 1 to be signicant. Connecting to the previous
intuition, the steeper the slope, the more the long-term self has to lose from movement along the
frontier, and thus the larger the potential backre region will be. If the Pareto frontier is smooth,
the curve separating regions 1 and 2 is dened by

0

0

(ds − ds )(Ul (α) − dl ) = (dl − dl )(Us (α) − ds ),
where

(ds , dl )

is the original disagreement point (dened by Lemma 1),

0

0

(ds , dl )

is the disagree-

ment point created by the original bliss point of the long-term self and the new option (a point
on the curve), and

α

is the original outcome.
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If the Pareto frontier is not smooth at the current

outcome, then the boundary between regions 1 and 2 is itself a region as opposed to a curve; the
addition of a new point anywhere inside this boundary region does not change the outcome.
I close this section by illustrating the temptation eect in a continuous action set.

Consider

again our illustrative savings example, and suppose that the agent has committed to saving at least
0.3. Then, when it is time to make the nal savings decision, the bliss action of the short-term self
is to save exactly 0.3, as 0.2 (their former bliss action) is no longer in

A.

As a result, the agent is

less tempted toward low saving rates, and the action chosen by the agent moves from

a = 0.367.

a = 0.354

This is shown in gure 11.

a=0.5

Ul
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1.40
d
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1.36
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1.04
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1.10

1.12

Us

Figure 11: Savings decision with commitment to minimum of 0.3.

20 This

minor result is a direct implication of Lemma A.2, given in Appendix A.
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6 Welfare Implications
While it presents more challenges to interpretation than the standard geometric discounting utility
model, the dual-self bargaining model presented here need not be silent on questions of welfare. By
choosing to view an agent as actually consisting of two individuals, there are several results that
grant leverage for welfare evaluation. This gives an advantage over models in which there is a single
individual whose preferences change in each period due to non-geometric time discounting. Rather
than have one set of preferences for each period, here there are only two in total.

There is also

the observation that utilities are intrapersonal here, rather than interpersonal. Selves share a payo
utility from actions, and so utility comparisons arguably carry more weight here than they would
when comparing across individuals. I rst address the notion of Pareto improvements: actions that
improved the utility for both selves over another action.

Lemma 8.
and

b

Given two actions

a

and

b, a

is never chosen from any action set

if and only if the utility vector created by

Proof:

If

b

is a Pareto improvement, then

chosen. If

a

is never chosen from

a

A = {b, a},

b

A

containing both

is a Pareto improvement over that created by

a

a.

will not be on the Pareto frontier, and so will never be
then it must be that

b

is a Pareto improvement, as the

agent would otherwise choose a strict mixing of the two actions.
This has a close relation with the notion of the unambiguous choice relation developed by Bernheim and Rangel (2009). Essentially, if

unambiguously preferred to
this model,

b

a,

a

written as

is never chosen when

∗

bP a,

is unambiguously preferred to

a

b

is available, then we say that

which is unambiguously preferred,

a

is

in the terminology dened by their work. Thus, in

if it represents a Pareto improvement over

to the two selves. An immediate extension is that for a given action,

b,

b

a

in regard

a, if there exists another action,

can denitively said to be Pareto inecient from a welfare

perspective. It also has the important implication that if an agent always makes the same decision
from a binary choice (probability 1), then the choice made is a Pareto improvement over the other,
and thus can be denitively said to be welfare improving.
I now turn to the more dicult question of welfare evaluation of options when neither is a Pareto
improvement over the other.

If we wish to make meaningful statements about welfare on such

questions, it is necessary to consider some aggregation of the utilities received by the two selves.
One method by which to do so is a weighted utility welfare function,

W (a) = wUl (a) + (1 − w)Us (a),

famously advanced by Harsanyi (1955, 1977) as a method of aggregating interpersonal social welfare.
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For what follows, I will conne attention to this form of welfare function.

21 A

criticism of such a weighted utility function as a measurement of social welfare involves the diculty in

interpersonal utility comparisons, e.g. Sen (1977). In my model the utility comparisons are intrapersonal: the selves
in fact share a payo utility function, and I argue that this lessens the strength of the critique.

Second, more

practically, as the selves share their payo utility function, it is desirable that any measure of welfare be invariant to

31

Lemma 9.

Consider a choice set given by

A = {a, b},

suppose that

short-term self, and that the agent is observed to choose

p<

1

1−w γ
w

+1

b

b

is the action preferred by the

with probability p. Then,

⇐⇒ wUl (a) + (1 − w)Us (a) > wUl (b) + (1 − w)Us (b).

Lemma 9 implies that, if welfare of an individual is evaluated by a weighting between options,
observation of choice from a binary set of two actions is sucient to say which is welfare superior.
If
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w = 0.5, so that welfare is considered as an equal weighting between the selves, then the condition

simply becomes

p < 0.5,

so that

γ

need not be known, nor which action is preferred by which

self. This is appealing for application: it would imply that in a series of random choices between
two options the agent would be observed to choose the option one granting higher welfare more
frequently.
We may also wish to consider welfare weightings that place greater weight on the utility of the
long-term self.

Lemma 10.
from

A

Consider a choice set given by

with probability

p,

and that

a utility weighting given by

b

A = {a, b}, and suppose an agent is observed to choose b

is the action preferred by the short-term self. Further, consider

wUl (·) + (1 − w)Us (·),

with

w ≥ 0.5.

Then,

p < 0.5 ⇒ wUl (a) + (1 − w)Us (a) > wUl (b) + (1 − w)Us (b).

Proof:

Consider

w = 0.5.

From Lemma 9,

p < 0.5 ⇐⇒ 0.5Ul (a) + 0.5Us (a) > 0.5Ul (b) + 0.5Us (b)

⇒ Ul (a) − Ul (b) > Us (b) − Us (a) ⇒ w(Ul (a) − Ul (b)) > (1 − w)(Us (b) − Us (a))
⇒ wUl (a) + (1 − w)Us (a) > wUl (b) + (1 − w)Us (b)

for

for

w ≥ 0.5

w ≥ 0.5.

Lemma 10 says that if a utility weighting welfare function places at least equal weight on the
long-term self 's utility, then observing the agent choosing the long-term self 's preferred action more
frequently than an alternate action implies that the more frequently chosen action grants higher
welfare. This is of interest because if, for example, a bag of potato chips is resisted more often than
not, then it implies that it is welfare improving to remove the bag of chips as an option. Additionally,
it allows a degree of welfare evaluation to take place without taking a stance on whether an equal

ane transformations of this underlying payo function, and a weighted utility welfare function meets this criterion.

22 In

cases where it is not apparent, which action is preferred by which self is easily established by time delay due

to the diminishing impatience phenomenon
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weighting between selves, or a higher weighting on the long-term self, is the correct choice in a
welfare function.

23

Finally, consider the welfare eects of the availability of commitment devices.

Lemma 11.
w > 0.

Consider action set

Consider decision

1,

with

An ,

and a welfare function

tn − t1 = ∆t ≥ 0.

Then,

W (a) = wUl (a) + (1 − w)Us (a),
∃∆

such that

∀∆t > ∆,

with

allowing the

agent access to a zero-cost commitment action set at time t1 increases welfare.

Lemma 11 says that as long as you put positive weight on the utility of the long-term self, then
a commitment option given suciently far in advance of the action being committed to is welfare
improving. The implication is that if weighted utilities between selves is regarded as an acceptable
method of welfare evaluation then, regardless of the weights used, commitment devices can create
welfare improvements. In fact, the result will easily extend to any welfare function which is bounded,
continuous, and strictly increasing in

Ul .

Thus, the model gives strong support to the notion that

commitment devices create welfare improvements for agents.

7 Extensions, Future Work and Conclusion
One alteration to the model of interest is in the timing of the conict game.

Currently, selves

compete for control, and then choose their action. An alternative method of modeling would be for
the selves to rst commit to an action, and then have their eort game, allowing for strategic choice
of actions on the part of the selves. The general results for commitment and diminishing impatience
are conjectured to remain unchanged, but the temptation results alter in that there would no longer
be a backre eect: neither self would strategically choose an action which would backre in the
way described, meaning that the decision process would become monotonic in the sense of Kalai
and Smorodinsky (1975): adding an action which increased the maximal possible utility for a self
would increase the outcome for that self. This is not necessarily an undesirable alteration, as the
backre eect is relatively limited in scope, and does not seem to correspond to any strong empirical
regularities. However, at this time it is not known whether the equilibrium of a conict game in
which selves strategically choose their bliss points is generically unique.
Another alteration to consider is the bargaining procedure used; Nash bargaining was selected
here for tractability, but the general properties of this model are dependent on the conict game, not
the bargaining procedure. Indeed, it is not dicult to show that the qualitative results of diminishing
impatience, preference for commitment, and temptation, result from any bargaining procedure that
satises two uncontroversial properties. First, invariance to ane transformations of utility. Second,

23 Arguments

for considering a short-term, or impatient self as more important than the long-term self, in contrast,

do not exist in the literature on multiple selves, nor does the concept seem to carry any introspective weight.
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the utility granted to each bargainer by the outcome should be monotonic in the utility granted to
that self by the disagreement point.

Other bargaining procedures which satisfy these properties,

then, generate the same qualitative results.
Extending from this, an axiomatization of bargaining procedures which generate the desired
behavior would be of keen interest. Obvious axioms of choice are Pareto eciency and Symmetry,
as well as invariance to ane transformations of the shared payo utility function; this form of
invariance is equivalent to the bargaining problem being invariant to shifts and non-distorting scaling
of the bargaining set. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives cannot be included, as it is the lack of
this property which generates the temptation eects. Nor can the more general form of invariance to
ane transformations that Nash bargaining builds upon be included; it is the lack of invariance when
separate transformations are applied to the selves which generates time inconsistency in the model.
Monotonicity, as Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining, is certainly a plausible axiom. As mentioned, this
removes the backre eect. However, including Monotonicity is insucient to pin down a unique
solution, and it is not obvious if there is another natural axiom or axioms of choice. Other future
work will certainly include symmetric multiself models in which the selves vary in dimensions other
than time discounting. In particular, selves that vary in a risk aversion parameter is of interest in
attempting to generate regularities related to risk.
To conclude, this work formalizes intuition about conicting internal preferences into a model that
provides a unied explanation for a number of behavioral regularities. A smooth time inconsistency
arises from the relative dierence in time preference between the selves.

Temptation eects, or

violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives, result from the diering incentives of the selves
in conict over control. Use of commitment devices derives from the long-term self 's advantage in
foresight over long time horizons. All of these come from a tightly parameterized dierence in time
preference between the selves, which additionally creates novel intuition about the nature of such
behavior.
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Part II

Temporal Reference Points
1 Introduction
Extensive evidence exists that agents are sensitive to the pattern and timing in which information
is revealed to them, even when they cannot make use of that information.

Gneezy and Potters

(1997) and Haigh and List (2005) nd that agents exhibit greater risk aversion the more frequently
that they evaluate the state of nancial outcomes.

In particular, Bellmare et al.

(2005) isolates

information feedback, and not investment exibility, as the variable of greater inuence.

Köszegi

and Rabin (2009) develop a model in which agents prefer to have their information clumped together
rather than spread out.
Concurrently, there is a body of work indicating that the way in which time is framed and
presented inuences how individuals evaluate situations put before them. For example, Chandran
and Menon (2004) nds that agents judge risk to be greater when health risks are presented to
them in daily terms rather than yearly, even though the overall risk level is objectively the same.
Gourville (1998) examines the eect of the temporal framing of costs (e.g. just pennies per day!)
on the the decisions of individuals, and nds them to be signicant.
These two groups of research suggest a common thread: there may be something special about
the points in time to which an agent's attention is drawn. I leverage this idea to create a model which
unites the concept of diminishing impatience with preferences for clustered information. Further, the
model provides a novel explanation for some discordant results in studies on diminishing impatience.
I make the assumption that the value of a prospect is not only dependent on the distribution
over ultimate outcomes, but also on a set of subjectively important times in the life of that prospect,
which I term temporal reference points. When evaluating a prospect the agent is assumed to have a
discount function which is applied to each of the durations between these temporal reference points.
This replaces standard time discounting, in order to model the sensitivity the agent may have with
regard to these points in time.
I remain agnostic about how agents form these temporal reference points (though I believe it is
a promising future avenue of research). Instead, I examine two natural cases. The rst is the case
where an agent forms the temporal reference points solely from the times he expects to receive new
information about the outcome of a prospect. This agent is sensitive to updates of information on
the ultimate value of a prospect, but not sensitive to other possible framing eects (such as emphasis
on a particular point in time in the presentation of a set of prospects). I refer to such an agent as
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information focused. The second is a case where shifting a prospect into the future causes an agent
to treat the new starting point of the prospect as a temporal reference point.
Section 2 develops the notation and fundamentals of the model, which addresses the preferences
of agents over prospects set in continuous time. In particular, agents are characterized by a utility
function, a discounting function, and a framing mapping, the last of which represents the process by
which the agent decides upon the temporal reference points of the prospect. If the framing maps to

{0},

so that the only temporal reference point is now, then the model becomes standard expected

utility, with the discount function reverting to standard time discounting. Thus, the model can be
viewed as a generalization of standard models. Prospects are characterized by distributions over the
set of possible outcomes, of which exactly one will occur in nite time. Further, each prospect has
a set of possible histories of informational updates given to the agent (signals). The history at any
given time aects both the distribution over future signals, as well as the expected distribution over
outcomes.
Section 3 examines the case where agents are information focused.

I develop the notion of

preference for grouped information (PGI), which indicates a preference for informational updates
to be folded into one another, reducing the total number of times at which information is gained.
PGI is similar in spirit to Dillenberger (2010), which develops Preference for One-shot Resolution
of Uncertainty (PORU), but here I place the notion in a time-sensitive setting, whereas PORU is
dened in time neutrality. I show an equivalence between PGI and diminishing impatience in this
environment. Diminishing impatience, an extensively documented property of agents' behavior (e.g.
Thaler 1981) is the idea that an agent becomes less impatient between an immediate and a delayed
alternative as both are delayed further.
A second, more rened, type of information preference is also developed. This is a preference for
informational updates to be closer to each other temporally, which I call a preference for less dispersed
information (PLDI). I show the equivalence between PLDI and strongly diminishing impatience, a
renement of diminishing impatience which requires an agent to become continually less impatient
as rewards become more distant. As shown by the survey Frederick et al. (2002) there is evidence for
strongly diminishing impatience, though it ceases to diminish after a period (they show that after a
year there is zero evidence of further diminishing impatience). I am unaware of any empirical studies
examining PLDI at the present time, but this work suggests such studies may be of interest. PLDI
is further shown to be a generalization of PGI, with grouped information being a limiting case of less
dispersed information. This limiting relationship is of importance in the continuous time setting, in
which dening a single point in time at which information is received is potentially problematic.
Section 4 relaxes the assumption of information focused agents, which opens up many possibilities
as to how agents may determine temporal reference points. I focus on a single case where the act of
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shifting a prospect into the future causes the agent to treat the new starting point of the prospect as
a temporal reference point. I show that in such a case the agent's indierence curves over prospects
are also shifted into the future by the same amount, retaining indierence between equally shifted
prospects.
This particular case of temporal reference points is important because it suggests a novel resolution to apparently contradictory experimental evidence concerning diminishing impatience. A very
large body of work attests that diminishing impatience becomes less strong as prospects are pushed
further into the future, e.g. Frederick et al. (2002). Numerous studies show that subjects exhibit
preference reversals when a set of options is made more distant, e.g. Keren and Roelofsma (1995).
However, the thorough experimental survey Glimcher et al. (2007) examines the eect of shifting a
set of prospects into the future, and nds disagreement with this previous work. The authors show
that when the shifted prospects retain their temporal relation to one another, subjects' indierence
curves remain statistically constant over the prospects.

Specically, the diminishing impatience

across the set of prospects was just as strong, despite the set being more temporally distant. The
model here oers explanation for this apparent conict by supposing that the experimental design
of the Glimcher study, where all of a very large number of delayed comparisons were made to a $20
payout in 60 days, caused the subjects to focus on 60 days as a subjectively important point in time.
Thus, subjects plausibly form a temporal reference point in that study that would not be formed in
other studies without a similar point to focus on.
Section 5 concerns the discounting function and how it can be interpreted in this model given
the multiple steps of discounting occurring in the evaluation of prospects.

I focus on two inter-

pretations in particular. One in which the discounting is divided into geometric time discounting
and an additional survival function, which can be thought of as encompassing implicit risk.

In

this interpretation, the agent sees the temporal reference points as problem spots, where something
might go wrong with the explicitly stated outcomes of the prospect. This may be due to distrust of
the explicitly stated prospect, mortality risk, or just general pessimism. The second interpretation
treats the discounting function as time discounting, but has the agent place himself in the role of his
future selves, evaluating his preferences as if  he were those selves, before discounting backward.
In essence, the temporal reference points become the times to which the agent projects himself.
Section 6 concludes and proposes further avenues for research, in particular research on the
formation of temporal reference points.
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2 The Model
2.1 Decision Problem and Notation
An agent is faced with a choice between multiple prospects at time
prospects denoted

P.

There is a closed and compact set of payouts,

24

with a payout in nite time with probability 1.

O = {(α, tα )},

where

α∈A

and

tα

0,

with the set of all possible

A, and every prospect terminates

Further, there is a closed and compact set of pairs

indicates the time at which the payout occurs. Elements of

O

are referred to as outcomes.
Time is continuous, but each prospect,

A ∈ P,

has a nite number of distinct, ordered, positive

points in time,

A
A
IA = {tA
1 , t2 , ....tN },

at which new information, a signal, is received by the agent as to the outcome of the prospect.
The signal from prospect

A

received at time

tA
n

is denoted

At any point in time in the life of a prospect,

hA
t

∈

HtA

=

{sA
1,

A
sA
2 , ...si }, where

occurred at each of the elements of

t,

sA
n.

the agent will have seen a history of signals

tA
i is the largest element of
IA

25

IA

strictly less than

t,

of what has

(what information was revealed) up to, but not including,

A
The distribution over possible st is a function of the signals received to that point,

t.

hA
t . The history

of signals and the prospect itself, then, dene a mapping that gives the distribution over the nal
possible outcomes of the prospect, denoted for a given history

hA
t

by

4A (hA
t ) : O −→ [0, 1].
These distributions are assumed to be consistent with the probabilities of signals. So, the distribution over outcomes just before an informational update is equivalent to the distribution over
signals expected at that update composed with the distributions induced by the receipt of those
signals. Intuitively, this represents the agent rationally and recursively determining the distribution
over outcomes based on the probability of each signal and the distribution over outcomes induced
by those signals.

24 Although

the elements of

A

are not limited to monetary payments, nothing will be lost in the intuition of the

model by considering them to be.

25 Note

0. While this assumption would be
0 is the time at which the agent is evaluating the

that this excludes the possibility that uncertainty is resolved at time

very limiting in a discrete time setting, here it is not. Given that time

prospect, this is just assuming that uncertainty is not being resolved while this evaluation is occurring. Uncertainty
can still be resolved arbitrarily close to time

0,

which allows the accounting of cases where, say, an agent is oered a

choice between two gambles, and the dice are rolled moments after their choice.
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At the beginning of the prospect looking forward to any time

t generates an expected distribution

over histories, each of which generates a distribution over outcomes. Thus each time
has associated with it a distribution over distributions over outcomes, denoted

ΛtA .

t for a prospect
At time

0,

due

to there being no history, this distribution over distributions is degenerate on a single distribution
over outcomes. That is,
Appended to the set
generated by prospect

Λ0A
IA

A.26

is degenerate on a single distribution, denoted
are the times

0

A

A

and tF , where tF

> tA
N

40A .

is the time of the last outcome(s)

This denes the set:

A
A
A
TA = {0, tA
1 , t2 , ....tN , tF }.

For ease of notation,

TA =

{tA
0,

tA
1,

tA
2,

tA
0

....tA
N,

will sometimes be used in place of zero, and

tA
N +1

in place of

tA
N +1 }. Payouts may be received at any of the elements of

tA
F,

TA ,

so that

and once

a payout is received, the prospect terminates with no further payouts possible.
Each agent further associates with each prospect a set of non-negative ordered points in time,

A
RA = {0, r1A , r2A , rM
},
which will be referred to as the temporal reference points of that prospect. At minimum, this set
includes

0.

So, each agent has a mapping from the set of prospects to the set of subsets of the

non-negative real numbers,

R : P −→ P(R+ ).
This mapping can conceptually be thought of as how the agent frames the subjectively important
points in time when evaluating the prospect.

As will be shortly seen, the elements of

RA

will

determine how the agent applies discounting to their evaluation of the prospect.
The agent further has a utility function over outcomes,
function,

D(·) : R+ −→ [0, 1],

u(·) : A −→ R+ ,

as well as a discounting

which is decreasing, non-negative, and satises

D(0) = 1.

The

discount rate should be understood to not only include time discounting, but potentially other
forms of discounting future payouts as well.

27

Further interpretation of this discount function is

dealt with in Section 5.

26 Note

that

A
tA
F > tN

implies the assumption that there is at least one possible payout/utility received after all

uncertainty is resolved. Like the case of excluding

0 from IA , this is not limiting in a continuous time setting.

A payout

can be modeled as being arbitrarily close to knowledge of the payout, such as when an agent receives a monetary
payment mere moments after knowing that he will.

27 However,

in the special case where

R

maps all prospects

model becomes standard expected utility with

D(t)

A

to

{0},

so that the only important time is now, the

representing normal time discounting (and thus encompassing

both geometric and non-geometric time discounting models).
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In evaluating the present discounted utility of prospects the agent discounts based on his temporal
reference points, rather than discounting based on the time between now and the payouts as is
standard in the literature.

For each payout he discounts between now (the time at which he is

evaluating) and the rst such temporal reference point, between each pair of temporal reference
points before the payout, and between the last temporal reference point before the payout and the
time of the payout.
Formally, let

A
rn̂(t)

be the highest element of

RA

evaluates the present discounted value of a prospect

ˆ

which is less than

A

t.

Then an agent at time

0

as



A
A
A
− rn̂(t)−1
) ∗ D t − rn̂(t)
,
u(α) ∗ 40A (α, t) ∗ D(r1A − 0) ∗ D(r2A − r1A ).... ∗ D(rn̂(t)

VA =
(α,t)∈O

and prefers the prospect with the highest such present discounted value.

Denition.

Consider an agent whose mapping,

R

satises

28

R(A) = IA ∪ {0}, ∀A ∈ P .

This agent

is said to be information focused.

An information focused agent regards as important all the times at which new information will
be received, in addition to right now. Section 3 will examine this type of agent, whereas Section 4
will relax this assumption on the mapping

R.

Noting that for an information focused agent each outcome occurs at an element of
write the present discounted value of a prospect

A

TA ,

we can

for an information focused agent as:

ˆ
VA =
(α,tA
n )∈O


A
A
A
A
A
A
A
u(α) ∗ 40A (α, tA
n ) ∗ D(t1 − 0) ∗ D(t2 − t1 ).... ∗ D(tn−1 − tn−2 ) ∗ D tn − tn−1 .

Finally, in cases where

rate of

D(t).

D(t)

is continuously dierentiable, I denote

h(t) =

−D 0 (t)
D(t) , the hazard

The hazard rate gives us what is essentially the instantaneous rate of discounting. For

example, for the geometric

D(t) = e−ρt , h(t) = ρ.

This will be of aid in intuition for several of the

results.

28 This

representation makes clear that for

D(t) = e−ρt

the model collapses to standard geometric time discounting.
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2.2 Example With Visualization
Given a prospect with countable support over signals after each history of signals (which implies
countable outcomes due to nite history length), we can visualize the prospect as a branching tree.
The visualization will aid intuition even in the non-countable case. Aligning the tree from left to
right, with the root at
elements of

I,

t = 0,

and points further to the right as points farther in time, at each of the

when new information is received, the tree splits.

A.

For example consider the following prospect,
ability

t3 .

p.

If

a

There is a

is not received then at time

t2

q

and a

probability of receiving

b,

At time

t1

the agent will receive

a

with prob-

the agent learns what payout he will receive at time

1−q

probability of receiving

c.

The prospect is

visually represented in Figure 1.

a
p

b

1-p

q
1-q

c
t=0

t=t1

Figure 1:

Prospect

A

t=t2 t=t3
with

TA = {0, t1 , t2 , t3 }

Each split in the tree is an informational update to the agent. At time

t1 ,

they either receive

which is information in itself, or do not, which is a signal that they will receive either
example, if
places

q

h

is the history containing the signal that

weight on an outcome of

(b, t3 )

and

1−q

a

was not received at time

weight on an outcome of

t1 ,

b

or

then

c.

a,

For

4A (h)

(c, t3 ).

If the agent is information focused for this example, then the value of the prospect would be

VA = u(a)pD(t1 )+u(b)(1−p)qD(t3 −t2 )D(t2 −t1 )D(t1 )+u(c)(1−p)(1−q)D(t3 −t2 )D(t2 −t1 )D(t1 ),
or more succinctly

VA = D(t1 ) [pa + (1 − p)D(t3 − t2 )D(t2 − t1 ) (qb + (1 − q)c)] .
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3 Diminishing Impatience and Information Timing Preferences
In this section, I examine the case of an information focused agent. I begin by dening the notion of
diminishing impatience in the context of this model. An agent who exhibits diminishing impatience
becomes less impatient for a later outcome relative to an immediate outcome as both payouts become
more distant. More formally,

Denition.

Denote by

(a, t)

the deterministic prospect that provides payout

a

at time

t.

If an

agent's preferences over prospects are such that

(a, 0) ∼ (b, t1 ) ⇒ (a, t2 )  (b, t1 + t2 ) ∀ a, b ∈ A, ∀ t1 , t2 > 0,
then the agent exhibits diminishing impatience. If the preference is everywhere strict, they exhibit
strictly diminishing impatience.

If the agent's preferences are further such that

(a, t1 ) ∼ (b, t2 ) ⇒ (a, t1 + t3 )  (b, t2 + t3 ) ∀ a, b ∈ A, ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0,
then the agent exhibits strongly diminishing impatience. If the preference is everywhere strict, they
exhibit strictly strongly diminishing impatience.

29

Diminishing impatience here says that if an agent is indierent between an immediate reward
and a later, better reward, he will prefer the later reward if both are equally delayed.

Strongly

diminishing impatience is a renement of this which requires that preference change holds true for

any sooner versus latter reward, not only when one is immediate.

Lemma 1.

An information focused agent exhibits (strictly) diminishing impatience if and only if

D(t1 + t2 ) (>) ≥ D(t1 )D(t2 ) ∀ t1 , t2 > 0.
The agent exhibits (strictly) strongly diminishing impatience if and only if

D(t2 )D(t1 + t3 ) (<) ≤ D(t1 )D(t2 + t3 ) ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0.
Further, if

D(t)

is continuously dierentiable, then the agent exhibits (strictly) strongly dimin-

ishing impatience if and only if the associated hazard rate,

Proof:

h(t),

is (strictly) decreasing.

All proofs not in the text are given in Appendix B.

29 Similar

notions are introduced by Chakraborty and Halevy (2015), with strictly diminishing impatience here

corresponding to their denition of delay independent diminishing impatience (DIDI) and strictly strongly diminishing
impatience here corresponding to their denition of delay independent strongly diminishing impatience (DISDI). In a
discrete time setting without temporal reference points (or, equivalently, with the only temporal reference point being

0),

the notions coincide exactly.
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So, an agent exhibits diminishing impatience if and only if he discounts more heavily when a
length of time is broken up into two intervals before discounting. This occurs in discounting functions
with a steep drop-o  at

t = 0.

For example, the well known

D(t) ≡

β−δ



1,

if t = 0


βe−δt ,

otherwise.

discounting function,

Intuitively, breaking the length of time in two forces the overall discounting to have the drop-o 
twice.
As for strongly diminishing impatience in Lemma 1, the continuously dierentiable case with
a decreasing hazard rate lends us insight: an agent exhibits strongly diminishing impatience if he
discounts steeply at rst, with a high hazard rate, in the time immediately following a temporal
reference point, and then less and less steeply as time continues.
example, the hyperbolic form of discounting.

30

This matches, for one common

The intuition matches that of the diminishing impa-

tience case: if time is split in two, the overall discounting now has two periods of steep discounting
rather than one.
Since we are dealing with deterministic prospects here in the referenced denition of diminishing
impatience, there are no points at which new information is received. Thus,

T = {0, tF },

where

tF

is the time the payout is occurring. The restriction to an information focused agent, then, ensures
that there are no intermediate temporal reference points. Thus, discounting is based on the entire
time between the present and the payout, becoming analogous to standard models. This should not
be mistaken to mean that restricting attention to information focused agents in this model is no
dierent than applying

β−δ

or hyperbolic discounting; the similarity only extends to evaluating

deterministic prospects, when there is no new information to be had.
Similarly, Lemma 1 should not be misunderstood to be saying that the agent is exhibiting
diminishing impatience because the time is broken up into two segments.

Rather, the condition

which implies diminishing impatience is the same as the condition while implies more discounting
when time is broken up. It is this equivalence that will help lead to my rst result, but rst I must
address the ranking of information levels of prospects, and preferences over them.

30 Under

generalized hyperbolic discounting, a reward in

t
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time is discounted by

(1 + αt)−(γ/α) .

Denition.

Consider two prospects

A, B ∈ P

more grouped information than prospect

tA

B

if

such that

IA ⊂ IB .

kIB k − kIA k = 1

tB

A

is said to have

∃ i ≥ 2 s.t.

and

ΛAn = ΛBn ∀ n s.t. 0 ≤ n < i − 1,
tA

Then, prospect

and

tB

ΛAn−1 = ΛBn ∀ n s.t. i ≤ n ≤ kIB k,
∃ C ∈ P s.t. A

or if
than

B.

satisfy

has more grouped information than

C,

and

C

has more grouped information

Further, an agent's preferences exhibit preference for grouped information (PGI) if they

AB

for all such

A, B .

If the preference is everywhere strict, then denote it SPGI.

This denition is slightly cumbersome notationally, but not hard to understand intuitively. In
essence,

A

has more grouped information than

instance in which

A

B

if the two prospects are the same except for an

gives the same information in one update that

B

gives in two updates (more

than one instance of such is accounted for by the transitive part of the denition). I will illustrate
the denition with two examples.

a

a

0.9

0.5
0.5

0.1

0.5

0.1

b
a

0.5
0.9

b
t=2

t=0

Figure 2:
Prospect

A

Prospect

A,

i

is 2.

tA
0
must be the case that ΛA

=

IA = {2},

while prospect

B

tB
ΛB0 .

B

over distributions expected at t2

(a, 3),

and

0.5

IB = {1, 2}.

B,

right.

In the scope of the
First, it

This is just the requirement that they have the same initial

= 2 under prospect B

tA

tB

ΛA1 = ΛB2

A

0.5

1

alone.
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and

2

= 2 under prospect

weight placed on the degenerate

weight placed on the degenerate outcome of

communicates the same information at times

. That is, the distribution

is the same as that at t1

Indeed, this is the case; at those times both prospects have

outcome of

B

has

t=3

So, to satisfy the denition, two things have to be true.

distribution over outcomes, which they clearly do. Second,

A.

t=2

left, has more grouped information than prospect

in Figure 2 has

denition, the relevant

t=1

t=0

t=3

b

that prospect

(b, 3).
A

Intuitively, prospect

communicates at time

2

a

0.4
0.5

0.6

0.6

t=1

Figure 3:

t=3

t=2
Prospect

A,

0.4

c

0.1

=

tA
ΛA2

=

t=0

t=4

t=1

t=2

i

0.8 ∗ 0.4 + 0.2 ∗ 0.9 = 0.5
on outcome

tA
1

d. ΛA

0.4

t=4

t=3

left, has more grouped information than prospect

B,

right.

that satises the denition is, again, 2. It is easy

tB
ΛB3 . We see that at time tB
2

on the distribution placing

0.3
0.7

d

to conrm that the initial distribution over outcomes is the same.

tB
ΛB2 and

0.4
0.6

0.9

In this slightly more complex example, the

tA
ΛA1

0.3
0.7

0.2

0.7

t=0

0.8

b

0.3

0.5

a
b
c
d
a
b
c
d

0.4
0.6

=

weight on outcome

It must also be the case that

tB
2, ΛB2 places weight

a

and

weight on the distribution placing

0.6

0.3

0.8 ∗ 0.6 + 0.2 ∗ 0.1 = 0.5

weight on outcome

weight on outcome

is an identical distribution over distributions.

tA
2

ΛA

and

tB
3

ΛB

c,

b,

and weight

and

0.7

can be similarly

veried to be the same distribution over degenerate outcomes. Again, in essence, Prospect
in one step what prospect

B

weight

A

does

does in two.

The agent who has preferences for grouped information prefers to eliminate points in time at
which information is revealed by grouping information together.

Proposition 1.

An information focused agent exhibits (S)PGI if and only if he exhibits (strictly)

diminishing impatience.
Here the rst result draws an equivalence between a preference for more grouped information and
diminishing impatience. The intuition for the result is not dicult: a prospect with less grouped
information implies that the times which are being discounted over are further broken up. As was
previously established, the condition for diminishing impatience is the same as that which implies
more discounting when lengths of time are subdivided.
The restriction on the nature of the agent's framing function,
unrestricted it may be that a prospect

A

R,

is necessary here; if

R

were

contained more temporal reference points in spite of

having more grouped information. The restriction to information focused agents is not the minimum
restriction needed for the equivalence, but it is the most natural and intuitive such restriction.

31 The

31

minimum necessary restrictions for the equivalence would be rst that all informational update times are

temporal reference points, second that removing an informational update time removes that point as a temporal
reference point, and third that removing an informational update time does not add new temporal reference points.
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I now turn to a dierent notion of information preferences, and that is preferences over the
relative dispersion of informative points in time.

Denition.

Consider

than prospect

B

∃C∈P

if

information than

A, B ∈ P

B,

s.t.

such that

A

kIA k = kIB k.

IA

and

IB

has less dispersed information

has less dispersed information than

or if all of the following is true. First,

single unique element in

A

Then

C

which has less dispersed

kIA r IB k = kIB r IA k = 1.

Second, the

have the same index in their respective sets, denoted
tA

n0 .

Third,

tB

ΛAn = ΛBn ∀ n, 0 ≤ n ≤ kIA k.
Fourth,
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
min{tA
n0 − tn0 −1 , tn0 +1 − tn0 } < min{tn0 − tn0 −1 , tn0 +1 − tn0 }.

Further, an agent is said to have preference for less dispersed information (PLDI) if his preferences are such that

AB

for all such

A, B .

If the preference is everywhere strict, then denote it

SPLDI.
The denition essentially says: take a prospect,

B , take a point in time at which new information

is revealed in that prospect (but not one where outcomes are received, since from
and

B

the set

tA

tB

ΛA0 = ΛB0

,

A

must have the same distribution over outcomes) and shift it so that its nearest neighbor in

T

is closer than its previous nearest neighbor. Then the resulting new prospect,

A,

has less

dispersed information. Note that the conditions of the denition imply that the same information
is revealed at the shifted point in both prospects; all that changes is when it is revealed.
More succinctly, if you push informative elements of

TA

closer together, the resulting prospect

has less dispersed information. The transitive part of the denition says that if you do this multiple
times, the end result has less dispersed information than what you started with. A few examples
will make this clear. Consider,
Prospect

TA = {0, 1, 4, 6}

and

TB = {0, 2, 4, 6}.

A satises the fourth criterion for having less dispersed information than prospect B .

their informational update points give the same information, then
than

B.

The relevant

n'

for the denition is 1, since it is element

its nearest neighbor than

tB
1 .

C

and

A,

TC = {0, 1, 5, 6}.

Prospect

information than

Proposition 2.

C

A.

t1

has less dispersed information

that is dierent.

tA
1

is closer to

Specically,

A
A
A
min{tA
1 − t0 , t2 − t1 } = 1
Now consider

A

If

and

B
B
B
min{tB
1 − t0 , t2 − t1 } = 2.

Assuming the rst three criteria are satised for prospects

has less dispersed information than prospect

Conceptually,

tA
2,

at 4, has been shifted to

tC
2,

B

because it has less dispersed

5.

An information focused agent exhibits (S)PLDI if and only if he exhibits (strictly)

strongly diminishing impatience.
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The intuition here is a bit less obvious. Less dispersed information, for example, means moving
from discounting over two moderate lengths of time to discounting over one shorter and one longer
length of time. If one pictures the tail of one of the moderate lengths being removed and added to
the other moderate length, this creates one shorter and one longer period. If it is the case that the
discounting becomes less steep as time goes on, then the tail removed is discounted more heavily
then the tail added. This, then, connects back to Lemma 1. In that Lemma, one can see

t1 + t3

t2

and

as being the moderate times, whereas t1 and t2 + t3 are the shorter and longer times (because

t1 < t2 ).

Lemma 2. An information focused agent exhibits (S)PGI if they exhibit (S)PLDI.
Proof: Direct from Propositions 1 and 2, and the fact that (strictly) strongly diminishing impatience
implies (strictly) diminishing impatience.
This relationship concerning dierent types of information preferences is not surprising.

A

prospect with more grouped information can be thought of as a limiting case of a prospect with
less dispersed information, in which a shifted informative element of

T

is shifted close enough to its

nearest neighbor to coincide with it in the limit. This limiting relationship is important conceptually,
as it allows the sidestepping of tricky issues of how to dene a single point in time at which an agent
received information. Further, the combination of both types of preference allows us to ll in some
gaps left by the denition of PGI.
To see what is meant by this, consider two prospects,

TB = {0, 2, 4, 6},
over times

2

and

where prospect

4.

A

A

and

B,

gives the same information at time

Intuition may lead toward regarding prospect

information than prospect

B,

with

but they do not satisfy the denition.

A

3

TA = {0, 3, 6}

that prospect

B

and

spreads

as having more grouped

However, prospect

C,

with

TC = {0, 3, 4, 6} does have less dispersed information than B , and A has more grouped information
than

C.

So, an agent exhibiting PLDI would satisfy

A  C  B.

However, this does not necessarily extend to any such situation. Consider instead
and

TB = {0, 1, 1.1, 3.9, 4}

information at time

2.5

as

B

where, similar to the previous example, prospect

spreads over

less dispersed information than

B.

1.1

and

3.9.

TA = {0, 1, 2.5, 4}

A

gives the same

In this case, there is no intermediate

Intuitively, this is because

C

with

B 's information is already clustered in

tight temporal groups, and an agent exhibiting PLDI might prefer they stay clustered. Thus, knowledge of PLDI is not enough here to determine the agent's preference between the two prospects.
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An agent whose

D(t)

is represented by a

β−δ

function, and thus who exhibits SPGI as well

as complete indierence to dispersion, would prefer prospect

A;

such an agent cares only about

the number of groupings he receives the information in. However, a

β−δ

discounting function is

arguably a poor choice for modeling in a continuous time setting, as it sees no distinction between
a minute gap and a day. This is especially true if uncertainty resolution is to take place arbitrarily
soon after the evaluation of prospects.

For this reason, in this setting, a hyperbolic discounting

function with very steep initial discounting that rapidly approaches geometric discounting is likely
a superior choice to model agents who exhibit diminishing impatience, but show little evidence of
strongly diminishing impatience.

4 Non-Informative Temporal Reference Points
In this section, the assumption that agents are information focused is relaxed, so the agents may
regard non-informative points in time as important. This is done to accommodate the theoretical
case that an agent may focus on a particular point in time based on how prospects are presented or
framed, such as if an experiment repeatedly involves a particular point in time.
First, some notation. For a given set,

S,

denote:

S +t ≡ {s + t| s ∈ S}

Denition.

A prospect

X

is said to be

τ -shifted

from prospect

Y,

if

IX = IY+τ ,
and if

∀ distributions over outcomes, 4X

and

4Y

satisfying

4X (α, t+τ ) = 4Y (α, t), ∀ (α, t) ∈ O,

it is the case that

tX

tY

ΛXn (4X ) = ΛYn (4Y ) ∀ n, 1 ≤ n ≤ kIX k.
Simply put, a prospect
prospect

Y

in time by
whenever

X

is

τ -shifted

from

Y

if

X

is equivalent to taking everything about

(outcome mapping function, timing and distributions over signals) and shifting it forward

τ.

X

is

Note that, in particular, this means that

τ -shifted

from

Y.
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40X (α, t + τ ) = 40Y (α, t), ∀ (α, t) ∈ O,

Proposition 3.
shifted from

A,

An agent's preferences satisfy

with

R(C) = R(A)+τ ∪ {0},

and

A ∼ B ⇔ C ∼ D, ∀ A, B, C, D ∈ P s.t. C
D

is

τ -shifted

from

B,

with

is

τ-

R(D) = R(B)+τ ∪ {0}.

Proposition 3 takes two competing prospects and shifts them into the future; the result says
that if the point they are shifted to becomes a temporal reference point in addition to any that
already existed, then an agent's indierence between the two prospects is maintained. The key here
is that

R(C)

and

R(D)

both contain the element

τ

as their rst non-zero element. As the agent

still discounts back to that same point for both, before discounting to the present, the indierence
between the prospects

A

and

B

is maintained. In other words, the added discounting of

same for both shifted prospects. The particular discount function,

D(t),

D(τ )

is the

used is irrelevant to this

result.
The signicance of this is as a resolution to the apparent conict of diering experimental evidence
on diminishing impatience. As discussed in the introduction, Glimcher et al. (2007) shows results
of an experiment in which the indierence curves of agents were maintained when the prospects
were shifted into the future by 60 days. The model here can account for this through the suggestion
that, because every one of a large number of choice pairs in the delayed set of prospects involved a
comparison to $20 in 60 days, agents were induced to regard 60 days as a temporal reference point,
a subjectively important date in time, in their evaluation and comparison of prospects.
Thus, the combination of Proposition 3, with a discount function implying diminishing impatience
(in accordance with Lemma 1), can account for both the results of Glimcher, and the pervasive
evidence showing that diminishing impatience weakens at the very least, as in Frederick et al.
(2002), and arguably disappears, as rewards become more distant. This is done through the simple
argument that the former experiment provided ample reason for agents to focus on a particular
point of time in the future, whereas other experiments on diminishing impatience have not done so.
Further contrast of this evidence is examined in Section 6.

5 Interpretation of Discounting in the Model
In this section, I will discuss possible interpretations of discounting in this model, and what it might
mean, in an intuitive sense, to discount between temporal reference points.
One possible interpretation of the discount function,

D(t),

is to split it into two components:

geometric time discounting, along with a survival function representing implicit risk,

e−ρt s(t).
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s(t): D(t) ≡

In this case, the survival function,

s(t),

can be interpreted as capturing the subjective view of

the probability with which the explicitly stated outcomes of the prospect will endure over time

1 − s(t),

then, is the subjective probability assigned to not explicitly stated (implicit) outcomes

by the agent.

This implicit risk may be a result of pessimism, distrust, or simply non-explicit

death probability. It is straightforward to show that the same requirements on
diminishing impatience, PGI, PLDI, etc., apply to
example, if
if

s(t)

t.

s(t)

s(t)

D(t)

which imply

directly under this interpretation. Thus, for

is continuously dierentiable, then a time focused agent exhibits PLDI if and only

has a decreasing hazard rate,

h(t) =

−s0 (t)
s(t) .

A decreasing hazard rate lends itself well to an interpretation where focusing on particular points
in time causes a rise in pessimism at those points which fades until brought back into focus by another
such point. An agent, whether consciously or not, may view a point in time on which he is focused
as an opportunity for something to go wrong with regard to the explicitly stated outcome of the
prospect. While this may seem supercially similar to loss aversion, and the preference for grouped
information that can arise out of it, such as in Köszegi and Rabin (2009), they are functionally quite
distinct. Loss aversion implies greater weight being placed on negative adjustments in expectations
than is placed on positive adjustments; no mechanism for the distinction of positive and negative
adjustments exists in this model. This interpretation can however be extended to encompass the risk
of some single external outcome taking place, provided that this outcome is weakly worse than any
of the explicitly stated ones.

32

For example, prospect death risk as examined by Halevy (2008), or

the implicit risk that an experimenter oering you a deferred payment will renege on his agreement
at some point.
A second interpretation is to view the discount function as time discounting, with the addition
that the agent focuses on temporal reference points as if  he was his future self at that point. So, for
example, if he regards one year from now as being a temporal reference point, he would rst discount
payouts occurring after that point in time as if  he were himself in a year, and then discount back
to the present from that point.

Thus, the signicance of the temporal reference points would be

as points to which the agent projects himself in evaluating prospects. In this interpretation,
as hyperbolic time discounting, such as

−(γ/α)

D(t) = (1 + αt)

,

would satisfy the conditions for

diminishing and strongly diminishing impatience, and thus for PGI and PLDI.

32 This

could be t in the model simply by normalizing the utility payout of such an outcome to zero.
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D(t)

6 Conclusion and Future Research
I conclude having shown that temporal reference points hold promise in giving novel explanation for
a number of experimental results. Even with this promise, the question of how agents form temporal
reference points remains to be explored in detail.
I dealt with, rst, the case in which temporal reference points are formed by informational
updates.

This assumption immediately leads to the question of information thresholds; that is,

how much information is needed to form a temporal reference point. For the information focused
consumer, it was assumed here that any information creates a temporal reference point. However,
in daily evaluation of prospects, informational updates are often, in a sense, ubiquitous.

When

considering the returns on prospects derived from stock investment for example, information is
received on a daily basis by the simple fact that the agent knows that the stock market hasn't
crashed today. It is not plausible, however, to suppose that such low-granularity information would
cause the individual to focus on every instance at which he becomes freshly aware that, yes, the
stock market is still intact. Thus, what the threshold for informational granularity is in order to
trigger a temporal reference point is an important question for the viability of this model.
I also dealt with the case where uniform delay of two prospects caused the delay factor to become
a temporal reference point. This particular deviation from information focused agents was chosen
due to the results of Glimcher et al.

(2007).

Glimcher, as earlier discussed, proposes that the

variable of interest explaining their results is the time of the soonest possible reward, in contrast to
the explanation proposed here. The data from their experiment alone is not enough to disentangle
the two explanations, but such disentanglement should be possible through choice experiments in
which focus is made on a latter point in time (e.g. 60 days), but choice sets include options from
that time, later times and earlier times.
Further, while the formation of a temporal reference point by the subjects in Glimcher is plausible
due to the focus and repetition of a particular point in time, this does not go very far towards
developing a actual theory of how temporal reference points are formed.

Issues of attention and

focus, repetition and ubiquity in temporal framing may all be factors in the formation of such.
This is not an issue in applications where information focused consumers is a natural and obvious
assumption to make, but if a theory of temporal reference points is to be extended beyond these
cases, more investigation into the method of the formation of such reference points will be needed.
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Part III

Related Literature
Time Inconsistency
 Good resolutions are useless attempts to interfere with scientic laws. Their origin is
pure vanity. Their result is absolutely nil. (Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray)

Samuelson (1937) gave us the discounted utility function that became ubiquitous in economic literature. In spite of Samuelson's concerns about the model (It is completely arbitrary to assume that
the individual behaves so as to maximize an integral of the form envisaged in [the DU model]), it
became the standard due to its elegance and tractability. As mounting evidence since that time has
shown, Samuelson was right to disavow the descriptive accuracy of his model. Numerous inconsistencies in behavior have arisen inconsistent with the DU model, among them time inconsistency,
the simple observation that what an agent wants for himself tomorrow is not the same as what he
wants when tomorrow arrives. The empirical evidence for and theoretical work on time inconsistency and the subtopic of diminishing impatience is broad and spans disciplines, seeing particular
interest in psychology and economics.

I focus here on a few of the more inuential and relevant

studies. Frederick et al. (2002) provides a far more extensive and thorough review of the economic
literature on time preference, with a special focus on time inconsistency, up to the date of that work.
The literature in this section is relevant to both the multiself bargaining model and the temporal
reference points model.
The classic work Strotz (1956) is the rst to formally analyze time inconsistency. Strotz sets out a
model in which an agent must choose a plan for lifetime consumption with the added complication of
a non-geometric discount function. He identies the inherent uctuations in behavior and preference
reversals that this would lead to and identies two alternate strategies that a non-myopic agent can
adopt in the face of such challenges. The rst strategy is pre-commitment: noting that the ability
to lock in or lock out certain future actions would always be desirable to a non-myopic agent, Strotz
explains the observed use of costly commitment devices. The second strategy is consistency: in the
face of a lack of commitment ability an agent would naturally wish to choose the best current plan
given the foreknowledge of the diering preferences of the agent's self in the future and the ability
of that future self to change the plan.
Strotz maintains that exponential discounting is the proper way of discounting, and concludes
with the speculation that exponential discounting is a learned behavior which, with proper education
and upbringing, can override the inherent non-exponential form. In the best case the agent becomes
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a true geometric discounter, having supplanted his natural inborn form of time inconsistency. In the
less eective cases, we may see individuals being weak, and failing to uphold the correct exponential
discounting that they have been taught. This is the cause of the splurges, binges and extravagances
of human behavior.
Ainslie (1975) gives a wide overview of literature on impulsiveness in economics, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and therapy. He identies three proposed explanations for impulsive behavior.
First, that the agents do not truly understand the consequences of their actions. Second, that agents
are compelled by a lower principle to act against their own best interest. Third, that agents innately distort their valuation of consequences with imminent consequences having a greater weight.
Through the aid of extensive animal research, Ainslie identies the third as the most promising in explanatory power. He establishes that a hyperbolic discounting function and its associated smoothly
diminishing impatience is the best and most elegant t for the behaviors prescribed by the ani-

33

mal research.

He further notes that the same discounting function creates an elegant explanation

for many observed human behaviors of impulsivity. Finally, Ainslie makes the important observation that Strotz was partially incorrect to identify pre-commitment and consistency as alternatives,
noting simply that an agent would ideally employ both: committing against as many undesirable
behaviors as possible, while retaining consistency with those that remained. In Ainslie (1992) he
follows this earlier work with further evidence showing that both animal and human behavior ts
hyperbolic discount functions.
Note here that while the multiself bargaining model I propose generates behavior in line with
hyperbolic discounting, it could be interpreted to t into Ainslie's second category. That is, with the
impatient self representing a low impulse attempting to pull the individual away from their true
preferences. While tempting, however, I do not see a good argument to be made for why the patient
self is any more true than the impatient one. This leaves the model, by default, to fall into Ainslie's
third category, if any of them.
Thaler (1981) provides an inuential study testing three hypotheses concerning patterns of decision making. First, he nds that implicit discount rates decrease with length of time, indicating
that the discount rate is higher over proximate time than over distant time. The explanation he
promotes as most promising is that the agent inherently sees a greater dierence between today and
tomorrow than between a year from now and a year and a day. This is the explanation that has
been most prominently adopted in the economic literature to explain preference reversal. Second,
he nds that implicit discount rates decrease with the size of the rewards under consideration. He
identies as a plausible explanation a cost of self control that does not increase with the size of the
reward. Third, he identies that discount rates are smaller for losses than for gains. The explanation

33 Specically,

under generalized hyperbolic discounting, a reward in
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t

time is discounted by

(1 + αt)−(γ/α) .

put forth for this is one of loss aversion: an agent does not equate the opportunity costs of forgone
gain with out of pocket costs, over-weighing the latter compared to the former.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) argue that insucient attention has been applied to violations of
the canonical discounted utility (DU) of Samuelson (1937). They enumerate four identied anomalies
in behavior not consistent with the DU model, and develop a model that accounts for them. Three
of these anomalies match with the three results of Thaler above.

The fourth, documented by

Loewenstein (1988), nds that the amount required to compensate for delaying a reward by a given
interval was two to four times greater than the amount subjects were willing to sacrice to speed up
consumption by the same interval. This is evidence of a framing eect because both choices were
just dierent representations of the same underlying options. They encompass these anomalies in
their model by including these framing eects, a value function which is steeper for losses than for
gains and, most relevant to the present work, a hyperbolic time discounting function.
Keren and Roelofsma (1995) examine the connection between the certainty eect (the observation that certain outcomes are over-weighed relative to near-certain outcomes) and diminishing
impatience. In their experiment, they develop six subject groups. In one group, subjects were offered a choice between $100 now and $110 in four weeks; 82% chose the $100. In another group,
subjects were oered a choice between $100 in 26 weeks and $110 in 30 weeks; 37% chose the $100.
This demonstrates the classic diminishing impatience and is in line with previous work. However,
consider another two groups in their study. In one, subjects were oered a choice between a 50%
chance of $100 now, and a 50% chance of $110 in four weeks; 39% chose the rst option. In the
other, subjects were oered a choice between a 50% chance of $100 in 26 weeks, and a 50% chance
of $110 in 30 weeks; 33% chose the rst option. Similar results were shown for a 90% chance set.
In other words, when payments are made less certain the present bias and diminishing impatience
quickly fades. Their results are suggestive that at least part of the reason that subjects overweight
the present is that the present is absolutely certain; that is, diminishing impatience is at least in
part caused by the certainty eect. When the present is made very uncertain, present bias fades.
Halevy (2008), building on the results of Keren and Roelofsma, develops a discrete time model
with a rank-dependent expected utility maximizer with constant stopping (death) probability. He
develops his model to show the equivalence of diminishing impatience and the common ratio eect
in such a setting. A correction by Saito (2011) argues that the equivalence is between diminishing
impatience and the certainty eect, and between strongly diminishing impatience and the common
ratio eect.
Chakraborty and Halevy (2015) further corrects both Halevy (2008) and Saito (2011). The authors show a problem in both works stemming from a too-weak denition of diminishing impatience.
In the rst two papers diminishing impatience and strongly diminishing impatience are dened based
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on a delay of only one period in two competing rewards. In the 2015 paper, Chakraborty and Halevy
show that these time preference notions must be dened for all possible (discrete) delays in order for
the desired equivalence to hold. With their strengthened notions of delay independent diminishing
impatience (DIDI) and delay independent strongly diminishing impatience (DISDI), they show the
equivalence in their setting between DIDI and the certainty eect (CE) and between DISDI and the
common ratio eect (CRE). Notably, this is an equivalence between a time preference based in a
discrete time setting, and risk preferences over probabilities in the unit interval. Both are united by
the property of increasing elasticity of the probability distortion function inherent in rank-dependent
utility. This dierence in domains for time and risk preferences, one discrete and one continuous,
is what led the original weaker denition to fail to create equivalence. With the original denition,
the risk preference (CE, CRE) implied the corresponding time preference, but the converse did not
hold, as Chakraborty and Halevy illustrate with an example. Intuitively, the strengthening of the
time preference denitions the authors employ changes their notion of diminishing impatience to one
that has a natural connection to a continuous time setting. To see this intuition, note that if the
denition holds true for any delay, then it can approximate a notion of diminishing impatience in
a continuous time setting (such as the denition employed by the temporal reference points model)
by employing arbitrarily small period lengths. There is no such connection possible to continuous
time with the original denition based on a delay of a single period length, which in a sense causes
the original denition to be unable to bridge the gap between the discrete time preferences and
continuous risk preferences.
Turning back to non-rank-dependent settings, Laibson (1997) popularized the use of the
model of discounting in discrete time models. In such a discount function, consumption
in the future is discounted using discount factor

0 < β < 1,

βδ τ

when

τ >0

(and by factor

1

for

τ

β−δ

periods

τ = 0).

When

the author argues, this discount function retains the important qualitative properties

of hyperbolic discounting while remaining relatively tractable.
hyperbolic. Laibson's work led to widespread use of the

β−δ

He terms this discounting quasiform of discounting in applications.

In Laibson (1998), he applies this model to known stylized facts about consumption choices, showing
that it predicts many well-documented regularities. He further expounds on the welfare implication
of the hyperbolic model, specically how under-saving can lead to welfare losses in the Pareto sense:
to all present and future selves. In Laibson et al. (1998), the authors calibrate a model to

β−δ

discounting based on data on saving for retirement. They show that patterns of asset accumulation
are consistent with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, using observed regularities to distinguish between
quasi-hyperbolic and exponential savers.
Frederick et al.

(2002), as mentioned, provides a very thorough survey of the literature on

non-exponential time discounting. One result from their work bears particular mention here. By
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analyzing the numerous studies measuring discount rates, they nd that after a horizon of around
a year there is no evidence at all of a further decline in discount rates.

This is strong evidence

that discounting is asymptotically exponential; that is, discount functions become increasingly close
to exponential as time spans increase.

This evidence ts in with the multiself bargaining model,

provided that the long-term and short-term selves have reasonably distinct discount rates. In the
language of the temporal reference points model, this would be consonant with a discount function
exhibiting preference for grouped information, and also preference for less dispersed information
within a limited time horizon. Such an agent would only care about the proximity of information
to other information when the updates were relatively close.
Harris and Laibson (2013) provide an alternate approach to avoiding the discontinuity of predictions that come from the standard beta-delta model by introducing an element of uncertainty. In
their model, there remains a discontinuous distinction between now and later, as in standard

β − δ,

but the agent, in evaluating the discounted value of rewards, is uncertain about when now will end,
and later will begin. The interpretation of this is challenging, as it implies the agent is internally
uncertain about how they themselves are discounting future rewards. However, it is shown that this
model of uncertainty generates preferences equivalent to a deterministic discounting function which
is qualitatively similar to true hyperbolic discounting. Thus, their work presents an alternate form
of a continuous time discounting function (as opposed to the hyperbolic discounting function).
Of special signicance to the temporal reference points model is the work of Glimcher et al.
(2007), whose well-documented results stand in direct opposition to several of the others discussed
here. A study performed on individuals in MRIs given choices over pairs of prospects leads the authors to disagree with the fact that diminishing impatience swiftly disappears as contrasted prospects
become more distant, and also disagree with the fact that preference reversals occur when options
are pushed into the future. In the study one set of options, the immediate set, gave choices between
$20 immediately and delayed amounts greater than $20. An indierence curve was t to individuals
based on the choices made, and the implicit discounting indicated by this curve was found to be
well t by a hyperbolic function. This rst results conrms previous work. However, another set of
options in their study, the delayed set, gave choices between $20 in two months, and an amount
greater than $20 at a delay of more than two months. It is important to note that every choice in
the delayed set had  $20 in two months as one of the two options. Two important results of theirs
stand out.
First, and most importantly, they nd that the hyperbolic discount function stochastically tting
the indierence curve generated by choices over the immediate set is the same as the hyperbolic
discount function for the indierence curve of the delayed set. In the words of the authors, subjects
were just as hyperbolic when making choices at delays of two months as they were when making
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choices of no delay. Second, they nd that neural activity for the delayed set was scaled down by
approximately as much as the 60 day option was for the immediate set. For instance, the 120 days
option in the delayed option set was scaled by that same factor twice. Neither of these results are
in line with previous results concerning time discounting. The authors propose that the additional
variable of interest is the time of the soonest possible reward, supposing that the time of this reward
becomes a default starting point for discounting. In other words, they argue that individuals are
not present biased as much as they are as soon as possible biased. This explanation is not fully
sucient to rectify evidence, such as that of Keren and Roelofsma (1995) mentioned above, that
agents do exhibit behavior consonant with diminishing impatience. The evidence presented there,
and in many other surveys, cannot be explained by a bias for the soonest possible reward. Indeed,
no such bias appears at all when the rewards become distant enough. The results of Glimcher et
al. as well as the literature preceding it can be rectied in the temporal reference points model, as
I discussed in that work. The fact that every comparison was made to 60 days is what makes it
plausible that an agent would focus in on 60 days as an important point in time, whereas such a
focus would be absent from other studies done on diminishing impatience.
Mullainathan and Banerjee (2010) take a dierent approach to time inconsistency by proposing
a class of temptation goods. These goods are assumed to generate utility for the current self, but
not for earlier selves that anticipate their consumption. The source of inconsistency is immediately
apparent: an agent never wishes his future selves to consume temptation goods, yet always wishes
to consume them immediately himself.

By assuming the fraction of marginal earnings spent on

temptation good is decreasing with overall consumption, the authors predict behavior consistent with
regularities concerning the behavior of the poor relative to the rich, such as borrowing repeatedly
at extremely high interest rates.
Going one step further in their notion of time inconsistency, Jamison and Wegener (2010) propose
that people regard their future selves as truly separate persons. They draw upon neuroscientic and
functional imaging studies that seem to indicate that mental systems associated with mentalizing
other agents are the same as those associated with imagining oneself in the future. Thus, they argue
that modeling intertemporal choice as a strategic game between present and futures selves is more
than just a convenient modeling device, but has direct descriptive value.
Other evidence of diminishing impatience includes Angeletos et al. (2001), who simulate both
hyperbolic and exponential households, nding that the former t consumption data much better.
Kirby and Herrenstein (1995) provide another study documenting preference reversal.

Myerson

and Green (1995) show further evidence of hyperbolic discounting in particular via a experimental
study. Fang and Silverman (2009) estimate a structural model of labor supply and welfare program
participation.

They use their estimation to reject exponential discounting in favor of hyperbolic,
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and then use counterfactuals to quantify a measure of the utility loss stemming from a lack of
commitment power.
As mentioned rst by Strotz (1956), and followed up on by many papers mentioned, an immediate
corollary of diminishing impatience is a desire for commitment power, unless the agent is completely
naive about future preference reversals. The evidence for this preference for commitment is also substantial. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) show that students voluntarily choose binding intermediate
deadlines for paper submissions in a college class. However, they do not set them optimally, and
external deadlines are still superior. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) report on a proposed, and tested,
savings plan which allows workers to voluntarily commit to automatically saving a fraction of future
raise increases for retirement. Their evidence shows that the majority of subjects subscribe and stay
in the program. Kaur et al. (2009) report on an experiment on workers in an Indian data entry rm.
Workers had a wage per unit of work of

w/2

w

and could voluntarily choose to have that wage drop to

unless they achieved a certain minimum target which they could also choose. Despite the fact

that they stood to lose quite a lot, a signicant number of subjects committed to non-trivial targets.

Temptation & Multiple Selves
The term temptation has been used to refer to two types of behavioral phenomenon observed
in the literature.

The rst is related to the tendency of agents to be tempted to make decisions

biased toward payos in the present or near future; this use is tied directly into time inconsistency.
The second is the observation of violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives when multiple
immediate choices are available, where agents may be tempted by an appealing option which
inuences their choice without actually choosing the appealing option. More precisely, violations of
Sen's (1971) condition

C(A)

α,

which states that if

is the set of elements chosen from set

x ∈ B ⊂ A,

and

x ∈ C(A),

then

x ∈ C(B),

where

A.

Temptation in either form will lead to agents having a preference for commitment: the ability
to constrain the eect of these tempting options either by removing options in advance, or by
exercising costly self-control. Due to a large number of models addressing both forms of temptation
simultaneously, and simple conation of the word temptation to mean either of these eects,
this section will necessarily have some spill-over to the previous section.

I particularly focus on

literature examining these concepts through the lens of models containing multiple sets of conicting
preferences.
First, there is copious research, largely in psychology, showing that self-regulation seems to be a
limited resource. Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) examine patterns of self-regulatory failure in
the literature. They conclude that the evidence supports a limited resource model of self-regulation,
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and that people often voluntarily lose control. Muraven et al. (1998) follows this by examining
the limited resource model of self-control in more detail. Through a series of studies they are able to
show that a limited resource model ts the data better than other models of self-control. Baumeister
et al. (2007) provides a further short survey of evidence for the limited resource model to that date.
Vohs and Faber (2007) take these insights to economics by examining the hypotheses of the
limited resource model as related to impulse buying.

They nd that participants who had par-

ticipated in a willpower depleting activity felt stronger urges to buy and spent more money when
confronted with unanticipated buying opportunities.

Similarly, Ozdenoren et al.

(2012) apply a

limited willpower model to the domain of endowment consumption over time. Their model generates a number of qualitative predictions, showing that time preference may be domain specic, that
previous actions aect preference for future ones (due to potential expenditures of willpower in the
recent past), and that intertemporal smoothing will not, in general, appear.
A limited self-control resource implies violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives; the
act of resisting one alternative will aect an agent's ability to resist another. While willpower as
a limited resource is not a part of the multiself bargaining model, the same behavior is generated
by both. In the multiself bargaining case, the introduction of more tempting options, that is more
options desirable to the short-term self, increases the bargaining power of that self, and thus forces
the long-term self to 'give ground'.

This can thus be interpreted as a limited capacity to resist

multiple tempting options.
Gul and Pesendorfer introduced the axiomatic treatment of temptation and self control.

In

Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), they develop a very important axiomatic representation result for
temptation preferences with self-control in a two period setting.

In the rst period, the agent

chooses a set of lotteries. In the second period, the agent chooses one lottery from the set chosen in
the rst period. An agent has both an a priori ranking over singleton sets of lotteries, a commitment
ranking, represented by

u(·),

and an instantaneous urge or temptation toward singleton sets of

v(·).

lotteries, a temptation ranking, represented by

An agent must compromise between what he

would have chosen without temptation, represented by

arg max u(x),
x

not choosing the most tempting option in each set, which would be

and the psychological cost of

arg max v(x).
x

The cost of this

self-control is represented by the temptation utility dierence between the choice made and the most
tempting choice, so that the further from the temptation, the greater the cost. Thus, an individual
chooses

x

to maximize

u(x) − (max v(y) − v(x)),
y

so that preferences over sets of options in the rst

period can be represented by:

U (A) = max u(x) − (max v(y) − v(x)).
x∈A

y∈A

Gul and Pesendorfer then dene preferences in the second period over
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{(A, x) : x ∈ A}

where

A

is the set of lotteries chosen in period 1, and

x ∈ A

is the lottery chosen in period 2.

In

other words, the preference is over both the menu and the choice from the menu. This extended
preference, denoted by
if

∗ ,

({x}, x) ∗ ({x, y}, x).

the temptation of

y,

allows them to formalize the notion of temptation, saying y tempts x
In other words, the agent would rather choose

then choose

x

in the presence of the temptation of

y.

x

in the absence of

This preference allows

them to develop a notion of dynamically consistent preferences while accounting for self-control and
temptation eects. More specically, since the preferences are dened over the menu and the choice,
and not the choice itself, the representation allows the accounting of apparent temptation eects
while maintaining a notion of independence.
In Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), they extend their two period analysis to an innite horizon to
provide an alternative to non-exponential time discounting. This gives rise to a representation with a
recursive denition of preferences, in which in each period the consumer need pay a self-control cost
based on the diculty of not consuming their entire wealth. Or, more precisely, based on the dierence between the temptation utility granted by consuming everything, and the temptation utility of
consuming the choice made. They interpret this as an individual whose temptation utility interferes
with his long-run self-interest. Notably, they nd that removing non-binding constraints changes
equilibrium allocations, and that steady state consumption is independent of initial endowments and
increasing in self-control (or decreasing in self-control costs).
As for economic literature on multiple selves, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) deal with the issue of
self-control and intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization in discrete time.
This organization consists of a farsighted planner and a series of myopic doers who have no care
beyond the current period. Their work stresses the similarities of this conict within an individual
to the principle-agent conict of actual rms and is, to the best of my awareness, the rst formal
economic model to view an individual as having two sets of preferences at a single point in time
that are in conict. They argue that such a model is unavoidable to explain self-control, because
self-control implies conict within the self.
To expand a bit on the details of their model, a series of single-period lived doers derive utility
from consumption, and have direct control over the consumption in that period. The single planner
derives utility from the consumption of all doers, rather than getting consumption directly. Each
doer would consume the maximum amount possible if allowed, but the planner is able to restrict
their choices through discretion and rules. Discretion takes the form of a parameter choice which
is costly in utility terms but limits the maximum consumption that can be chosen.

This is the

essence of costly self control. Rules refers to the use of either pre-commitment, or the imposition
of a rule of thumb that the doer has to follow, such as a self-imposed ban on borrowing (perhaps
with exceptions to be made for houses and automobiles).
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They apply their model rst to data

from pension plans, which showed that pension savings and non-pension savings were not perfect
substitutes. More specically, the introduction of forced savings was not oset by an equal decrease
in voluntary savings. This is explained by the involuntary savings being essentially willpower-free,
allowing the planner to focus self-control on voluntary savings.
It is shown in Benabou and Pycia (2002) that Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) representation can
also be interpreted through the dual-self view of Thaler and Shefrin, in which there is an endogenous
probability of losing control to your more myopic urge. Their re-interpretation bears an interesting
conceptual connection to the multiself bargaining model. Specically, Benabou and Pycia postulate
two selves who lobby the brain for control, each expending a resource cost, and receiving probability
of control proportional to the expenditure of the eort.

This bears a close resemblance to the

conict that I use to determine the disagreement point.

There are important distinctions, most

saliently of which is that the multiself bargaining here allows bargaining between the selves to a
mutually preferred point, rather than stopping at strict randomization between their most favored
points. This allows the accommodation of randomization in the case of discrete decisions, as well
as deterministic decisions for actions such as savings-consumption choice. In contrast, Benabou and
Pycia's interpretation implies randomization in all cases where the selves prefer dierent outcomes.
Further, I distinguish selves by a single parameter rather than distinct evaluations.

This more

restrictive view is limiting, but allows the generation of novel insights.
Chatterjee and Krishna (2006, 2009), develop a model of conicting preferences closely related
to the representation result of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). In the rst period an individual has to
choose a set of feasible choices from which he will select one in the second period. With a probability
dependent on the set chosen, the individual in essence loses control to an alter ego in the second
period, who makes a choice based on their own preferences, represented by

v(·).

model, in which

an alter-ego has a probability of appearing and overriding the decision of the far-sighted decision
maker. The preferences over sets of lotteries, then, is given by:

U (A) = (1 − pA )maxu(x) + pA max u(y),
x∈A

where

pA

y∈Bv (A)

is the probability of losing control when faced with set

maximizers in

A.

A,

and

Bv (A)

is the set of

v

The authors show that this dual-self representation is a relaxation of the axioms

of Gul and Pesendorfer. That is, Gul and Pesendorfer's representation implies that a decision maker
behaves as if  he has an alternate ego in the second period when he is making choices in the rst
period. The authors argue that this reinterpretation allows unambiguous welfare statements in the
face of dynamic inconsistency.
Building on Thaler and Shefrin (1981), work of Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2011, 2012) bears
the closest resemblance in the literature to the multiself bargaining model. In Fudenberg and Levine
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(2006), they develop a discrete time model consisting of a single long-lived patient self, and a series
of one period lived short-term selves, in which the short-term self has full control over the action
in each period, and the long-term self exerts costly eort to constrain the actions available to the
short-term self, where the cost is increasing in the utility denied to the short-term self. Their model
is more general than that of Thaler and Shefrin, applying to a wide range of situations, as opposed
to simply consumption-savings. Further, they specify the self-control aspect more precisely, allowing
the model to be more tractable and make more precise predictions.
Expanding on the details of their model, each period is played in two stages. First, the longrun self chooses a self-control action that inuences the utility function of the myopic self.

The

choice of this self-control action reduces utility for both selves, and changes the preferences of the
short-term self.

Second, the short-term self chooses the optimal action (for himself ).

They use

their model, rst, to explain diminishing impatience. Further, by arguing that self-control costs are
convex rather than linear, they explain violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives as well as
experimental evidence showing decreased self-control in the face of increased cognitive load. Rabin's
paradox of risk aversion in the large and small is explained by a case in which cash-on-hand is used
as a commitment device, leading the agent to consume all small but unexpected winnings. When
winning large amounts, self-control allows the agent to save some of it. Intertemporal smoothing
makes agents less risk averse in this latter case, so that they are less risk averse to large gambles
than to small ones. Further, they argue that the axioms of Gul & Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) need be
relaxed in order to account for the experimental evidence on the eects of cognitive load.
In Fudenberg and Levine (2011), they extend their model, with the assumption a convex cost
of self control, in order to account for a wider range of puzzling experimental phenomena.

One

important qualitative prediction derived in their work is that preference reversal is less likely when
the probability of rewards is smaller. This is in line with the data of Keren and Roelsofsma (1995)
expounded on earlier. Second, they are able to show how convex costs of self-control can explain
the Allais paradox as well as the common ratio eect.

The essential force behind both of these

qualitative additions is that in cases where payos are less likely (such as when two options are
mixed with a chance of getting nothing), less self-control is needed. The convex costs of self-control,
then, allow the long-term self to exert more inuence over situations where decisions are more likely
to be payo irrelevant. Similarly, they predict that the Allais paradox should disappear as payos
become more distant (as the long-term self is able to exert more control). Further, by estimating a
version of the model, they are able to demonstrate that a wide range of phenomena can be explained
by a stable set of parameters.
In Fudenberg and Levine (2012), they further extend the model, relaxing the assumption of
completely myopic short-term selves in order to remove discontinuities in such eects as time dis-
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counting and cognitive load.

As the short-term selves now care somewhat about the future, the

authors modify self-control costs to depend on the present value denied to the short-term self, rather
than the period utility. This specication requires, as the authors point out, the assumption that the
short-term selves, in spite of caring about the future, are still strategically naive, unable to conceive
of future self-control. Finally, in order for temptation and limited self-control to have inuence in
more than just the present period, they make the crucial addition of a cognitive resource variable
that tracks self-control over time.
The Multiself Bargaining model developed in this work departs from this strand of work by
Fudenberg and Levine conceptually primarily by treating selves symmetrically. The key innovation
is that many behaviors of interest can be generated solely by a dierence in geometric time preference
between two selves, without the introduction of self-control cost or cognitive resources as modeling
elements.
Ainslie (1986) speculates on the nature of intra-personal conict, and its value to psychology
and economics, in particular touching on the idea of inner bargaining.

His form of bargaining is

not symmetric, and focuses on selves that act at dierent times. However the work is signicant for
being the rst, to my awareness, to mention the concept of two inner selves deliberately coming to
a mutually benecial agreement rather than conict.
Green and Hojman (2009) in a working paper develop an important set of results for welfare analysis related to multiple selves and to cases of IIA violations in general. Starting with the statement
that revealed preference theory cannot be used as a basis for welfare analysis because rationality
cannot be reasonably assumed, they explain choices are arising from compromise between conicting preference relations.

34

They develop a method to determine a set of explanatory preferences

that can give rise to the observed data, and nd that, in general, their method does not yield a
unique set of explanatory preferences. Thus, they compute bounds on welfare based on the set of
all possible sets of explanatory preferences. The authors do not assume multiple sets of preferences,
but rather show how such sets are generated from a set of choice data. They also develop a cardinal
welfare theory based on the weighting the dierent possible sets of explanatory preferences place on
each preference within the explanatory set.
Finally, Ambrus and Rozen (2013) show in a working paper that a limitation on the number of
selves is necessary for any multiple self model to have predictive value. They establish a measure of
the number of independence of irrelevant alternatives violations that a choice rule generates. They
then show that there is a linear relationship between the number of selves aggregated into a given
choice rules and the number of such IIA violations. They conclude, then, having shown that without

34 The authors by rationality

mean that there exists a preference relation dened over singleton sets which accounts

for the choice data; they do not allow for the Gul & Pesendorfer view of rationality, which broadens the denition of
the preference to encompass IIA violations.
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an a priori limitation on the number of selves, any number of IIA violations can be rationalized.
Neurological studies on the descriptive accuracy of multiple concurrent selves are mixed. McClure
et al. (2004) shows MRI evidence consistent with the notion that decisions made with dierent time
horizons engage very dierent areas of the brain, and argues that this is evidence for multiple
structures within the brain. In contrast, the aforementioned Glimcher et al. (2007) uses separate
MRI evidence to contradict this assertion, claiming that there is no evidence that multiple selves in
conict is any more than a convenient modeling assumption. I am at present unaware of a resolution
to this conict among neurological evidence.

Information Preferences & Temporal Framing
In this section, I give an overview of the literature on the preferences of agents over the timing of
information, as well as studies on the eects of temporal framing. The literature in this section is
relevant primarily to the temporal reference points model.
I begin with an overview of both disappointment aversion and loss aversion with narrow framing,
neither of which forms part of the temporal reference points model, but which are both popular
sources of alternate hypotheses as to why information timing matters to agents. Both involve agents
being more sensitive to bad outcomes than to good ones.

The central intuition of the literature

employing these to explain information preference is that additional information exposure provides
more opportunities for both good and bad news, but the negative eect of the chance of bad news
outweighs the positive eect of the change of good news.
First, Gul (1991) sets forth the theory of disappointment aversion, in which agents evaluate a
lottery based on an endogenous reference point.
point are weighted at
at

1.

1 + β,

Outcomes worse than the endogenous reference

while those better than the endogenous reference point are weighted

He proposes that this model is the most restrictive one which both includes expected utility

theory as a special case and also accounts for the Allais paradox. The reference point is the unique
value,

x,

such that if the expected value of the lottery is calculated with the additional weight put

on values less than

x,

that expected value will be equal to

x.

Disappointment aversion fares well

empirically for many aspects of choice behavior. For example, Camerer and Ho (1994) use a survey
of violations of independence and betweenness to show that disappointment aversion ts the data
far better than expected utility.
Loss aversion, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their seminal paper on prospect
theory, is the tendency of agents to be more sensitive to losses than to gains.

Narrow framing

suggests that individuals examine each outcome or decision in isolation. In combination, these two
have been used to explain a number of economic regularities, being jointly referred to as myopic
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loss aversion.
Turning now to evidence evidence of the eects of information feedback on agents, Gneezy and
Potters (1997) allowed subjects to sequentially bet $2 on a repeated known lottery.

In one case,

subjects learned the outcome and made a new decision each period. In another case, subjects made a
decision for the next three periods, and learned only the aggregate outcome. Subjects were found to
bet much less in the rst case than in the second. The authors note that this increased risk aversion
in the presence of greater feedback is in line with myopic loss aversion. Haigh and List (2005) did a
similar study to Gneezy and Potters with undergraduates and professional traders. They not only
replicated the result of Gneezy and Potters, but interestingly found that the informational feedback
eect was greater for the traders than the undergraduates.
Bellemare et al.

(2005) were able to separate the eect of information feedback from that of

investment exibility. Building from the Gneezy and Potters experiment, they added a third case
where subjects could only change their decision every third period, but still received informational
updates every period.

They signicantly found that even when investment exibility was xed,

informational feedback alone explained most of the dierence in risk aversion.

Thus, they argue,

myopic loss aversion is driven by information feedback.
Köszegi and Rabin (2009) develop a dynamic consumption model in which utility is based on
current consumption and changes in beliefs about consumption (both present and future). In their
model, agents are assumed to be loss averse with respect to changes in these beliefs; that is, negative
news is worse than positive news is good. The informational updates received in their model are the
changes in expected future consumption. One result is that agents prefer to get information clumped
together. This is due to the loss aversion: information more spread out gives more opportunities
for uctuations in the expectations of consumption, and thus more opportunities to experience loss.
This preference is in line with the PGI developed in the temporal reference points model, though
the source is dierent. (As their model is in discrete time, there is no equivalence to PLDI). Their
model further shows a preference for receiving the same information earlier. The agent prefers to
get bad news about a future event sooner so that the loss is felt to be more distant.
Palacios-Huerta (1999), building on Gul's disappointment aversion, is the rst in the economic
literature to raise the idea that a disappointment averse individual would prefer all uncertainty
to be resolved at once, rather than sequentially. This is shown by working out an example. The
fundamental insight is that a weakening of the independence axiom will induce a preference for
the way in which uncertainty is resolved. The author supports the use of disappointment aversion
over prospect theory (i.e.

myopic loss aversion) based explanations on the basis of the fact that

disappointment aversion is only one parameter richer than expected utility, and retains as much as
possible of expected utility theory while also being consistent with the Allais paradox and other
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behavioral anomalies.
Dillenberger (2010) deals with the nature of what he calls Preferences for One-Shot Resolution
of Uncertainty (PORU), a formalization of the idea raised by Palacios-Huerta. An agent exhibiting
PORU would prefer that any two stage lottery be resolved in a single stage. Dillenberger further
introduces Negative Certainty Independence (NCI), which says that an agent who prefers a nondegenerate lottery to a certain outcome will not reverse preferences when both options are mixed
with a common third option. Essentially, NCI is a formalization of the certainty eect, as it says
that the certainty of the certain outcome must (weakly) give it some additional appeal over the

35

lottery.

Dillenberger then establishes that these properties, PORU and NCI, are equivalent. He

further quanties PORU by dening the gradual resolution premium, which is the amount the
agent would pay to replace a two stage lottery with its single stage equivalent. That is, to avoid the
gradual resolution of uncertainty.
It is important to note that, while there are certainly similarities between PORU and a preference for grouped information (PGI) in the temporal reference points model, they are not the same
property because they occupy dierent settings. Dillenberger (2010) uses time neutrality (the idea
that an agent does not care about timing), as one of the conditions for the equivalence he develops
in order to isolate the eects of gradual resolution of uncertainty apart from the timing. Thus, PGI
cannot be seen as a direct application of PORU. The closest connection to PORU would be via an
information focused agent with discount function described by a continuous time analog of

β−δ

discounting, so that

D(t) ≡



1,

if t = 0


βe−δt ,

otherwise.

In the temporal reference points model, such an agent would only have preferences with regard to
the number of stages in which information is revealed in this model, without caring at all about the
relative timing of those informational updates.
Artstein-Avidan and Dillenberger (2010) show directly that disappointment aversion implies
PORU, and then, as an application, extend disappointment aversion to lotteries with an arbitrary
number of stages, noting that a disappointment averse agent prefers to replace each two-stage sublottery with its single-stage counterpart. This mirrors closely the property of PGI in the temporal
reference points model.
Turning to the eects of direct temporal framing, Chandran and Menon (2004) examine the
eects on temporal framing on the decisions of individuals.

35 The

Through survey data, they examine

certainty eect is an empirically supported observation that agents over-weigh certain outcomes in compar-

ison to outcomes with even the slightest bit of uncertainty.
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the dierences in framing health risks by per day risk versus per year risk.

They nd that risks

presented in per day terms appear more proximal and concrete to subjects, leading to increased selfrisk perceptions. They suggest, through an adoption of the Construal Level Theory of Liberman and
Trope (1998, 2000) that this is due to the idea of a day triggering the notion of a proximal event,
and a year a distant one. In the language of the temporal reference points model, an alternate
hypothesis is that framing health risks in terms of daily events creates additional temporal reference
points, which decreases the value of the health-based lottery, making the subjects appear more risk
averse.
Gourville (1998) looks at the pennies-per-day phenomenon where a consumer cost is presented
as a drawn out, minimal daily (or weekly, or monthly) cost in contrast to a single larger payment. He
nds that the alternate types of cost framing trigger dierent associations, and lead to signicantly
dierent consumer behavior. In contrast to the work of Chandran and Menon, Gourville argues that
the associations of the two types of payments are not temporal. Rather, the minimal daily cost is
shown to be compared with other small ongoing costs by the agent (cup of coee per day!), while
the single larger payment is associated with other large expenses. Thus it is not clear here that the
eect is due to the temporal framing or other types of framing. In other words, it may be due to
framing based on the size of the payment, rather than the timing of it.

Bargaining
In the realm of bargaining, a small existing strand of literature explores methods of generating
endogenous disagreement points in bargaining problems, which is relevant to the multiself bargaining
model.
Vartiainen (2007) studies a bargaining problem without a disagreement outcome. He develops
a solution that determines the outcome and the disagreement point simultaneously.

Further, he

shows that there is a unique solution of this kind which satises Pareto-optimality, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, symmetry and scale invariance, and that this solution maximizes the Nash
product with respect to the solution and the reference point. Essentially the way this is dened is
to nd two points in the set of outcomes,

y

x and y

, such that

x is the Nash bargaining solution when

is the disagreement point, and that when the entire set is inverted arithmetically, the inverted

becomes the Nash bargaining solution with the inverted

x

y

as the disagreement point. This solution

concept requires strict convexity of the utility set in order to generate a unique solution.
Bozbay et al. (2012) develop a similar extension for Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining, where
both a disagreement point and a compromise point are determined simultaneously. The compromise
point is the classic Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome for the disagreement point. The disagreement point is
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determined by following the line joining the compromise point and the anti-utopia point (consisting
of the worst possible utility for each player), and then nding the worst point on this line within
the set of outcomes. Once again, this solution concept requires strict convexity of the utility set in
order to generate a unique solution.
Unfortunately, neither of these methods of endogenous disagreement points can be applied to the
multiself bargaining model. This is primarily because both require strict convexity of the bargaining
set, which would exclude from consideration discrete action sets (which create utility vector sets
which are not strictly convex). Secondarily, the methods of disagreement point generation, while
mathematically elegant, do not seem to be any more conceptually tting for the application than
the one used.
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Part IV

Appendices
Appendix A: Proofs for Multiself Bargaining Model
I begin the proofs by formalizing a few results, not included in the main body of the paper, that
derive from the nature of the Nash bargaining solution.

Lemma A.1 formalizes the notion that, taking the line drawn between the disagreement point
and the Nash bargaining outcome, if the disagreement point is moved to the right side of that line,
the outcome will also move to the right, and visa versa. In Figure A.1, the shaded area represents
where a moved disagreement point would move the outcome to the right. This result will be used
in several of the latter proofs.

Ul

b

l

a
d

b

s

Us

Figure A.1: Line dividing eect of moving disagreement point.
Lemma A.1.

Consider a bargaining set,

bargaining outcome by
2
point (ds ,

d2l − d1l ,

(Us1 , Ul1 ).

U

with disagreement point

(d1s , d1l ),

Consider the same bargaining set with a dierent disagreement

d2l ), and denote Nash bargaining outcome by

(Us2 , Ul2 ).

Denote

4ds = d2s − d1s , 4dl =

and assume that neither disagreement point is on the Pareto frontier of

d2s ≥ Us1 =⇒ Us2 > Us1 ; d2l ≥ Ul1 =⇒ Ul2 > Ul1 .

If

and denote the Nash

d2s < Us1 , d2l < Ul1 ,

then
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U.

Then,

4ds (Ul1 − d1l ) − 4dl (Us1 − d1s ) < 0 ⇒ Ul2 ≥ Ul1 ;

4ds (Ul1 − d1l ) − 4dl (Us1 − d1s ) > 0 ⇒ Us2 ≥ Us1 ;

4ds (Ul1 − d1l ) − 4dl (Us1 − d1s ) = 0 ⇒ Us2 = Us1 ,

with the right inequalities strict if the Pareto frontier of

Proof:

U

is smooth at

(Us1 , Ul1 ).

The rst line follows directly from fact that if the disagreement point is not on the Pareto

frontier, then the Nash bargaining outcome will necessarily be a Pareto improvement on it. Meaning,

Us2 > d2s .
Now, consider the second case, where the original outcome remains a Pareto improvement on
the new disagreement point.

Note that the Pareto frontier of

U

is a continuous, not necessarily

dierentiable, curve with endpoints at the bliss points of the two selves.
bijective mapping
maps

f

0

f

[0, 1]

that maps

onto this curve.

to the bliss point of the long-term self, and

Take any continuous

Without loss of generality, assume that it

1

to the bliss point of the short-term self.

can then be divided into two mappings, one for each of the two coordinates of the points on

the Pareto frontier,

fs : [0, 1] → [X l , X s ]

(Us (x), Ul (x)) ≡ (fs (x), fl (x))
Us (x)

is strictly increasing in

and

fl : [0, 1] → [Y l , Y s ].

the point on the Pareto frontier which

x,

while

Ul (x)

is strictly decreasing in

For

x

x.

x ∈ [0, 1]

denote by

is mapped to. Note that
Then, we can rewrite the

outcome of the Nash bargaining procedure to be the solution to:

max Us (x) − d1s

x∈[0,1]
Denote

x1




Ul (x) − d1l .

the argument of the solution to this maximization (Nash bargaining gives us a unique

solution). Then, the Nash bargaining outcome can be written as
and

Ul (x)


Ul (x1 ), Us (x1 ) .

Where

Us (x)

are dierentiable, which is wherever the Pareto frontier is smooth, the rst derivative of

the objective is:

∂Us (x)
∂Ul (x)
(Ul (x) − d1l ) +
(Us (x) − d1s ),
∂x
∂x
so that the rst order condition is:

∂Ul (x)/∂x
Ul (x) − d1l
=−
.
1
Us (x) − ds
∂Us (x)/∂x
If the Pareto frontier is smooth at the Nash bargaining outcome, we then have
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∂Ul (x1 )/∂x
Ul (x1 ) − d1l
=−
.
1
1
Us (x ) − ds
∂Us (x1 )/∂x
Now consider the new disagreement point

(d2s , d2l ).

Denote

x2 = arg max Us (x) − d2s
x∈[0,1]

Assume that the Pareto frontier is smooth at




Ul (x) − d2l .


Ul (x1 ), Us (x1 ) ,

then,

4ds (Ul1 − d1l ) − 4dl (Us1 − d1s ) < 0 ⇔ 4ds Ul (x1 ) + 4dl d1s < 4dl Us (x1 ) + d1l 4ds

⇔ 4ds Ul (x1 ) + (d1l + 4dl )d1s < 4dl Us (x1 ) + d1l (d1s + 4ds )

⇔ (d2s − d1s )Ul (x1 ) + d2l d1s < (d2l − d1l )Us (x1 ) + d1l d2s

⇔ Us (x1 )Ul (x1 ) − d1s Ul (x1 ) − d2l Us (x1 ) + d2l d1s < Us (x1 )Ul (x1 ) − d2s Ul (x1 ) − d1l Us (x1 ) + d1l d2s

⇔ Ul (x1 ) − d2l

⇔






Us (x1 ) − d1s < Ul (x1 ) − d1l Us (x1 ) − d2s

Ul (x1 ) − d1l
Ul (x1 ) − d2l
∂Ul (x1 )/∂x
Ul (x1 ) − d2l
<
⇔
<−
1
2
1
1
1
2
Us (x ) − ds
Us (x ) − ds
Us (x ) − ds
∂Us (x1 )/∂x

⇔

∂Ul (x1 )
∂Us (x1 )
(Ul (x1 ) − d2l ) +
(Us (x1 ) − d2s ) < 0.
∂x
∂x

This last line shows that the Nash product, with the new disagreement point, is now decreasing
in

x

at

x1 .

This, implies

x2 < x1 ,

since the Nash product is single-peaked along the Pareto frontier.

Thus,

⇒ x2 < x1 ⇒ Us (x2 ) < Us (x1 ), Ul (x2 ) > Ul (x1 ).
The rest of the cases for a smooth Pareto frontier follow similarly.
Now, we need to consider the case where the Pareto frontier is not smooth at
and proceed by contradiction. Suppose that

4ds (Ul1 − d1l ) < 4dl (Us1 − d1s )

other case will follow identically). This immediately implies
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Us2 > Us1 (U 2


U 1 = Ul (x1 ), Us (x1 ) ,

but that

Ul2 < Ul1

(the

is to the lower right of

←−→
←−→
d1 to U 1 as d1 U 1 , with slope m1 . Similarly d2 U 2 , with slope m2 for
←1−→2
2
2
d
the line between d and U , and d d , with slope m , for the line between the disagreement points.
←
−
→
2
1 1
We begin by showing that d is above d U . Consider three cases. Case 1, 4ds > 0. Then,

U 1 ).

Denote the line connecting

4ds (Ul1 − d1l ) < 4dl (Us1 − d1s ) ⇒ m1 =
Thus,

md > m1 .

As

d2s > d1s , d2

lies above

←1−→1
d U .

Case 2,

4ds (Ul1 − d1l ) < 4dl (Us1 − d1s ) ⇒
Two subcases. If
above

←1−→1
d U .

If

4dl > 0

4dl < 0,

then

, then

md < 0, (d2

1

d

m >m >

(Ul1 − d1l )
4dl
<
= md .
(Us1 − d1s )
4ds
4ds < 0,

(Ul1 − d1l )
4dl
>
.
1
1
(Us − ds )
4ds

is to the left and above), and so

0, and as d2s

<

d1s ,

2

d

lies above

←1−→1
d U .

d2

is denitely

4ds < 0.

Case 3,

4ds (Ul1 − d1l ) < 4dl (Us1 − d1s ) ⇒ 4dl > 0, so that d2 is directly above d1 .
←1−→1
←1−→1
2
2
Thus, d lies above d U . Now, U is below d U , as it lies to the right along the Pareto frontier
←1−→1
←1−→1
←2−→2
1
2
2
of U from U . So, as d lies above d U and U lies below it, d U and d U necessarily cross, so
that

m2 < m1 .

Now, consider a some set of utility vectors,
connecting
of

U,

as

U

U

1

and

U

2

V,

that has a Pareto frontier consisting of the line

. Note that all points on the line between

U1

and

is convex. Then, consider the bargaining problem given by

solution vector as
frontier. Thus, if

V

1

1
. Vs

≤

Vs1 > Us1 ,

are necessarily elements

< V, d1 >,

and denote its

Us1 . This is because the Nash product is single-peaked along the Pareto

then any point to the right of

a greater Nash bargaining product than that of
Nash product maximizing choice from

1
elements of U . Therefore, Vs
is higher than

U2

≤

U

< U, d1 >,

1

.

U1

along the Pareto frontier of

But, this would imply that

U

1

1

d

and

V

1

induces

was not the

since there are points to the right of

Us1 . This means that that the slope between

V

U

that are

, denote

m1v ,

m1 . m1v ≥ m1 .

Similarly, for the bargaining problem

< V, d2 >,

with solution

V 2 , Vs2 ≥ Us2 ⇒ m2v ≤ m2 .

m2v ≤ m2 < m1 ≤ m1v ⇒ m2v < m1v
However, since the slope of the Pareto frontier of

V

is smooth, from earlier in the proof we know

that the line connecting a disagreement point to the outcome vector should be the negative of the
slope of the frontier. This implies that

m1v = m2v ,

which gives us the contradiction.



Lemma A.2 uses the fact that if we have two dierent utility vector sets whose Pareto frontiers
coincide in an open interval around the Nash bargaining outcome, then small variations in the
disagreement point will have the same eect on the outcome chosen from both sets. This allow us
to apply Lemma 1 for dierent sets when the Pareto frontier around the outcome is the same for
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both sets.

Lemma A.2.

Consider a utility vector set set

Nash bargaining outcome by

(Us1 , Ul1 ).

U 1,

with disagreement point

U2

Consider another utility vector set

(d2s , d2l ), and denote the Nash bargaining outcome by (Us2 , Ul2 ).

Denote

(d1s , d1l ),

and denote the

with disagreement point

4ds = d2s −d1s , 4dl = d2l −d1l ,

and assume that neither disagreement point is on the Pareto frontier of their respective utility vectors
sets. Further, assume that there is an open connected subset of the Pareto frontier of

(Us1 ,

Ul1 ), and that this subset is also a subset of the Pareto frontier of

the Pareto frontier of

U 1.

U

2

U1

containing

1
. and that (Us ,

Ul1 )

is on

Then,

d2s ≥ Us1 =⇒ Us2 > Us1 ; d2l ≥ Ul1 =⇒ Ul2 > Ul1 .

Otherwise, if

d2s < Us1 , d2l < Ul1 ,

then,

∃4̄ > 0

such that if

4dl < 4̄

and

4ds < 4̄,

4ds (Ul1 − d1l ) − 4dl (Us1 − d1s ) < 0 ⇒ Ul2 ≥ Ul1 ;

4ds (Ul1 − d1l ) − 4dl (Us1 − d1s ) > 0 ⇒ Us2 ≥ Us1 ;

4ds (Ul1 − d1l ) − 4dl (Us1 − d1s ) = 0 ⇒ Us2 = Us1 ,

with the right inequalities strict if the Pareto frontier of

Proof:

U1

is smooth at

(Us1 , Ul1 ).

The rst line follows directly from fact that if the disagreement point is not on the Pareto

Us2 > d2s .

frontier, then the Nash bargaining outcome will be a Pareto improvement on it. Meaning,
Now consider the second line. First, the Nash bargaining outcome chosen from
ment point

(d1s , d1l )

same as that of

U

1

is

(Us1 , Ul1 ).

with disagree-

This follows from the fact that the Pareto frontier of

U2

is the

, and from the fact that the Nash bargaining product is continuous and has a

unique local maximum. Thus, if the Nash product from

(Us1 , Ul1 )

U2

U2

could be increased by moving away from

in one direction, then so could the Nash product from

Second, consider the Nash bargaining outcome chosen from

U 1.

U1

with disagreement point

(d2s , d2l ).

As the Nash bargaining outcome varies continuously with the disagreement point, for a suciently
small change in the disagreement point, this outcome will lie within the open connected subset of the
Pareto frontier containing

(Us1 , Ul1 ).

Then, by the same reasoning as for the original disagreement
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point, this new outcome will also be the result of the Nash bargaining solution applied to
disagreement point

(d2s , d2l ).

U2

with

Thus, for a suciently small variation in the disagreement point, the

eect on the outcome chosen from

U1

is the same as the eect on the outcome chosen from

U 2.

The

result then follows directly from Lemma A.1.

Lemma A.3.

Suppose that the Pareto frontier of

Un

consists only of mixtures of the two bliss

points. Then, the lottery selected via bargaining has the same mixing weights between actions as the
equilibrium of the conict game.

Proof of Lemma A.3:

First, if using the disagreement point with the eort costs added back in,

the result follows directly from the fact that the disagreement point is on the Pareto frontier.
Consider the other case (without the eort costs added in). The bliss points are given by
and

(Xns , Yns )

(Xnl , Ynl ), so that a mixing between them can be expressed as wXns + (1 − w)Xnl , wYns + (1 − w)Ynl

where

w



,

is the weight placed on the bliss point of the short-term self. From Lemma 1, the disagree-

ment point is given by:



Snγ+1 (Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn )
Lγ+1
(Lγn + (1 − γ)Snγ )
n
l
s
Xn +
, Yt +
.
(Snγ + Lγn )2
(Snγ + Lγn )2
To nd the Nash bargaining solution, then, we choose

w

to maximize the product of gains over

the disagreement point utilities. This product is given by:



wXns

+ (1 −

w)Xnl

−


=

wSn −

Xnl

S γ+1 (Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn )
− n
(Snγ + Lγn )2

Snγ+1 (Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn )
(Snγ + Lγn )2



(Lγn + (1 − γ)Snγ )
Lγ+1
n
s
l
s
wYn + (1 − w)Yn − Yt −
(Snγ + Lγn )2



Lγ+1 (Lγn + (1 − γ)Snγ )
(1 − w)Ln − n
.
(Snγ + Lγn )2

The rst order condition is


Sn

Lγ+1 (Lγn + (1 − γ)Snγ )
(1 − w)Ln − n
(Snγ + Lγn )2




− Ln

S γ+1 (Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn )
wSn − n
(Snγ + Lγn )2


=0

⇒ Sn Ln (Snγ + Lγn )2 − Sn Lγ+1
(Lγn + (1 − γ)Snγ ) + Ln Snγ+1 (Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn ) = 2wSn Ln (Snγ + Lγn )2
n

⇒ Sn Ln (Snγ + Lγn )2 − Sn L2γ+1
+ Ln Sn2γ+1 = 2wSn Ln (Snγ + Lγn )2
n
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2γ
2γ
γ
γ 2
⇒ Sn2γ + 2Snγ Lγn + L2γ
n − Ln + Sn = 2w(Sn + Ln )

⇒ Snγ (Snγ + Lγn ) = w(Snγ + Lγn )2 ⇒ w =

Snγ

Snγ
.
+ Lγn

This is exactly the same weight placed on the short-term self gaining control, and thus on the
bliss action of the short-term self, by the equilibrium of the conict game.

Proof of Lemma 1:

First,

es = el = 0 is not an equilibrium;

a marginal increase in eort by either

self leads to a guarantee of control, and thus a strictly positive increase in utility. Similarly,ei

e−i = 0

is not an equilibrium; self

i

> 0,

would strictly prefer to lower their eort, as doing so does not

reduce their probability of control, but does reduce their cost. Now, consider an interior equilibrium,

es > 0, el > 0.

The short-term self chooses

Us (es , el ) =

es

to maximize expected utility, given by

eγl
eγs
s
X
+
X l − es .
eγs + eγl n eγs + eγl n

The rst and second derivatives of this objective are

∂
Us (es , el ) = γeγ−1
eγl (eγs + eγl )−2 Sn − 1;
s
∂es
∂2
Us (es , el ) = γeγ−2
eγl (eγs + eγl )−3 [(γ − 1)(eγs + eγl ) − 2γeγs ] Sn ,
s
∂ 2 es
similarly for the long-term self. Note that the second derivative is negative if

0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, satisfying

the second order condition. We can write the rst order condition of the selves as

γeγ−1
eγl Sn = (eγs + eγl )2 ;
s
Dening

Rn =

γelγ−1 eγs Ln = (eγs + eγl )2 .

Ln
Sn , and equating the two left hand sides we have

γeγ−1
eγl Sn = γelγ−1 eγs Ln ⇒ el = es
s

Ln
= es Rn .
Sn

Substituting into the short-term self 's rst order condition,

γ
γ 2
γeγ−1
eγs Rnγ Sn = (eγs + eγs Rnγ )2 ⇒ γe−1
s
s Rn Sn = (1 + Rn )

⇒ es =

γLγn Snγ+1
γRnγ Sn
.
γ 2 =
(1 + Rn )
(Snγ + Lγn )2
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We get

el

similarly, and the probability

el =

p

of the short-term self winning the contest.

γ
eγs
Snγ
1
γLγ+1
n Sn
.
γ
γ 2; p = γ
γ =
γ
γ =
(Sn + Ln )
es + el
Sn + Ln
1 + Rtγ

This gives us a unique interior local maximum for
self prefers to deviate to

e i = 0.

Given the above

es

0 ≤ γ ≤ 1;

and

el ,

we must now verify that neither

the expected utility for the short-term

self is

Snγ

=

=

Snγ

Lγn
γLγn Snγ+1
Snγ
s
l
γ Xn + γ
γ Xn −
+ Ln
Sn + Ln
(Snγ + Lγn )2

Snγ
Snγ
Snγ + Lγn l
γLγn Snγ+1
s
l
γ Xn − γ
γ Xn + γ
γ Xn −
+ Ln
Sn + Ln
Sn + Ln
(Snγ + Lγn )2

γLγn Snγ+1
Snγ+1
γLγn Snγ+1
Snγ
s
l
l
l
(X
−
X
)
+
X
−
=
+
X
−
n
n
n
Snγ + Lγn n
(Snγ + Lγn )2
Snγ + Lγn
(Snγ + Lγn )2

= Xnl +

Snγ+1 (Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn )
.
(Snγ + Lγn )2

If the short-term self exerts zero eort, their expected utility is

Xnl .

So, we need

Snγ+1 (Snγ + Lγn ) − γLγn Snγ+1
> 0 ⇒ Snγ+1 (Snγ + Lγn ) > γLγn Snγ+1
(Snγ + Lγn )2

⇒ (Snγ + Lγn ) > γLγn ⇒ Snγ > (γ − 1)Lγn .
Which is true for

ei = 0;

γ ≤ 1.

Similarly for the long-term self. So, neither player wishes to deviate to

note that this implies that neither bliss point is a Pareto improvement over the disagreement

point. Thus, we have a unique Nash equilibrium given by:

e∗s,n =

γ
γLγ+1
Snγ
1
γLγn Snγ+1
n Sn
∗
∗
,
γ
γ 2 , el,n =
γ
γ 2 , pn =
γ
γ =
(Sn + Ln )
(Sn + Ln )
Sn + Ln
1 + Rnγ

which creates an expected utility vector of:



Xnl +

Proof of Lemma 2:

Snγ+1 (Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn )
Lγ+1 (Lγn + (1 − γ)Snγ )
, Yns + n
γ 2
γ
(Sn + Ln )
(Snγ + Lγn )2


.

Pareto eciency follows directly from the fact that we are applying the Nash

bargaining solution, and so will only choose a point on the Pareto frontier of
Consider replacing the shared payo utility function
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u(·)

with

U.

v(·) = λu(·) + µ.

Denote

Unu

and

Unv

the respective sets of utility vectors that result from using the two utility functions, and similarly

for

u and v superscripts on other terms.

and so becomes
and

Lvn = λLun .

we nd that

Every vector

(λUs + µ, λUl + µ) ∈ Unv .36

consists of weighted sums of

As the bliss points are transformed similarly,

Putting these into the formula for

dvn = λdun + µ.

(Us , Ul ) ∈ Unu

dvn

Unu ,

Thus, each point in

u(·),

Snv = λSnu

(with or without the eort costs added in),

as well as the disagreement point, have been

subject to the same ane transformation. It follows from the properties of Nash bargaining that the
outcome is subject to the same ane transformation, and so the resulting lottery (corresponding to
that utility outcome) is unchanged.
If

Un

is such that

(x, y) ∈ Un

(y, x) ∈ Un ,

if and only if

s
points are necessarily mirrors of each other. Xn

=

implies that the disagreement point is such that

Ynl ,

Xns

then the coordinates of the two bliss

= Ynl , so that Sn = Ln .

dn,s = dn,l .

This immediately

Given that the disagreement point is

symmetric, the result follows from the Symmetry property of Nash bargaining.

Proof of Lemma 3:

The time

t1

utility vectors given from choosing

ML

or

MH

are, respectively


 
u(ML )e−ρs ∆1 , u(ML )e−ρl ∆1 ; u(MH )e−ρs (∆1 +∆2 ) , u(MH )e−ρl (∆1 +∆2 ) .
If

u(MH )e−ρl ∆2 < u(ML ), then both selves prefer the sooner payo, and pL = 1.

u(ML ), then both selves prefer the latter payo, and pL = 0.

If

u(MH )e−ρs ∆2 >

In either case, the result follows directly.

Consider now the case where:

u(MH )e−ρl ∆2 > u(ML ) > u(MH )e−ρs ∆2 ,
so that the long-term self strictly prefers the latter payo, and the short-term self strictly prefers
the sooner payo. Then,

S1 = u(ML )e−ρs ∆1 − u(MH )e−ρs (∆1 +∆2 ) = e−ρs ∆1 u(ML ) − u(MH )e−ρs ∆2




L1 = u(MH )e−ρl (∆1 +∆2 ) − u(ML )e−ρl ∆1 = e−ρl ∆1 u(MH )e−ρl ∆2 − u(ML )

γ
e−ρs ∆1 γ u(ML ) − u(MH )e−ρs ∆2
Sγ
= −ρ ∆ γ
p1 = γ
γ
γ
S + Lγ
e s 1 (u(ML ) − u(MH )e−ρs ∆2 ) + e−ρl ∆1 γ (u(MH )e−ρl ∆2 − u(ML ))

36 The

weighted sums are discounted sums of expectations of utilities induced by lotteries over actions.
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γ
u(ML ) − u(MH )e−ρs ∆2
∂
=
p1 < 0.
γ ⇒
γ
∂∆1
(u(ML ) − u(MH )e−ρs ∆2 ) + e(ρ2 −ρl )∆1 γ (u(MH )e−ρl ∆2 − u(ML ))
Thus, the probability the short-term self wins the conict game is decreasing in

∆1 .

From Lemma

A.3, the decision of the agent will have the same weightings on the actions as the conict game.
Thus, the probability that the bliss point of the short-term self (the smaller, sooner payout) is chosen
is decreasing in

∆1 . 

Proof of Proposition 1 (Diminishing Impatience):

Without loss of generality, we can consider

the shared payo utility to be zero. Note that this implies that the discounted utilities of the actions
only dier through their impact on future action sets, and therefore future payo utilities.
Consider the eects of an

ε
increase. So, ∆1

= ∆1 +

ε

increase in

∆1 .

Denote with superscript

ε

relevant terms after this

ε, U1ε is the set of utility vectors after the increase,

S1ε

and

Lε1

are the

respective dierences between bliss points utilities for the two selves after the increase. The time
between the decision at time

t1

the value of all lotteries at time

and all payo utilities increases by

t1

by an additional

e−ερi

ε,

so that both selves discount

as a result of the change. The proof will

proceed by considering three bargaining problems given by:

< U1 , d1 >; < U1ε , da1 >; < U1ε , dε1 >,
where

da1 = (e−ερs d1,s , e−ερl d1,l ).
We will show rst that the rst two bargaining problems result in the same chosen lottery, and
second that the third bargaining problem improves the outcome for the long-term self relative to
the second bargaining problem. This will then immediately imply that the

ε

problem gives higher

utility to the long-term self.
Consider

< U1ε , da1 >.

The rst coordinate (short-term self utility) of all utility vectors in

U1ε , as well as the disagreement point, are multiplied by
with the long-term self utility and
of

< U1 , d 1 >

e−ερl .

e−ερs

This means that

relative to

< U1ε , da1 >

< U1 , d1 >.

Similarly

is an ane transformation

and, by the invariance to ane transformations property of the Nash bargaining

solution, both bargaining problems must result in the same action.
Now consider

< U1ε , dε1 >.

Note that:

S1ε = e−ερs X1s − e−ερs X1l = e−ερs S1 ; Lε1 = e−ερl Ls1 − e−ερl Ll1 = e−ερl L1 .
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We must consider the disagreement point both with and without the eort cost added in. Recall
that without the cost added in:

d1 =

X1l

Lγ+1
S γ+1
+ γ 1 γ , Y1s + γ 1 γ
S1 + L1
S1 + L1

!
,

which implies:

dε1


=

e


=

−ερs

−ερs

Xnl



e

Now, consider

(e−ερs S1 )γ+1
(e−ερl L1 )γ+1
−ερl s
,
e
+ −ερs
Y
+
n
Sn )γ + (e−ερl Ln )γ
(e
(e−ερs Sn )γ + (e−ερl Ln )γ

Xnl

+

Sn γ

< U1ε , da1 >
da1

Now comparing


=




S1 γ+1
L1 γ+1
−ερl
s
, e
Yn + (ρ −ρ )γε γ
.
+ e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε Ln γ
e 1 2 Sn + Ln γ

again. The disagreement point from this bargaining problem is:

−ερs

e


Xnl +

< U1ε , dε1 >

to




S1 γ+1
L1 γ+1
−ερl
s
, e
.
Yn + γ
Sn γ + Ln γ
Sn + Ln γ

< U1ε , da1 >,

note that the two share the same set of utility

vectors, but dier in their disagreement point. Specically, since
Applying Lemma A.1, with

4ds < 0

and

4dl > 0.

da1

<

U1ε ,

da1

>

ρ2 > ρ1 , dε1,s < da1,s , and dε1,l > da1,l .

as the rst disagreement point, and

dε1

as the second, we see that

Denoting in parenthesis the case where the Pareto frontier is smooth, the

utility the long-term self receives under

< U1ε , da1 >,



< U1ε , dε1 >

is (strictly) greater than that received under

meaning that it results in a lottery (strictly) more favorable for the long-term self. As
and

< U1 , d 1 >

result in the same action,

(strictly) preferred by the long-term self as compared to

< U1ε , dε1 >

< U1 , d1 >.

likewise results in an action

This gives the rst part of the

result.
We now show that this also holds for the disagreement point without the eort added in, which
is given by:


d1 =

Xnl +

Lγ+1 (Lγn + (1 − γ)Snγ )
Snγ+1 (Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn )
, Yts + n
γ
γ 2
(Sn + Ln )
(Snγ + Lγn )2

The disagreement points for the

dε1

=

ε


.

case and the ane transformation case are given by:

(e−ερs Sn )γ+1 ((e−ερs Sn )γ + (1 − γ)(e−ερl Ln )γ )
,
((e−ερs Sn )γ + (e−ερl Ln )γ )2
!
(e−ερl Ln )γ+1 ((e−ερl Ln )γ + (1 − γ)(e−ερs Sn )γ )
−ερl s
e
Yt +
=
((e−ερs Sn )γ + (e−ερl Ln )γ )2
e−ερs Xnl +

79

"
e

−ερs

Xnl

da1
If

Sn γ+1 Snγ + (1 − γ)e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε Lγn
+
(Snγ + e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε Lγn )2


=

e

−ερs

dε1,s < da1,s ,

#

"
−ερl

, e

Yts

Lγ+1 Lγn + (1 − γ)e(ρ1 −ρ2 )γε Snγ
+ n
(e(ρ1 −ρ2 )γε Snγ + Lγn )2

 #!





Sn γ+1 (Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn )
Lγ+1
(Lγn + (1 − γ)Snγ )
n
l
−ερl
s
Xn +
, e
Yt +
.
(Snγ + Lγn )2
(Snγ + Lγn )2

and similarly,

dε1,s

<

da1,s

dε1,l > da1,l ,

then the application of Lemma 1 goes through as before.


Snγ + (1 − γ)e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε Lγn
(Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn )
⇔
<
γ
γ
(Snγ + Lγn )2
(Sn + e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε Ln )2



⇔ Snγ + (1 − γ)e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε Lγn (Snγ + Lγn )2 < (Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn ) (Snγ + e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε Lγn )2




⇔ Snγ + (1 − γ)e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε Lγn Sn2γ + 2Snγ Lγn + L2γ
<
n



(Snγ + (1 − γ)Lγn ) Sn2γ + 2e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε Snγ Lγn + e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε L2γ
n

(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε γ 2γ
⇔ 2Sn2γ Lγn + Snγ L2γ
Ln Sn <
n + (1 − γ)e

γ 2γ
2e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε Sn2γ Lγn + e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε Snγ L2γ
n + (1 − γ)Ln Sn

⇔ (1 − γ)(e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε − 1)Lγn Sn2γ < 2(e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε − 1)Sn2γ Lγn + (e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε − 1)Snγ L2γ
n
e(ρ2 −ρ1 )γε − 1

is positive, so,

γ
γ
⇔ (1 − γ)Lγn Sn2γ < 2Sn2γ Lγn + Snγ L2γ
n ⇔ 0 < (1 + γ)Sn + Ln ,
with the last true since

γ ≥ 0.

Similarly for

dε1,l > da1,l .

Thus, the rst part of Proposition 1

holds whether we use the disagreement point with or without the eort costs added in.
Now consider the second part of Proposition 1.

The utility granted to the long-term self is

bounded below by the utility granted to them by the disagreement point.

80

Thus, the dierence

;

between the long-term self 's bliss point utility and the utility granted to them by the action chosen
by the agent is bounded above by the dierence between their bliss point utility and the utility of
the disagreement point. In other words,

Y1l,ε − dε1,l
Y1l,ε − Ul (D(Aε1 ))
≤
.
e−ρl (41 +ε)
e−ρl (41 +ε)
So, let us consider the limit of the right hand side.

lim

Y1l,ε − dε1,l

ε→∞ e−ρl (41 +ε)

lim e

ρl 41



ε→∞

Y1l

−

= lim e

ρl (41 +ε)

ε→∞


e

−ερl

Y1l

L1 γ+1
− (ρ −ρ )γε γ
e 1 2 Sn + Ln γ

Y1s


= lim eρl 41 L1 1 −
ε→∞

the last following from the fact that

−e

−ερl


Y1s +


= lim e
ε→∞

ρl 41

L1 γ+1
e(ρ1 −ρ2 )γε Sn γ + Ln γ


L1 −

L1 γ
(ρ
−ρ
)γε
e 1 2 Sn γ + Ln γ

ρ1 − ρ2 < 0.


=

L1 γ+1
e(ρ1 −ρ2 )γε Sn γ + Ln γ




= 0,

The result also follows with the disagreement

point without eort costs added in.

"
lim e

ρl (41 +ε)

e

ε→∞

−ερl

ε→∞

ρl 41

ε→∞

−e

−ερl

Y1s

Lγ+1 Lγ1 + (1 − γ)e(ρ1 −ρ2 )γε S1γ
+ 1
(e(ρ1 −ρ2 )γε S1γ + Lγ1 )2

Lγ+1 Lγ1 + (1 − γ)e(ρ1 −ρ2 )γε S1γ
Y1l − Y1s − 1
(e(ρ1 −ρ2 )γε S1γ + Lγ1 )2

= lim eρl 41

= lim e

Y1l

L1

Lγ Lγ + (1 − γ)e(ρ1 −ρ2 )γε S1γ
1 − 1 1(ρ −ρ )γε γ
(e 1 2 S1 + Lγ1 )2

 #!

!

!
= 0.

So, for either disagreement point,

Y1l,ε − dε1,l
Y1l,ε − Ul (D(Aε1 ))
≤
lim
= 0.
ε→∞
ε→∞ e−ρl (41 +ε)
e−ρl (41 +ε)
lim

Proof of Lemma 4:

Consider a given commitment action

discounted utility a self receives from

a1

a1 ∈ Ar1

which constrains

An

to

an .

The

is given by:

Ui (a1 ) = u(a1 ) + K + e−ρi ∆t Ui (an ),
where
and

n,

K

is the total of discounted payo utilities resulting from all decisions strictly between

1

of which there may be none. Following from the denition of required commitment set, and
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the fact that commitment actions

K

are the same

∀ a1 ,

a1

cannot aect the action sets in periods other than

so without loss of generality we can normalize

a commitment lottery

α1 ∈ Ar1

u(a1 ) + K

n, u(a1 ) and

to zero.

induces a realized lottery over actions at decision

37

Similarly,

n, αn .

As the

utilities of lotteries are equal to the lottery over utilities, we have:

Ui (α1 ) = e−ρi ∆t Ui (αn ) ⇒ eρi ∆t Ul (α1 ) = Ul (αn ).
Now, note that

αnnc 6= bln .

That is, the agent will not choose a degenerate lottery on the bliss

action of the long-term self at decision

n;

this follows from the fact that the bliss points are not

Pareto improvements over the disagreement point (shown in the proof of Lemma 1), and thus cannot
be the Nash bargaining solution. So,

Ul (αnnc ) < Ul (bln ) ⇒ 0 < Ul (bln ) − Ul (αnnc ).
Consider now the case where

∆t = 0 .

Because

U1r

is not discounted relative to

Unnc , Unnc = U1r ,

and the lottery over actions induced by the commitment lottery choice will be the same as the lottery
chosen without commitment, so that

αnnc = αnr .

Now consider increasing

∆t .

By Proposition 1,

Y1l − Ul (D(Ar1 ))
= 0 ⇒ lim eρl ∆t Ul (bl1 ) − eρl ∆t Ul (α1r ) = 0
∆t →∞
∆t →∞
e−ρl ∆t
lim

⇒ lim Ul (bln ) = Ul (αnr ).
∆t →∞

So, for

∆t = 0, Ul (αnr ) = Ul (αnnc ) < Ul (bln ),

Thus, there

∃

some

∆

for which

Ul (αnnc ) < Ul (αnr ).

nc
monotonically increasing in ∆t , so Ul (αn )
the long-term self trivially implies that
If the Pareto frontier of
case with

∆t = 0,

so that

Unnc

while in the limit of

<

By the rst part of Proposition 1,

∀ ∆t ≥ ∆.

Ul (αnr )

is

The dierence in the utilities for

αnnc 6= αnr .

is smooth at

αnnc = αnr ,

Ul (αnr )

∆t , Ul (αnnc ) < Ul (αnr ) = Ul (bln ).

(Us (αnnc ), Ul (αnnc ))

then again consider the limiting

implying

(Us (αnnc ), Ul (αnnc )) = (Us (αnr ), Ul (αnr )) .
Since the utility vectors in

U1r

are the discounted utility vectors of

is smooth at a vector if the Pareto frontier of
is smooth at

(Us (αnr ), Ul (αnr )), U1r

Unnc

is smooth at

the Pareto frontier of

is smooth at the corresponding vector. As

(Us (α1r ), Ul (α1r )).

part of Proposition 1 to see that a marginal increase in

37 This

Unnc ,

∆t

U1r

Unnc

Finally, we can apply the rst

causes a strict increase in

Ul (αnr ),

which

amounts to a non-distorting shifting of the entire bargaining problem, which has no impact on the lotteries

chosen.
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indicates for

∆t > 0

the utilities, and thus the actions, will dier.

Proof of Proposition 2 (Preference for Commitment):
over commitment actions at decision

αnnc .
cnc

That is,

α1cnc

1

First, denote

α1cnc ∈ Ao1

that induces the same lottery over decision

n

the lottery
actions as

is committing to doing what you would have done if you hadn't committed;

indicates committing to the non-committing action lottery. It diers from not committing in

that it carries with it some commitment cost,

anc
1

action,

in

Ao1 .

Now note that

(Us (α1cnc ) + c, Ul (α1cnc ) + c),

U1o

c,

and so is Pareto dominated by the no commitment

consists of

U1r

with the addition of

nc
(Us (anc
1 ), Ul (a1 )) =

as well as mixings between that vector and the Pareto frontier of

r
Um
;

see the right graph of Figure 7 for a visualization.
Start with the case where
and

αnr ,

Unnc

contains Pareto improvements on all strict mixings between

both of which lie on the Pareto frontier. Since

Unnc , the utility vectors induced by
the Pareto frontier of

U1r . However,

U1r ,

(Us (acnc
1 ),

no commitment action in

α1cnc and

α1r ,

U1r

αnnc

consists of discounted utility vectors from

(Us (acnc
1 ),

Ul (acnc
1 ))

and

(Us (ar1 ), Ul (ar1 )),

lie on

and the line segment between their induced utility vectors lies inside of

Ul (acnc
1 ))

is not on the Pareto frontier of

U1o ,

since it is dominated by the

o
anc
1 ∈ A1 .

We will proceed in two steps. Step 1 is to show that for suciently small cost of commitment,

α1r

is on the Pareto frontier of

U1o .

r
if α1 is on the Pareto frontier of

Step 2 is to show that for suciently small cost of commitment,

U1o , it will be the lottery chosen.

Step 1. Consider the lottery over decision 1 actions dened by

cnc
Pareto improvements on all strict mixings between a1
and
utility vector

P
Us (aP
1 ), Ul (a1 )



on the Pareto frontier of

0.5acnc
+ 0.5α1r .
1

α1r , there is some point
U1r

As

U1r

contains

α1P with induced

which Pareto dominates this 50/50

mixture. Specically,

cnc
r
P
cnc
r
Us (aP
1 ) > 0.5Us (a1 ) + 0.5Us (α1 ) ⇒ Us (a1 ) − 0.5Us (a1 ) − 0.5Us (α1 ) ≡ εs > 0;

cnc
r
P
cnc
r
Ul (aP
1 ) > 0.5Ul (a1 ) + 0.5Ul (α1 ) ⇒ Ul (a1 ) − 0.5Ul (a1 ) − 0.5Ul (α1 ) ≡ εl > 0.
Now consider the lottery over decision 1 actions dened by
dominated by

aP
1

r
0.5anc
1 + 0.5α1 .

This lottery is Pareto

if

nc
r
P
cnc
r
Us (aP
1 ) − 0.5Us (a1 ) − 0.5Us (α1 ) > 0 ⇔ Us (a1 ) − 0.5 [Us (α1 ) + c] − 0.5Us (α1 ) > 0

cnc
r
⇔ Us (aP
1 ) − 0.5Us (α1 ) − 0.5c − 0.5Us (α1 ) > 0 ⇔ εs − 0.5c > 0 ⇔ 2εs > c.
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So, for suciently small

r
c, 0.5anc
1 + 0.5α1

is Pareto dominated by

Now, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that

α1r

Ul (anc
1 ),
anc
1 .

Ul (α1cnc ) < Ul (α1r ) ⇒ Ul (α1r ) − Ul (α1cnc ) ≡ δl > 0,
r
c < δl , Ul (anc
1 ) < Ul (α1 ),

it follows that for

Then, it must be the case that

α1D ∈ Ar1

is Pareto dominated by

aP
1,

and

U1o .

is not on the Pareto frontier of
Note that

r
0.5anc
1 + 0.5α1

aP
1.

α1r

by Lemma 4. As

α1r

meaning that

is not Pareto dominated by

anc
1

is dominated by a mixing between

that induces a utility vector on the Pareto frontier of

U1r .

Ul (α1cnc ) + c =

and some other lottery

So,

r
D
nc
r
wUs (α1D ) + (1 − w)Us (anc
1 ) > Us (α1 ); wUl (α1 ) + (1 − w)Ul (a1 ) > Ul (αl ).
Then, it follows that since the mixture between

Ul (α1r )

Ul (α1D ).

<

anc
1

P
Similarly, as α1 is a mixture of

and

α1D

α1r and

dominates

anc
1 ,

Ul (anc
1 )

α1r ,

it must be that

< Ul (α1P ) < Ul (α1r ).

Altogether,

P
r
D
Ul (anc
1 ) < Ul (α1 ) < Ul (α1 ) < Ul (α1 ).
For ease of notation, I will refer to the utility vectors induced by these four as

U D.

to refer to the magnitude of the slope between

U nc

and

UP .

was established as a Pareto improvement on a mixing between

U nc

and

U r,

I will use

As

UP

the case that

m(U nc , U P )

U nc , U P , U r

UP

lies above the mixing line segment connecting

U nc

and

U r.

and

it must be

This implies

m(U P , U nc ) > m(U r , U nc ) > m(U r , U P ).
Next,

UP , Ur

and

UD

are all vectors on the Pareto frontier of

U1r .

Since

U1r

is convex,

Ul (α1P ) < Ul (α1r ) < Ul (α1D ) ⇒ m(U r , U P ) ≥ m(U r , U D ).
Together,

⇒ m(U r , U nc ) > m(U r , U D ) ⇒ m(U r , U nc ) > m(U nc , U D ) > m(U r , U D ).
But, if the last is true, then
the assertion that

Ur

Ur

lies above the mixing line between

UD

and

U nc , which contradicts

is Pareto dominated by a mixture of the two. Thus, we conclude that for

c < min{εs , εl , δl },
α1r

lay on the Pareto frontier of

U1o .

Figure A.2 gives a visualization of the relevant slopes.
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D
r

Ul

P

nc
cnc

Us
Figure A.2: Illustration of slopes.
Illustrated by the thick curve is
mixings with it. Finally, as

U1r

U1r . U1o

U nc ,

consists of this plus the addition of

is convex, if the line segment connecting

Ur

to

U cnc

along with

is strictly inside

the Pareto frontier (excepting the endpoints), as it is by supposition, then there exists an open
subset of the Pareto frontier of
this subset to
that

α1r

U

cnc

U1r

around

Ur

such that the line segment connecting any vector in

is also strictly inside the Pareto frontier. The argument that was used to show

is on the Pareto frontier of

U1o ,

then, applies to the points in this open subset as well, which

establishes that there is an open subset of the Pareto frontier of
of the Pareto frontier of

c, α1r = D(Ao1 ).

containing

α1r

which is a subset

U1o .

Step 2. We now want to show that if
small

U1r

α1r

lay on the Pareto frontier of

We begin by showing that for small

c

U1o ,

the bliss points of

then for suciently

U1r

are the same as

o
for U1 .

Ul (α1cnc ) < Ul (brl ) ⇒ Ul (brl ) − Ul (α1cnc ) = ζl > 0 ⇒ Ul (brl ) − Ul (α1nc ) = ζl − c;

Us (α1cnc ) < Us (brs ) ⇒ Us (brs ) − Us (α1cnc ) = ζs > 0 ⇒ Us (brl ) − Us (α1nc ) = ζs − c.
So, for

c < min{ζs , ζl },

has the same bliss points as

the bliss points of

U1r .

means that the decision from

U1r

grant higher utility than

anc
1 ,

which means that

U1o

As the disagreement point is solely dependent on the bliss point, this

Ar1

will utilize the same disagreement point as the decision from

Finally, the application of Lemma A.2, with

Ao1 .

4ds = 4dl = 0, (Us (α1r ), Ul (α1r )) = (Us (α1o ), Ul (α1o )) ⇒

α1r = α1o .
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Thus, for

c < min{εs , εl , δl , ζl , ζs }, α1r = α1o .

This concludes the case for when

Pareto improvements on all strict mixings between
Now we consider the case where
between

αnnc

and

αnr .

Unnc

αnr .

In this case, the utility vectors induced by the two lotteries must lie on a line

line segment on the Pareto frontier of

Unnc .

and

contains

does not contain Pareto improvements on strict mixings

segment which is a subset of the Pareto frontier of

a distortion of

αnnc

Unnc

U1r .

Unnc .

Similarly, then,

α1cnc

and

α1r

must lie on a

As for the rst part of the proof, this is because

U1r

is

Consider the endpoints of this line segment, and the corresponding lotteries.

Denote these lotteries

g

and

h.

We can then write:

α1r = θr g + (1 − θr )h; α1cnc = θnc g + (1 − θnc )h,
for some values of

θr

and

θnc .

Denote

gl = Ul (g), gs = Us (g), hl = Ul (h), hs = Us (h).

the result of the Nash bargaining solution for

U1r ,

As

α1r

is

and thus maximizes the Nash product, we know

that

(θr gl + (1 − θr )hl − drl )(θr gs + (1 − θr )hs − drs )

−(θnc gl + (1 − θnc )hl − drl )(θnc gs + (1 − θnc )hs − drs ) = εN > 0.
Now we look at the no commitment lottery in

Ao1 ,

nc
cnc
cnc
(Us (anc
1 ), Ul (a1 )) = (Us (α1 ) + c, Ul (α1 ) + c)

= (θnc gs + (1 − θnc )hs + c, θnc gl + (1 − θnc )hl + c) .
Consider the lottery given by

α̃1r =
Intuitively,

α̃1r

1 − θr nc
θr − θnc
g
+
a
1 − θnc
1 − θnc 1

maintains the same relative position as

α1r ,

but is shifted up to the Pareto frontier

nc
that has been expanded by the addition of a1 to the choice set. Now,

(Us (α̃1r ), Ul (α̃1r )) =
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θr − θnc
1 − θr nc
1 − θr nc
θr − θnc
nc
nc
g
+
[θ
g
+
[θ
g
+
(1
−
θ
)h
+
c]
,
g
+
(1
−
θ
)h
+
c]
s
l
s
s
l
l
1 − θnc
1 − θnc
1 − θnc
1 − θnc


=


1 − θr
1 − θr
r
r
c, θ gl + (1 − θ )hl +
c .
θ gs + (1 − θ )hs +
1 − θnc
1 − θnc
r

r

As previously established, if

c < min{ζs , ζl }

then the disagreement points of

U1o

and

U1r

are the

r
same. Now we look at the dierence in the Nash products that result from selecting α̃1 or selecting

anc
1

from

U1o .


1 − θr
c − ds
θ gs + (1 − θ )hs +
1 − θnc
r

r



1 − θr
r
r
θ gl + (1 − θ )hl +
c − dl −
1 − θnc

(θnc gs + (1 − θnc )hs + c − ds ) (θnc gl + (1 − θnc )hl + c − dl ) =



1 − θr
1 − θr
r
r
c θ (gl + gs ) + (1 − θ )(hl + hs ) + 2
c − (dl + ds ) −
1 − θnc
1 − θnc

c (θnc (gl + gs ) + (1 − θnc )(hl + hs ) + 2c − (dl + ds )) + εN .
For suciently low

c,

this dierence is positive, as all terms except

r
means that for suciently low c, α̃1 results in a higher Nash product than
lottery on

anc
1

εN

approach zero.

This

anc
1 , so that a degenerate

cannot be the choice of the agent.

Proof of Lemma 5:

Two cases.

actions committed to vanishes as

If

c > 0,

∆t → ∞ ,

then because the discounted utility received from

and the no commitment action

o
payo utility than all other actions in A1 , for suciently high

t

anc
1

has strictly higher

the utility vector induced by the no

commitment action Pareto dominates all other utility vectors, and the result follows.
If

c = 0,

then

cnc
U (anc
1 ) = U (α1 ).

For

set. Thus, as we know the agent chooses

o
equivalent vectors from U1 , which are

∆t = 0, U1o

αnnc

anc
1 and

at decision

and

n,

Unnc

are all the same utility vector

he must choose some mixture of the

α1cnc . By Proposition 1, increasing the time between

commitment and payo (∆t ) cannot decrease the future payo to the long-term self, meaning that

αno

(the lottery of decision

n

actions induced by

(move up on the Pareto frontier of

o
frontier of U1 from

Unnc ).

α1o )

must weakly improve for the long-term self

But this means that

α1o

must also move up the Pareto

anc
1 , and the result follows.

Proof of Proposition 3 (Minimal Commitment Equivalence):
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First, note that

Am
1

may be

represented as

m
am
1 ∈ A1

[a, b],

with

am
1 ∈ [a, b]

being the minimal action committed to, so that choosing

n

causes the action set at decision

to be limited to

[am
1 , b].

By supposition,

Un ([am
1 , b])

will have a Pareto frontier of pure actions, and so the decision made by the agent in decision

[am
1 , b].

a pure action in

commitment to some
Now, as

Ui (an )

By Lemma 6, then, the commitment to a minimal

am
1

n

is

is equivalent to the

an ∈ [am
1 , b].

is continuous by supposition,

of actions available at decision

n.

Un

varies continuously with the size of the interval

Likewise, as the disagreement point varies continuously with the

bliss points, which vary continuously with

Un ,

the disagreement point varies continuously with the

size of the interval of actions available. Then, as the Nash bargaining solution is continuous with
respect to the disagreement point values, and points on the Pareto frontier, the decision made by
the agent at decision

m
Consider a1

am
1

= b.

n

varies continuously with the size of the interval of actions available.

This limits the action set at decision

continuously, so that the action set at decision

n to [b, b] = {b}.

n, [am
1 , b] is increasing.

m
argument, this continuous decrease of a1 results in decision actions
from

b;

they cannot go above

the set of decision
induced by some

n

b

the same set of decision

n

By the previous continuity

n that vary continuously, starting

since that is the dened maximum action. Varying

actions that result vary from

am
1 ∈ [a, b],

Now consider decreasing

and

am
1

b

to some minimum of

induces no actions outside of

[a0 , b].

actions, and therefore the same decision

have the same commitment cost

c

1

0

a.

am
1

Every

Thus,

Ar1

to

a,

an ∈ [a , b]

is

from

b
0

and

Am
1

create

discounted utilities. As they

by supposition, the result follows.

Proof of Proposition 4 (Pure Temptation):

I will drop the

n subscript here for ease of notation.

First, note that the disagreement point, with or without eort cost added in, can be expressed as a
function of the four bliss point utility values

X s, Y s, X l, Y l.

We can then consider the change in

the disagreement point utilities with respect to a change in the bliss point utility values. Start with
the disagreement point with eort costs added in.


d = (ds , dl ) =
S = Xs − Xl

and

L = Y l − Y s,

Xl +

Lγ+1
S γ+1
s
,
Y
+
S γ + Lγ
S γ + Lγ


.

so that

∂ds
(γ + 1)S γ
S γ+1 γS γ−1
S 2γ + (γ + 1)S γ Lγ
=
−
=
> 0;
∂X s
S γ + Lγ
(S γ + Lγ )2
(S γ + Lγ )2
∂dl
Lγ+1 S γ−1
=
−
< 0;
∂X s
(S γ + Lγ )2

⇒

∂dl
∂Us (D(A))
∂ds
(Ul1 − d1l ) −
(Us1 − d1s ) > 0 ⇒
≥ 0,
s
s
∂X
∂X
∂X s
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with the last from application of Lemma A.2, with the inequality strict if the Pareto frontier is
smooth. Since by supposition there are no Pareto improvements on the original choice, we also have

∂Ul (D(A))
≤ 0,
∂X s
also with the inequality strict if the Pareto frontier is smooth.
Now consider the disagreement point with eort costs added in,


d = (ds , dl ) =

L2γ+1 + (1 − γ)Lγ+1 S γ
S 2γ+1 + (1 − γ)S γ+1 Lγ
s
,
Y
+
X +
(S γ + Lγ )2
(S γ + Lγ )2
l


.

2γ+1
∂ds
(2γ + 1)S 2γ + (1 − γ)(1 + γ)S γ Lγ
+ (1 − γ)S γ+1 Lγ
γ−1 S
=
−
2γS
∂X s
(S γ + Lγ )2
(S γ + Lγ )3

=

S 3γ + (γ 2 + 2)S 2γ Lγ + (1 − γ 2 )S γ L2γ
> 0;
(S γ + Lγ )3

∂dl
γ(1 − γ)S γ−1 Lγ+1
L2γ+1 + (1 − γ)Lγ+1 S γ
=
− 2γS γ−1
s
γ
γ
2
∂X
(S + L )
(S γ + Lγ )3

=

γ(γ − 1)S 2γ−1 Lγ+1 − γ(γ + 1)S γ−1 L2γ+1
< 0;
(S γ + Lγ )3

So, the same reasoning applies.

Proof of Lemma 7:

An increase in

Xs

has two potential eects to consider. One is the alteration

of the disagreement point, and one is the alteration of the Pareto frontier.

Us (D(A)),

as seen in the proof of Proposition 4.

The rst increases

For the second, an increase in

Xs

can expand

the Pareto frontier, but not contract it. The utilities granted by the Nash bargaining solution both
strictly increase if Pareto improvements upon a bargaining outcome are added. Thus, both eects
increase

Us (D(A)).

Proof of Proposition 5:

We drop the

n

subscripts for ease of notation.

As in the proof of

Proposition 4, we look at the eect on the disagreement point of altering the bliss values. Note that

∂L
∂Y s

= −1,

and consider rst the disagreement point with eort costs added in.

∂dl
−(γ + 1)Lγ
γLγ−1 Lγ+1
(S γ + Lγ )2 − (γ + 1)Lγ (S γ + Lγ ) + γLγ−1 Lγ+1
=1+
+ γ
=
s
γ
γ
γ
2
∂Y
S +L
(S + L )
(S γ + Lγ )2
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=

∂ds
γS γ+1 Lγ−1
(1 − γ)S γ Lγ + S 2γ
> 0;
=
> 0.
γ
γ
2
s
(S + L )
∂Y
(S γ + Lγ )2

As the disagreement point improves for both selves, the application of Lemma A.2 is less straightforward than for the proof of Proposition 4.

4ds (Ul (α) − dl ) − 4dl (Us (α) − ds ) < 0 ⇔

γS γ+1 Lγ−1
(1 − γ)S γ Lγ + S 2γ
(U
(α)
−
d
)
−
(Us (α) − ds ) < 0
l
l
(S γ + Lγ )2
(S γ + Lγ )2

⇔ (γSLγ−1 )(Ul (α) − dl ) < ((1 − γ)Lγ + S γ )(Us (α) − ds ) ⇔

Ul (α) − dl
(1 − γ)Lγ + S γ
.
<
Us (α) − ds
γSLγ−1

So,

Ul (α) − dl
(1 − γ)Lγ + S γ
⇒ 4ds (Ul (α) − dl ) − 4dl (Us (α) − ds ) < 0 ⇒
<
Us (α) − ds
γSLγ−1
∂Us (D(A))
∂Ul (D(A))
≤ 0,
≥ 0.
∂Y s
∂Y s

Proposition 5' (Indirect Temptation with original disagreement point):
sion maker choosing

αn

from

An ,

corresponding

Un ,

and consider the eects of altering the utility

granted to the long-term self by the short-term self bliss point:
set of the Pareto frontier of

Un

Yns .

As long as an open connected sub-

containing the Nash bargaining outcome

a subset of the Pareto frontier of

Un ,

Consider a deci-

(Us (αn ), Ul (αn ))

remains

then

L
Ul (αn ) − dl
(Snγ + Lγn )2 + γ 2 Lγn (Snγ − Lγn )
∂Us (D(An ))
∂Ul (D(An ))
∗
<
⇒
≥ 0,
≤ 0,
S γLγn (Snγ + Lγn ) + γ 2 Lγn (Snγ − Lγn )
Us (αn ) − ds
∂Yns
∂Yns

with the reverse strict inequality implying the reverse weak inequalities.

Proof: The proof is the same as that for Proposition 5, other than the derivatives of the disagreement
point values.

∂dl
(2γ + 1)L2γ + (1 − γ)(1 + γ)S γ Lγ
L2γ+1 + (1 − γ)Lγ+1 S γ
=1−
+ 2γLγ−1
s
γ
γ
2
∂Y
(S + L )
(S γ + Lγ )3
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(S γ + Lγ )3 − (S γ + Lγ ) (2γ + 1)L2γ + (1 − γ)(1 + γ)S γ Lγ + 2γL3γ + 2γ(1 − γ)L2γ S γ
=
(S γ + Lγ )3



S 2γ Lγ 2 + γ 2 + S 3γ + S γ L2γ 1 − γ 2
.
=
(S γ + Lγ )3
γ(1 − γ)S γ+1 Lγ−1
S 2γ+1 + (1 − γ)S γ+1 Lγ
∂ds
=−
+ 2γLγ−1
s
γ
γ
2
∂Y
(S + L )
(S γ + Lγ )3

=

−(S γ + Lγ )γ(1 − γ)S γ+1 Lγ−1 + 2γLγ−1 S 2γ+1 + 2γ(1 − γ)S γ+1 L2γ−1
(S γ + Lγ )3

=

(γ − γ 2 )S γ+1 L2γ−1 + (γ + γ 2 )S 2γ+1 Lγ−1
.
(S γ + Lγ )3

So that,



S 2γ Lγ 2 + γ 2 + S 3γ + S γ L2γ 1 − γ 2
∂dl /∂Y s
=
∂ds /∂Y s
(γ − γ 2 )S γ+1 L2γ−1 + (γ + γ 2 )S 2γ+1 Lγ−1

=



L S γ Lγ 2 + γ 2 + S 2γ + L2γ 1 − γ 2
∗
S
(γ − γ 2 )L2γ + (γ + γ 2 )S γ Lγ

=

L
(S γ + Lγ )2 + γ 2 Lγ (S γ − Lγ )
∗
S γLγ (S γ + Lγ ) + γ 2 Lγ (S γ − Lγ )

The rest of the proof follows as for Proposition 5.

Proof of Lemma 9:

Dene

R=

L
S . Then,

wUl (a) + (1 − w)Us (a) > wUl (b) + (1 − w)Us (b) ⇔ w(Ul (a) − Ul (b)) > (1 − w)(Us (b) − Us (a))

⇔ wL > (1 − w)S ⇔ R >

1−w
1
⇔p= γ
<
w
R +1

1

1−w γ
w

+1

,

the last connection from Lemma 1 and A.3.

Proof of Lemma 11:
for suciently large

∆t .

By lemma 4, the ultimate action will shift in favor of the long-term self
This shifted action, in turn, will increase the discounted utility for the

long-term self and decrease it for the short-term self. For suciently large

91

∆t ,

the ratio between

this increase and decrease can be made arbitrarily large, as the short-term self discounts at a faster
rate. Thus, for any weighting of the long-term self 's utility, we can choose
weighted sum will increase.
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∆t

high enough that the

Appendix B: Proofs for Temporal Reference Points Model
Proof of Lemma 1:

First, diminishing impatience. As the agent is information focused, and there

are no new informational updates in a deterministic prospect, there are no temporal reference points
that break up the length of time which the agent discounts over. Thus,

(a, 0) ∼ (b, t1 ) ⇔ u(a) = u(b)D(t1 ),

and

(a, t2 )  (b, t1 + t2 ) ⇔ u(a)D(t2 ) ≤ u(b)D(t1 + t2 ).
So,

(a, 0) ∼ (b, t1 ) ⇒ (a, t2 )  (b, t1 + t2 ) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0, ∀ t1 , t2 > 0 ⇔

u(a) = u(b)D(t1 ) ⇒ u(a)D(t2 ) ≤ u(b)D(t1 + t2 ) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0, ∀ t1 , t2 > 0 ⇔
u(a)/u(b) = D(t1 ) ⇒ u(a)/u(b) ≤ D(t1 + t2 )/D(t2 ) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0, ∀ t1 , t2 > 0 ⇔
D(t1 ) ≤ D(t1 + t2 )/D(t2 ) ∀ t1 , t2 > 0 ⇔ D(t1 )D(t2 ) ≤ D(t1 + t2 ) ∀ t1 , t2 > 0.
For strongly diminishing impatience, similarly,

(a, t1 ) ∼ (b, t2 ) ⇔ u(a)D(t1 ) = u(b)D(t2 ),

and

(a, t1 + t3 )  (b, t2 + t3 ) ⇔ u(a)D(t1 + t3 ) ≤ u(b)D(t2 + t3 ).
So,

(a, t1 ) ∼ (b, t2 ) ⇒ (a, t1 + t3 )  (b, t2 + t3 ) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0,
∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0, ⇔

u(a)D(t1 ) = u(b)D(t2 ) ⇒ u(a)D(t1 + t3 ) ≤ u(b)D(t2 + t3 ) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0,
∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0, ⇔
u(a)/u(b) = D(t2 )/D(t1 ) ⇒ u(a)/u(b) ≤ D(t2 + t3 )/D(t1 + t3 ) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0,
∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0, ⇔
D(t2 )/D(t1 ) ≤ D(t2 + t3 )/D(t1 + t3 ) ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0, ⇔
D(t2 )D(t1 + t3 ) ≤ D(t1 )D(t2 + t3 ) ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0,
with the strict cases following by simply making the inequalities strict at each step. As far as
the relation to the hazard rate when the discounting function is continuously dierentiable, it will
suce to show, that when the hazard rate is decreasing,

D(t2 )D(t1 + t3 ) ≤ D(t1 )D(t2 + t3 ) ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0 ⇔ h0 (t) ≤ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0.
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h0 (t) ≤ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0 ⇔
ˆ

t+γ

⇔
t

−D0 (t + α)
−D0 (t)
≤
∀ t ≥ 0, α > 0
D(t + α)
D(t)

D0 (τ + α)
dτ >
D(τ + α)

t+γ

⇔ [ln(D(τ + α))]t

ˆ

D0 (τ )
dτ ∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0
D(τ )

t+γ

≥ [ln(D(τ ))]t

∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0

⇔ ln(D(t + α + γ)) − ln(D(t + α)) ≥ ln(D(t + γ)) − ln(D(t)) ∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0


⇔ ln

D(t + α + γ)
D(t + α)

⇔




≥ ln

D(t + γ)
D(t)


∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0

D(t + γ)
D(t + α + γ)
≥
∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0
D(t + α)
D(t)

⇔ D(t)D(t + α + γ) ≥ D(t + γ)D(t + α) ∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0
Denote

t1 = t, t2 = t + γ

and

t3 = α ,

⇔ D(t1 )D(t2 + t3 ) ≥ D(t2 )D(t1 + t3 ) ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0.

Proof of Proposition 1:
mation than

B,

Consider two prospects

kIB k − kIA k = 1.

with

A

and

B,

such that

A

does not be denoted by

Let's rst see that

kIB k > 1.

has more grouped infor-

Recall that by denition the prospects have the same time

distribution over outcomes, and let the unique point in time that
at but

A

B

0

gives an informational update

tb .

If not,

IA = {}, which implies that prospect A has no informational

updates, which means it is a deterministic prospect; any non-deterministic prospect necessarily gives
information at some point in the resolution, whether it is before the payout is received, or at the
time the payout is received. Since
means that prospect

B

A

and

B

have the same time

must also be deterministic.

informational update, and so by contradiction

0

distribution over outcomes, this

But this contradicts that prospect

B

has an

kIB k > 1.

Recall that we can write the value of a prospect

A

as

ˆ

A
A
A
A
A
u(α) ∗ 40A (α, t) ∗ D(tA
1 − 0) ∗ D(t2 − t1 ).... ∗ D(tn−1 − tn−2 ) ∗ D tn − tn−1 .

VA =
(α,tn )∈O
Denote by

0 < tb <

tb−1

and

tb+1

as the elements of

TA

and

tB
F , these elements both exist. Further, both
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TB

before and after

TA and TB

tb

respectively.

Because

share these two elements, while only

TB

contains tb . Note that in this case no outcomes can occur at time tb , because both prospects have

the same distribution over outcomes, and thus all times at which outcomes occur must be included
in both

TA

and

TB .

Now consider two types of outcomes.

The rst group are those occurring at or before time tb−1 ; this group may be empty. If not, then
all such outcomes are discounted by the same sequence of discounting multipliers in both prospects,
as both

TA

and

TB

have the same series of elements at and before

tb−1 .

Thus, such outcomes give

the same present value in the calculation of the value of the prospects, and can be ignored in a
comparison of which prospect has the higher value.
The second group are those occurring at or after

A
minimum some outcomes occur at tF

=

tb+1 .

This group is non-empty, because at

tB
F . The discounting given to these elements for prospect

A

will include:

.... ∗ D(tb+1 − tb−1 ) ∗ ....,
while for prospect

B

it will include:

.... ∗ D(tb − tb−1 ) ∗ D(tb+1 − tb ) ∗ ....,
where all discount factors before and after those shown are the same for both prospects, since
and

B,

TB

are the same except for

and thus

B

tb .

TA

Thus, these elements are discounted more heavily for prospect

has a lower value than

A,

if and only if

D(tb − tb−1 ) ∗ D(tb+1 − tb ) ≤ D(tb+1 − tb−1 ).
And

B

Now, if

has a strictly lower value if and only if the inequality is strict.

A ()  B

for any two prospects such that

A has more grouped information than B

kIB k − kIA k = 1, then the present value of prospect A is (strictly) higher than for prospect B .
this is true for any such
such that

τ1 = tb − tb−1

A

and

and

B,

for any positive value of

τ2 = tb+1 − tb ,

τ1

and

τ2

and

Since

we can nd a pair of prospects

so it must be the case that

D(τ1 + τ2 ) (>) ≥ D(τ1 )D(τ2 ) ∀ τ1 , τ2 > 0.
In the other direction, if
prospects, we have

B

D(τ1 + τ2 ) (>) ≥ D(τ1 )D(τ2 ) ∀ τ1 , τ2 > 0,

then for any such pair of

with some elements discounted more heavily, so that

A ()  B.

Now turning attention to the transitive part of the denition of more grouped information. Note
that for any two prospects,

A

and

Z

for which

A

has more grouped information than

Z,

it must be

the case that there is a nite sequence of pairs of prospects, whose magnitudes of their informational
update times dier by only 1, each with more grouped information than the last.
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So,

A

is more

grouped than

B,

grouped than

Z,

Then, if

which is more grouped than
with

C,

which is more grouped than

D...,

which is more

kTB k − kTA k = kTC k − kTB k = kTD k − kTC k = .... = 1.

D(τ1 + τ2 ) (>) ≥ D(τ1 )D(τ2 ) ∀ τ1 , τ2 > 0,

by the reasoning above, each prospect in

the sequence will have a (strictly) lower value than the one before it, so that prospect
(strictly) higher value than prospect
If

A

Z,

will have a

Z.

has a (strictly) higher present value than prospect

mation than

A

Z

whenever

kTZ k − kTA k = 1.

then just consider the cases where

A

has more grouped infor-

Then by the reasoning above,

D(τ1 + τ2 ) (>) ≥ D(τ1 )D(τ2 ) ∀ τ1 , τ2 > 0.
Lemma 1, with the observation that

D(τ1 + τ2 ) (>) ≥ D(τ1 )D(τ2 ) ∀ τ1 , τ2 > 0

if and only if the

agent exhibits (strictly) diminishing impatience completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 2:

Due to Lemma 1, it will suce to show that an information focused

agent exhibits (S)PLDI if and only if
Consider

A, B ∈ P

with

D(τ2 )D(τ1 + τ3 ) (<) ≤ D(τ1 )D(τ2 + τ3 ) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0.

kIA r IB k = kIB r IA k = 1

for less dispersed information. Denote by

TB r TA .

n

0

that satisfy the four direct conditions

the shared index of the unique elements

A

Note the times not shared by the two prospects (tn0 and

0
because if they did, 4A

6=

For any time index but

tB
n0 )

TA r TB

and

cannot support outcomes,

40B , in violation of the third condition of less dispersed information.
n',

I will drop superscript to refer to, for example,

since that time is shared by both

TA

and

TB .

First, outcomes occurring at or before

B
tn0 −1 = tA
n0 −1 = tn0 −1 ,

Now, look at two groups of outcomes.

tn0 −1 ;

this group may be empty.

If not, then all such

outcomes are discounted by the same sequence of discounting multipliers in both prospects, as both

TA

and

TB

have the same series of elements at and before tn0 −1 . Thus, such outcomes give the same

present value in the calculation of the value of the prospects, and can be ignored in a comparison of
which prospect has the higher value.
Second, outcomes occurring at or after

tn0 +1 .

This set is non-empty, because

outcomes will be discounted dierently by the two prospects.
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tn0 +1 ≤ tA
F.

These

In prospect

A,

they will be discounted by

A
... ∗ D(tA
n0 − tn0 −1 ) ∗ D(tn0 +1 − tn0 ) ∗ ....,

in prospect

B,

by

B
... ∗ D(tB
n0 − tn0 −1 ) ∗ D(tn0 +1 − tn0 ) ∗ ....

These outcomes will be discounted more heavily by prospect

B

if any only if

A
A
B
D(tB
n0 − tn0 −1 ) ∗ D(tn0 +1 − tn0 ) ≤ D(tn0 − tn0 −1 ) ∗ D(tn0 +1 − tn0 ).
From the denition of less dispersed information,

A
B
B
min{tA
n0 − tn0 −1 , tn0 +1 − tn0 } < min{tn0 − tn0 −1 , tn0 +1 − tn0 }
Let

A
B
B
τ1 = min{tA
n0 − tn0 −1 , tn0 +1 − tn0 }, τ2 = min{tn0 − tn0 −1 , tn0 +1 − tn0 },

tn0 −1 − τ1 − τ2 .

τ3 = tn0 +1 −

and

Then,

B
A
A
D(tB
n0 − tn0 −1 ) ∗ D(tn0 +1 − tn0 ) ≤ D(tn0 − tn0 −1 ) ∗ D(tn0 +1 − tn0 ) ⇔

D(τ2 ) ∗ D(τ1 + τ3 ) ≤ D(τ1 ) ∗ D(τ2 + τ3 ).
τ2 > τ1 ,

By construction,

τ2 ,

and

τ3 > 0.

being minimums of a split between

must be less than

τ2 ,

A

and

B

tn0 +1

and

tn0 −1 ,

B 's

τ1

and

can be at most half of that distance, and

so strictly less than half. Thus, their sum,

strictly positive. Thus,
for all such

To see why the latter is true, note that each of

τ1 + τ2 < tn0 +1 − tn0 −1 ,

making

τ1
τ3

outcomes, and thus its present value, will be discounted more heavily

if and only if

D(τ2 )D(τ1 + τ3 ) ≤ D(τ1 )D(τ2 + τ3 ) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0,
with

VB < VA

if and only if the inequality is strict.

Turning attention to all possible cases where

A

has less dispersed information than

Z,

note that

for any two such prospects, it must be the case that there is a countable sequence of pairs of prospects
starting with

A

and ending with

Z,

each pair only disjoint by a single element of

less dispersed information than the last. So,
less dispersed information than
dispersed information than

C,

A

I,

and each with

has less dispersed information than

which has less dispersed information than

Z.
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D...,

B,

which has

which has less

D(τ2 )D(τ1 + τ3 ) (<) ≤ D(τ1 )D(τ2 + τ3 ) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0,

Then, if

by the reasoning above,

each prospect in the sequence will have a (strictly) lower value than one before it, so that prospect

A

will have a (strictly) higher present value than prospect

A

If

Z.

has a (strictly) higher present value than prospect

mation than

Z,

then only consider the cases where

reasoning above,

A

and

Z

Z

whenever

A

has less dispersed infor-

are disjoint by one element, and by the

D(τ2 )D(τ1 + τ3 ) (<) ≤ D(τ1 )D(τ2 + τ3 ) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0.

Finally, since having a higher present value is the condition for preference, it is concluded that
for an information focused consumer,
and only if

AZ

whenever

A

has less dispersed information than

Z

if

D(τ2 )D(τ1 + τ3 ) (<) ≤ D(τ1 )D(τ2 + τ3 ) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0.

Lemma 1, with the observation that

D(τ2 )D(τ1 +τ3 ) (<) ≤ D(τ1 )D(τ2 +τ3 ) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0

if and only if the agent exhibits (strictly) strongly diminishing impatience completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 3:

Directly,

A ∼ B ⇔ VA = VB ⇔

ˆ



A
A
A
u(α) ∗ 40A (α, t) ∗ D(r1A − 0) ∗ D(r2A − r1A ).... ∗ D(rn̂(t)
− rn̂(t)−1
) ∗ D t − rn̂(t)
=

(α,t)∈O

ˆ



B
B
B
u(α) ∗ 40B (α, t) ∗ D(r1B − 0) ∗ D(r2B − r1B ).... ∗ D(rn̂(t)
− rn̂(t)−1
) ∗ D t − rn̂(t)
⇔

(α,t)∈O

ˆ



A
A
A
u(α)∗40A (α, t)∗D((r1A +τ )−τ )∗...D((rn̂(t)
+τ )−(rn̂(t)−1
+τ ))∗D (t + τ ) − (rn̂(t)
+ τ) =

D(τ −0)
(α,t)∈O

ˆ



B
B
B
u(α)∗40B (α, t)∗D((r1B +τ )−τ )∗...D((rn̂(t)
+τ )−(rn̂(t)−1
+τ ))∗D (t + τ ) − (rn̂(t)
+ τ) ⇔

D(τ −0)
(α,t)∈O

ˆ
D(r1C − 0)



C
C
C
u(α) ∗ 40A (α, t) ∗ D(r2C − r1C ) ∗ ...D(rn̂(t+τ
−
r
)
∗
D
(t
+
τ
)
−
r
)
n̂(t+τ )−1
n̂(t+τ ) =

(α,t)∈O

ˆ
D(r1D − 0)



D
D
D
u(α) ∗ 40B (α, t) ∗ D(r2D − r1D ) ∗ ...D(rn̂(t+τ
) − rn̂(t+τ )−1 ) ∗ D (t + τ ) − rn̂(t+τ ) ⇔,

(α,t)∈O
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this step from the fact that

ˆ

R(C) = R(A)+τ ∪ {0}

and

R(D) = R(B)+τ ∪ {0},



C
C
C
u(α)∗40C (α, t+τ )∗D(r1C −0)∗D(r2C −r1C )∗...D(rn̂(t+τ
) −rn̂(t+τ )−1 )∗D (t + τ ) − rn̂(t+τ ) =

(α,t+τ )∈O

ˆ



D
D
D
u(α)∗40B (α, t+τ )∗D(r1D −0)∗D(r2D −r1D )∗...D(rn̂(t+τ
−r
)∗D
(t
+
τ
)
−
r
)
n̂(t+τ )−1
n̂(t+τ ) ⇔,

(α,t+τ )∈O

this from the fact that

40X (α, t + τ ) = 40Y (α, t),

whenever

VC = VD ⇔ C ∼ D.
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X

is

τ -shifted

from

Y,

Part V
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